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Editorial: International Year of Statistics 2013  
 
Charles Crothers 
 
Although the International Year of Statistics has not had high visibility in New 
Zealand it is useful to consider the relationship of New Zealand statistics to 
New Zealand sociology. Given that many outsiders still (rather erroneously?) 
consider Sociology as a discipline founded on the methodology of surveys, a 
close relationship might be expected. This editorial will consider: 
‐ the architecture of NZ’s official social statistics system (structures and 
goals) 
‐ the foundation of data-collections 
‐ further processing capabilities 
‐ non-Government statistics 
‐ use of statistics by the New Zealand Sociological community. 
 
Statistics are often in the public eye: they provide excellent and cheap fodder 
for the media. For example, in the week when I began to write this editorial the 
New Zealand Herald ran: 
‐ StatsNZ material comparing household costs over time drawn from 
HES – which goes back to about 1970; 
- Review of the NCEA drawing on studies of a few schools; 
- Results of an NZCER survey of teachers, principals and parents 
concerning their views on the NZCEA standards; and 
- The (dismal for New Zealand) international results from the PISA 
survey. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting development is that the NZ Herald has joined the 
Evening Post in recently hiring a data journalist.1 This upgrades newspapers’ 
capacities to handle data and goes hand in hand with another development of 
data visualisation which advances presentation of statistical material.   
          Early New Zealand interest in social statistics, from the 1920s on, came 
from economists, historians and economic historians. But it could be readily 
                                                            
1 For more general background on data journalism see http://datajournalismhandbook.org/1.0/ 
en/ introduction.html. 
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argued that interest in social statistics emerged in 1970s with a compilation on 
social trends (Statistics, 1977) a UNESCO-commission-sponsored social 
indicators development conference (Cant, Hill and Watson, 1979) and the 
subsequently set-up social indicators unit which produced a Social Indicators 
Survey (1985). Alongside these developments were extensive survey work 
carried out in the health sector and on housing (through the National Housing 
Commission). Also a more sophisticated approach to social demography 
emerged (e.g. Pool, 1986). While most sociologists tended at best to flirt with 
statistics, Thorns and Sedgwick put together a major compilation of historical 
statistics (1997).   
 
The architecture of NZ’s official social statistics system (Structures and 
goals) 
The opportunity-structure for the sociological utilisation of statistics is largely 
set by the government’s Official Statistics System (OSS) which covers (under 
part 1 of the Statistics Act) all agencies that produce official statistics. StatsNZ 
is the main agency and leads in coordinating activity across the OSS. Within 
StatsNZ there is a Cultural and Social Statistics Division headed by one of a 
group of Deputy Statisticians.  It is important to remember that the Government 
Statistician is accorded statutory independence from the Government of the day 
in respect to the formulation of statistics. The Statistics Advisory Council which 
includes representatives (currently Prof. Natalie Jackson from Waikato 
University) can funnel advice from academics. The OSS includes information 
on statistical activities of other government units although this is presently not 
available on their website. 
          An important function of OSS is to develop domain plans for directions 
of statistical developments, which take the particular form of Tier 1 statistics 
which are those prioritized as central in the overall statistical system.2 
 
The Foundation of Data-Collections 
Official statistics include the operational statistical procedures and records of 
many Government departments, particularly those that the public comes into 
contact with (e.g. Police, Inland Revenue, Ministries of Education and Social 
Welfare etc) one general source for locating appropriate data series.3 While such 
                                                            
2 See http://www.statisphere.govt.nz/tier1-statistics.aspx 
3 See http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/o/official-information-your-
right-to-know 
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data tell much about operations sociologists have always had a difficulty in 
establishing the extent to which such information also tells about the wider 
social reality beyond the records kept of those in contact. There are ongoing 
efforts to ensure that the data kept is of high quality and that common protocols 
are used across different government units, but the extent to which internal 
government information can be pressed into social science service still needs 
constant attention and debate.  
          In addition, the state collects information from the wider community. 
Although sociologists might well be interested in data collected on firms (e.g. 
the ‘Business Operations Survey) it is more likely that individual and household 
surveys will have more sociologically pertinent information. The surveys 
currently being deployed by StatsNZ (or that are still fairly contemporary) 
include: 
‐ Census of population and dwellings 
‐ Disability survey 
‐ General social survey (GSS) 
‐ Household economic survey (HES) 
‐ Household labour force survey (HLFS) 
‐ Household use of information and communications 
technology   
‐ Longitudinal immigration survey New Zealand 
‐ New Zealand income survey (NZIS) 
‐ Post-enumeration survey 
‐ Survey of family, income, and employment (SoFIE) 
‐ Te kupenga: survey of Māori Wellbeing 
‐ Time use survey 
‐ Working Life Survey (HLFS) 
 
To these need to be added surveys regularly carried out by other government 
departments. Which include:  
‐ Health Surveys (MOH) 
‐ Crime Victimisation Survey (MOJ) 
‐ Living Standards Survey  (MSD) 
‐ Big City Quality of Life (coalition of Big City Councils). 
In addition, many government departments commission customer service 
satisfaction (or similar) surveys.   
Further processing capabilities 
In addition to collecting and being a repository of social data, StatsNZ provides 
further ‘value-added’ services.  In presenting available sources and services 
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several ‘packages’ have been developed, although these seem to complexly 
interpenetrate. ‘Packages’ include definitions, methods, results, commentaries, 
downloadable tables etc.  and are organized into sections. They interface with 
other packaging which is more closely tied to the vehicles of data-collection. 
Frameworks, relevant to sociologists within which statistics are packaged 
include: 
‐ Social indicators 
‐ People & Communities 
‐ Sustainability indicators. 
Social Indicators(SI) 
The most centrally-located is the recently developed SI page. This is organized 
by some domains which are derived from those used by the OECD and also in 
the MSD Social Report. 
          Under each of these headings there is material – and downloadable tables 
(e.g. including breakdowns by sex, age group, Māori and non-Māori, and by 
OECD country to allow international comparisons – also some regional 
breakdowns). The pages also provide useful further webpages and sources to go 
on to. It might be argued that these pages take over from the previous MSD 
Social Report framework. 
People and communities 
Information about people, the communities people live in, and social themes are 
packaged around a People and Communities theme.  
Sustainability indicators 
Measuring sustainable development allows a broad view to be taken of New 
Zealand’s long-term environmental, economic, and social progress.  Measuring 
New Zealand's Progress Using a Sustainable Development Approach: 2008 
(SNZ, 2009) used 85 indicators to measure New Zealand’s environmental, 
economic, and social progress and assess whether that progress is consistent 
with sustainable development, while Key Findings on New Zealand's Progress 
Using a Sustainable Development Approach: 2010 (SNZ, 2011) updates 13 of 
the 16 key indicators. Social indicators are included. 
Behind the more operational ‘packaging’ of information stand longer-
term frameworks which guide thinking about developments and how these link 
up with goals of statistical collections. “Domain plans” document the expressed 
needs of economic, environmental, and social areas and then indicate the 
statistical activities required to achieve these. “Stocktakes” list and describe 
existing data sources (both within StatisticsNZ and across the Official Statistics 
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System). Other efforts review particular date collection operations from time to 
time.  
Data-linkage projects are now important. One has been the Census-
Mortality data project (NZCMS)4 which has produced some excellent work in 
this epidemiological area. The general methodological point about the linking-
up of different bodies of official information is discussed by Davis (2004). This 
database links administrative and survey data sources and is being used in 
policy evaluation research. An important project is the Integrated Data IDI. 
While the IDI is primarily based on administrative data it also contains a 
number of surveys undertaken by Statistics NZ and other agencies. The 
Government has recently established an Analysis for Outcomes programme that 
uses this resource.5 
          Although a range of downloadable excel data tables are provided (some 
multivariate) especially through the “NZ Stat” website, researchers can also be 
provided with access to ‘unit record’ (i.e. individual) data (despite the strict 
confidentiality provisions regarding privacy).  Some CURFs are available and 
other data-sets are available through the DataLab service (where both data and 
analysis are carried out (under controlled conditions) on SNZ premises.6 In 
addition, StatsNZ produces its own analyses and reports which are scattered 
around its website although some series have been developed. Given the high 
powered statisticians employed by StatsNZ some methodological developments 
have emerged. Some sites both within StatsNZ and in other departments are 
dedicated to presentation of data in user-friendly formats (e.g. MYA Youth 
Indicators, the University of Otago Children’s service) and others. 
 
Non-Government Statistics 
There are a series of regular surveys which have been carried out in New 
Zealand over a considerable period although given the fragility of funding none 
have guaranteed futures, unlike many other jurisdictions where support for 
critical survey operations – and also the necessary support infrastructure - is 
given long-term funding. One example is the ‘General Social Surveys’ (or 
                                                            
4 See http://www.otago.ac.nz/wellington/research/hirp/otago020541.html 
5http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/snapshots-of-nz/integrated-data-
infrastructure.aspx  
6Some research underway is listed on http://www.stats.govt.nz/tools_and_services/microdata-
access/ research.aspx. 
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equivalent) which tap attitudes which are deployed in US, UK, Australia, 
Canada and the European Union. 
          Several academic-based surveys have provided a wealth of data and 
several have made their datasets publically available. In addition to these series, 
other one-off studies have been carried out: 
 
Abbreviated 
Name 
Name Years Periodicity 
NZES  NZ Election 
Survey 
 1987-  3-yearly 
NZVS NZ Values 
Survey 
1985- every 5 years 
ISSP International 
Social Science 
Programme 
1993-2012 annual 
WIPNZ World Internet 
Project NZ 
 2007- every 2 years 
NZ Values 
&Attitudes Study 
 2009- annual 
 
A small array of longitudinal surveys are particularly valuable as they allow 
tracing trends over time and these have produced a vast array of findings: 
Dunedin, Christchurch, AUT’s PIFS, Massey University’s Māori Families 
study and Auckland University’s Growing Up in New Zealand; also the NZCER 
had a panel (for a review see Poland and Legge, 2005). 
          Other series of surveys include Lincoln University series on 
environmental attitudes and, Canterbury University series on attitudes to 
relations with Europe. Of private enterprise market research only UMR’s Mood 
of the Nation has thus far proven to be long-lasting. 
          In an era of ‘big data’ (statistical) sociological attention should not merely 
be confined to orthodox data sources. Savage and Borrows (2007) argue that in 
an age of “knowing capitalism”, sociologists need to consider  the challenges 
posed to their expertise (and the opportunities offered by) the proliferation of 
'social' transactional data which are now routinely collected, processed and 
analysed by a wide variety of private and public institutions. The most obvious 
manifestation of this are spatially-orientated data services such as Mosaic or NZ 
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Posts’ Genius7 which provide profiling of small areas based on a range of data 
(including the census). 
 
Use of Statistics by the New Zealand Sociological community 
Sociological usage of official data has been led by COMPASS which is 
avowedly pro-quantitative in its approach. Compass hosts a network which 
provides statistics coursework and houses a data archive (temporarily under 
reconstruction). Compass’s NZ Data Archive Service has a small collection, but 
has hardly eaten into the large store of surveys which are produced and which 
should be preserved. Many surveys into health sociology issues have been 
mounted and in addition the centre has been active in exploiting census data for 
policy-related uses. 
To provide a portrait of the interconnection between sociology and 
statistics in New Zealand I use articles appearing in pages of New Zealand 
Sociology that either report statistical data or offer a view of where it is being 
used. The material found is stronger on reporting studies published elsewhere 
than studies based on statistics themselves. Several short articles report on 
organizations or programmes which commission surveys (or otherwise utilise 
statistical material): 
 
- Butcher (2009) describes The Asia New Zealand Foundation’s 
research programme which includes commission of surveys to 
regularly monitor attitudes and behaviour (mainly) of New Zealanders 
to Asia,  
- Callister (2011) describes the features of a major study into gender 
which draws on various statistical sources.  
- Cotterell (2009) describes ‘The 'Family, Whanau and Wellbeing 
Project': 2003-2008 which repackages census data on families to 
investigate trends over time in well-being.  
‐ Crothers & Billot (2010) describe the surveys (the local 
component of an international project) developed for The New 
Zealand Internet Project.  
- Davis (2011) Reviews one of several volumes in which historical 
sociologists have investigated class and community in Caversham, 
Dunedin and more generally.  
- Fairweather (2011) describes the TUI research programme into the 
agricultural innovations of farmers 
                                                            
7 http://www.nzpost.co.nz/business/direct-marketing/direct-marketing-products-
services/profiling-analytics-insight/genius 
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- Humpage (2011) overviews her research project into New Zealand 
attitudes to social citizenship in the context of neoliberalism which 
draws in particular on NZES data. 
- Meares et al. (2009) describe a research programme on The 
Economic Integration of Immigrants 
- Perry (2011) describes the several waves of the New Zealand 
Study of Values Survey 
- Smith (2009) reviews the collection edited by Kevin Dew and 
Anna Matheson on health inequalities in which considerable quant 
data is mobilised.  
 
Election surveys are regularly collected before and after each general election 
(and to a more limited extent around local government and other elections). 
Crothers (2004) describes the two main New Zealand research studies while 
Vowles (2010) reviews a follow-up volume. Educational research has produced 
many quantitative studies and the Health sector includes large volumes of data 
collection and analysis. 
          In terms of more substantive studies which have appeared in NZS since 
2000: 
- Crothers (2000) utilizes data from the NZES to investigate Social 
effects of the New Zealand neo-liberal experiment and in particular 
changes over time of the subjective financial situations of households 
- Crothers (2009) uses a range of data to bring to bear public and other 
relevant views to bear on the important policy topic of closing the 
income gap with Australia.  
- Dupuis (1999) investigates ‘What it means to be a 'New Zealander 
using data from an educational survey’s question on ethnicity.  
- Fairburn, Miles & Haslett, S J (2005) The New Zealand social 
structure, 1911-1951: did it become more middle class? New 
Zealand Sociology, 2005; v.20 n.1:p.20-45 
- Gale & Crothers (2011) investigate Māori social wellbeing drawing 
on data from the 2008 General Social Survey. New Zealand 
sociology (Online), 2011; v.26 special issue:p.76-90 
- Hayes (2005) uses census data to investigate the changing 
composition of New Zealand's class structure, 1896-2001.  
- Hoverd & Sibley (2009) use survey data to investigate Religious and 
denominational diversity in New Zealand 
- Hoverd (2008) uses census data to investigate Religious 
demographic change in New Zealand between 1966 and 2006. 
- Humpage (2012) uses NZES data to investigate  Māori and Pasifika 
attitudes towards employment and the unemployed 
New Zealand Sociology Volume 28 Issue 2 2013 
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- Kiro, Von Randow & Sporle (2011) investigate Trends in Māori 
wellbeing over the 1981-2006 period using census data 
 
Although this appears to be a quite considerable collection the journal carried 
few substantive analyses and most accounts are more focused on the research 
program than its results. It also must be noted that the journal has probably 
published more quantitative material than appears on SAANZ Conference 
programmes and that many quantitative contributors are from outside sociology. 
          Little is known about the sociology of statistics in New Zealand. The 
contributors in Crothers (ed., 1986) describe the Uses and limitations of census 
data: recent censuses to 1981. Lowe (1984) provides guidelines for Comparing 
1981 and earlier census data.  Crothers (2007) provides a Finding List of 
Surveys in New Zealand 1995–2007. Crothers, Woodley & Davies (2007) 
investigate the utilisation of official statistics in the Auckland region. 
          The OSS can provide important classificatory schema for key social 
variables used in any survey (this includes material for computer-assisted 
coding). StatsNZ has resources to ensure detailed validity of codes and also 
international linkages. However, there can be a loss of sociological veracity 
given the different concerns of official statisticians – and occasionally their 
need to pay attention to political directions.  
          Social statisticians are often critical of official statisticians and there is 
need for scholarly scrutiny of statistical work. A large debate has swirled 
around questions of ethnic (and to some extent national) identity with a variety 
of datasets being developed and/or pressed into service: one example is Kukutai 
& Callister (2009). (See also McClean, Patterson and Swain (eds.) reviewed by 
Pearson, 2013.) Methodological research into this issue has advanced 
substantive understanding of ethnicity in New Zealand. Some methodological 
work has developed better social measures; e.g. Milne (2012) describes how he 
produced the most recent update in a series to produce a New Zealand Socio-
economic Index (NZSEI-06). 
          Again, UK work on the sociology of statistics – public understanding – 
has not been systematically carried out in NZ- although some unpublished data 
is available. In the UK survey research has revealed a perception gap between 
the public’s view of the state of society and some of the objective evidence. 
This is because people draw on their personal experiences and anecdotal 
evidence to shape their understandings, which then affects broader perceptions 
of society. As a result people are often wrong about social facts but also place 
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little trust and value in statistics. The Statistics New Zealand (2003) Public 
Attitudes Survey examines concerns with privacy etc.  
One emerging user is the Royal Society of New Zealand which is 
currently undertaking a major a major interdisciplinary social science review, 
based on the 2013 census, of the changing New Zealand population, and the 
implications of this for the economy, social cohesion, education, and health.  A 
large network of scholars will be contributing to produce an interdisciplinary 
review of the evidence and current state of knowledge, integrating the 2013 
Census results. The resulting report, to be released midway through 2014, will 
be an overview of the changing New Zealand population and the impact this 
will have on a broad range of areas: 
‐ the composition of our main cities and provincial regions 
‐ the economy and labour market 
‐ health and education 
‐ indigeneity 
‐ our sense of ‘NZ identity’ 
‐ our place in the world. 
 
Conclusions 
Some of the large questions of sociology require to be addressed through (at 
least in part) statistical means. The New Zealand sociological community surely 
needs to be aware of the data available, to critique and contextualise but above 
all the available material and to just as assiduously pursue its own separate 
statistical investigations where warranted. This editorial is not intended to 
valorise statistical information over other forms of data collection and other 
approaches to data analysis, although perhaps some redress and balance is in 
order. Statistical work is more likely carried out in the province of other 
disciplines – economics, geography, psychology, political science, educational 
research.  Sociology seems to have abandoned earlier practises of teaching 
compulsory social statistics papers at undergraduate level and so both staff and 
students are under-equipped. This has been coupled with a lessened concern 
with macro-sociological issues. However, other disciplines retain a statistical 
concern (especially economics and psychology) and the more applied 
disciplines (education, health etc.) have close working relationships with 
schools, hospitals etc in their area of expertise which generated data and calls 
for statistical explanations. But, insufficient attention from sociologists means 
that social data is not always used to best advantage, such as sociology’s 
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concern with differentiation and inequalities and with how the micro is 
connected up with the macro levels of society.  
It is not just the contribution of official statistics to New Zealand 
sociology which we should be pondering but also the bigger concerns around 
application of sociological perspectives and knowledge to official (and other) 
statistics to assist public debate and public policy. In this task sociologists may 
need to engaged in debate those with other statistical agendas.  
How can improvements be made? In other jurisdictions call for better 
statistics training, this also seems to be an issue in NZ although we have no 
body which can readily encourage more statistical training and development of 
this side of the social research enterprise. Until sociologists join the statistics 
game, social data will be left in the hands of other (less sociologically-astute) 
disciplines. 
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Egalitarian Myths in New Zealand: a review of public opinion 
data on inequality and redistribution 
 
Peter Skilling 
 
        Abstract 
Economic inequality in developed western countries, including New 
Zealand, is a pressing social issue. Besides concerns of fairness, 
current high levels of inequality are associated with a range of 
socially damaging consequences. Drawing on new and existing data, 
this article presents a summary and an analysis of New Zealanders’ 
beliefs about economic inequality and political redistribution. It 
explicates and explores some apparent puzzles and paradoxes within 
the data, including the divergence found between respondents’ 
(declining, but still substantial) level of concern about economic 
inequality and their (much more limited) support for specific 
measures that would reduce that inequality. The article discusses 
some key factors that appear to influence opinion on inequality and 
redistribution, and it concludes with suggestions for future research to 
further explore some of the puzzles within the existing data. 
 
Introduction 
Inequalities of wealth and income in western countries, including New Zealand, 
have increased significantly over the last thirty years (OECD, 2008, 2011a; B. 
Perry, 2012). An important aspect of this trend has been the ‘hyperconcentration 
of wealth and income’(Hacker & Pierson, 2010: 15-18): the increasing share 
going to those at the very top of the distribution (Atkinson & Leigh, 2005; Saez, 
2012). This hyperconcentration has received greater public attention recently 
through high-profile public protests – most notably those of the worldwide 
‘Occupy’ movement – and through increased media scrutiny (Collins, 2011; 
Ramesh, 2011)1. Neither has this renewed focus on inequality been restricted to 
voices from the political left. David Cameron, The Economist, the OECD and 
The Financial Times have all raised concerns about some of the consequences 
of rampant inequality.  Public and political disquiet often refers to recent 
scholarly work that has shown the connections between high levels of inequality 
and a wide range of destructive social consequences (Hacker & Pierson, 2010; 
                                                            
1 See also many articles in the Financial Times’ ‘Capitalism in Crisis?’ and the New Zealand 
Herald’s ‘Divided Auckland’ series, both from 2012. 
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Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009), including a decrease in social mobility (Corak, 
2009: 7; Hacker & Pierson, 2010: 28-29; OECD, 2011a: 40; Wilkinson & 
Pickett, 2009: 157-160), an erosion of social trust (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005) 
and an undermining of democratic responsiveness (Bartels, 2008) and (thus, 
perhaps) political legitimacy (OECD, 2011b). 
New Zealand public opinion (see the summaries presented in Edwards, 
2010 and Humpage, 2008) appears to reflect the observations of Peter Taylor-
Gooby in the United Kingdom. Taylor-Gooby (2013: 31, my emphasis) notes 
that ‘during the past thirty years, incomes have grown more unequal, a small 
group at the top has captured a much greater share of resources, and poverty has 
increased’ and yet ‘most people have become … markedly less likely to want 
government to redistribute income or tackle poverty’ (see also Orton & 
Rowlingson, 2007b: 19-23).  Why, despite the apparent harms associated with 
current high levels of economic inequality, do existing empirical studies 
indicate opposition to measures (higher levels of tax and redistributive welfare, 
or greater control of pre-tax incomes, for example) that might ameliorate these 
levels of inequality? This opposition seems particularly puzzling, given a 
plausible expectation in a democratic setting that ‘the decisive swing voter … 
[who] almost invariably has an income lower than the average income in 
society’ would hold a rational self-interest in redistributive policies and greater 
equality (Hacker & Pierson, 2010: 77. On this ‘median voter hypothesis’ see 
also Stiglitz, 2012: 118 and, for a critical discussion, Lind, 2005.) 
Questions of justice in distribution are some of the central questions of 
politics, if we accept Laswell’s (1936) influential definition of politics as the 
question of who gets what, when and how. And while a wide range of data on 
public beliefs about the legitimacy of economic inequality exists – large-N 
surveys including the three-yearly New Zealand Election Study (NZES, from 
1990-2011), the New Zealand Study of Values (NZSV, 1998, 2004 and 2008), 
relevant modules of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP, 1992, 
1999, 2006 and 2009) and the one-off New Zealand Attitudes and Values 
Survey (NZAVS, 1986) all contribute to an understanding of public opinion – 
the data are patchy, with the wording of some questions changing over time, 
and some key questions not repeated at all. Further, despite the important 
contributions discussed below, these data have remained under-analysed and 
under-reported.  Given that inequality – which affects the life chances of 
individuals and groups, and which is correlated with significant social harms - is 
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a supremely important social issue, this gap in the local knowledge base 
represents a serious democratic deficit.  
This article summarises and synthesises existing data on New Zealanders’ 
opinions about the legitimacy of economic inequality and of political 
redistribution, supplementing this existing data with new data from the 2011 
New Zealand Justice and Equality Study (N=363).2 It analyses the available 
data to fill important gaps in our understanding of (1) how New Zealanders’ 
beliefs and opinions have changed over time and of (2) the major factors that 
might explain variations in opinions about inequality and redistribution. In 
doing so, the article identifies and explores some important puzzles and 
paradoxes within public opinion on these issues. It focuses on questions on 
which the data is unclear or contradictory and notes moments of uncertainty 
relating to the wording of questions. The analysis also finds varying levels of 
support for four well-established hypotheses that purport to explain variations in 
beliefs about inequality and redistribution and notes. The article argues that the 
ambiguities and contradictions evident in the data are important and valuable, in 
that they highlight areas in which further research – and careful theorising - is 
needed.  
While the analysis is chiefly empirical, the article’s concerns are also 
methodological and normative. Having contributed to a fuller presentation of 
what (we think) we know about public opinion about inequality and 
redistribution in New Zealand, it notes the inherently limited capacity of large-
N surveys to explore the reasoning and values that lie behind people’s stated 
opinions. The article concludes, therefore, by considering the methodological 
question of how we can best ascertain what – to put it provocatively - people 
really think about these complex issues. These questions of practical 
epistemology are related to a more explicitly normative question: if cogent 
arguments can be built to the effect that existing levels of inequality are (a) 
socially destructive and/or (b) at least partially undeserved, then why do these 
arguments seem to be so under-represented in public opinion about potential 
redistributive mechanisms? Drawing on examples of innovative studies 
overseas, the article concludes by pointing towards a research agenda better able 
                                                            
2 The NZJES drew on a semi-randomised sample of the New Zealand population based on 
the electoral roll. Compared to the larger-N surveys listed above, the NZJES had a narrower 
focus on respondents’ attitudes towards economic inequality and redistribution. The survey 
was conducted online with a hard-copy option and was conducted with the financial support 
of the research grant AUT-RP2011-8. The data-set is available on request from the author. 
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to explore how people construct and justify their beliefs about the legitimacy of 
economic inequality and political redistribution. 
 
Context and Method 
The basic and well-known story of economic inequality in New Zealand since 
the 1980s (see Figures 1a and 1b3) is of a rapid increase in inequality between 
the mid-1980s and the mid-90s, followed by a levelling off after the mid 1990s 
and then a slight decrease since the early-mid 2000s. The rapid increase in 
inequality from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s was noteworthy in international 
terms (Humpage, 2008; OECD, 2011a), and it was associated with a range of 
negative social outcomes (James, 1997).The changes illustrated in Figures 1a 
and 1b were the logical and predictable result of changes in domestic policy 
settings as well as changes in the global political economy. The increase in 
inequality after 1986 was associated with radical policy reforms that included a 
reduction in tax and benefit rates, reduced public spending and the privatization 
of state assets (Kelsey, 1995; Easton, 1997); the levelling off after 2000 with 
policy changes in the taxation and state housing areas, and the Working For 
Families programme. 
Changes in policy settings in the 1980s and ‘90s (and the associated 
increases in inequality) were justified as being necessary if New Zealand was to 
compete in an increasingly globalised economy (see NZ Treasury, 1984: 110, 
317). They were also supported, at the level of political language, by an 
insistence on the necessity and desirability of individual responsibility and 
reward. The National-led governments from 1990-99 adopted a strong 
‘discursive focus on individual culpability’ (Humpage, 2011: 83), while the 
Labour-led governments from 1999-2008 were more ambiguous. These latter 
administrations argued for a more active role for government, with Helen Clark 
(2000) stating that ‘[p]ure market forces … haven’t delivered the goods. The 
gaps just get bigger.’ Their focus, however, was on reducing ‘disadvantage’ and 
                                                            
3 Two measures are used. P90/P10 gives the ratio between the values at the top of the 90th and 
the 10th percentile, a ratio that ‘provides a good indication of the full spread of the 
distribution, going as far as possible to the extremes without running the risk of being overly 
influenced by unrepresentative very high incomes or by the difficulties with bottom decile 
incomes’ (B. Perry, 2012:. 84). The Gini co-efficient is a measure widely used internationally 
that ‘gives a summary of the income differences between each person in the population and 
every other person in the population’ (B. Perry, 2012: 86). In both cases that values are 
calculated after deducting housing costs, which results in a wider dispersion of incomes 
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amount of wealth inequality in their country and (2) preferred a situation even 
more equal than their erroneous estimate. 4  Given a choice between the 
distribution of wealth in the United States and in Sweden (the distributions were 
not labelled as such) 92% of American respondents preferred the (relatively 
equal) Swedish distribution. Tellingly, 77% of respondents preferred a system 
of absolute equality to the (highly unequal) US distribution. Strictly comparable 
data is not available for New Zealand, but ISSP questions in 2009 on the 
preferred ‘shape of New Zealand society’ (see Gendall & Murray, 2010: 3) 
suggest a similar picture. Given a choice of six shapes, most respondents 
preferred a society with most people in the middle, but believed society to be 
more like a pyramid, with a small elite at the top. This belief, in turn, appears to 
underestimate the actual extent of wealth inequality and concentration in New 
Zealand (Cheung, 2007: 6-8; B. Perry, 2012: 46). 
Taken together, these figures present something of a puzzle. Between 
1986 and 2004, income inequality increased sharply, as did levels of poverty 
(Perry, 2012) and the share of national income accruing to those at the very top 
of the income distribution (Atkinson & Leigh, 2005. See also The World Top 
Incomes Database, 2013). In this context, one might expect to see increased 
discomfort with inequality and increased support for ameliorating inequality, 
since the benefits of increasing inequality are clearly not widely shared. But the 
available data, as we have seen, refute these expectations. Further, the 
possibility that people grudgingly accept inequality as an evil that is necessary 
to ‘ensure national economic prosperity’ is not supported by the data. The 2008 
NZES found only 17.6% support for this proposition, with 42.9% disagreeing.5 
Presumably, there are many who either (a) do not see themselves as benefiting 
from redistributive policies or (b) have been persuaded that inequality, while 
unfortunate for some (and perhaps even unfortunate for themselves) is morally 
justified as the result of differential individual effort, ability or contribution. 
Certainly, the data show a growing acceptance of the doctrine of 
individual responsibility. NZSV data from 1998 and 2004 (Collins, 2006) show 
                                                            
4 Norton and Ariely’s findings in the United States formed the basis for a widely-viewed 
video animation, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPKKQnijnsM 
5 Note, however, figures presented in NZ Listener (2010: 15), where disagreement with the 
proposition that ‘large income differences are necessary for New Zealand’s economic 
prosperity’ appears to have halved from 60% in 1992 to 32% in 2010. The 2010 figure, 
however, comes from a UMR Research survey and it is not possible to tell if the questions 
asked were directly comparable. 
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a marked increase (from 50% to 73%) in those agreeing that the needy in New 
Zealand are poor due to their individual and rectifiable failings: specifically, due 
to their ‘laziness and lack of willpower’.6 These findings are broadly supported 
by the 2011 NZJES data, which find 64% of respondents believing that the 
poorest 10% of New Zealanders were often or very often in that position 
because of their own ‘lack of effort’, and 55% believing that an individual lack 
of talent was often or very often a factor. Much lower proportions believed that 
the position of the poor was often or very often due to undeserved social factors, 
such as a lack of equal opportunity (35%), discrimination (32%) or bad luck 
(19%). At the other end of the distribution, slightly higher numbers accepted the 
deservingness of the richest 10% of New Zealanders, with 72% agreeing that 
their wealth was often or very often due to their individual talent or ability. Far 
fewer people believed that luck (35%) or being born into a wealthy family 
(26%) were factors often or very often. 
Again, it is important to stress that the data do not support the conclusion 
that New Zealanders have become unconcerned with inequality, or implacably 
hostile towards redistribution. As we have already seen, there remains a clear 
(though diminished) majority who feel that income differences are too large. 
The 2011 NZJES found 81% support for the proposition that the government 
should ‘reduce levels of poverty’. And while the data show declining support 
for assistance for the unemployed (see Edwards, 2010: 4) the NZES 2011 
continued to show a majority (53%) agreeing that it was the government’s 
responsibility to ensure ‘decent living standards for the unemployed’, with 39% 
disagreeing. As Paul Perry notes (in Collins, 2006: A3), while support has 
grown for the principle of individual responsibility, most New Zealanders still 
support increased government spending on areas strongly correlated with 
inequality, such as health, education and housing. Indeed, Humpage’s (2008: 
222-223) synthesis of the existing data sources show that increased state 
spending on health (not just stable, but increased public spending) has 
consistently been supported by strong majorities (typically 80% and above) with 
similarly robust (albeit slightly lower) numbers endorsing increased spending 
on education (see Figure 4, below). In both cases, a decrease in government 
spending was never advocated by more than two per cent of respondents.7  
                                                            
6 The only other alternative offered in this question was that ‘they are poor because society 
treats them unfairly’. 
7 Except in the 2011 NZES where support for a decrease in spending had jumped to 2.3% (for 
health) and 2.5% (education) 
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spending in certain areas, such as health and education. If, as the data suggest 
(see Figure 3), many New Zealanders are uneasy with existing high levels of 
inequality but simultaneously opposed to policies of direct redistribution, it may 
be that a belief in equality of opportunity can help resolve this apparent tension. 
Those holding this sort of a view might reason that there is indeed too much 
inequality, but that inequality - seen as the result of differential effort and ability 
- ought to be rectified not by government action but by greater individual effort 
on the part of the poor. Inequality in New Zealand is seen here as best addressed 
not through direct redistribution but through the creation of conditions in which 
individuals - from whatever background – can rise or fall on the basis of their 
own abilities and effort. 
The intuitively appealing notion of equality of opportunity has been 
popular in political discourse in recent decades. I would argue that its resonance 
is long-standing, and that the ideal of equality of opportunity is an accurate 
summation of New Zealand’s historical “egalitarian myth”. Andrew Sharp 
(1997: 195) puts the point bluntly: ‘Equality of opportunity and unequal 
rewards based on past performance: these, in the Pākehā ideology, constituted 
justice.’ A large component of the egalitarian strand in the national imagination 
has always been the insistence that New Zealand really is a class-less society, 
and that a beneficent centralised state really does work to the benefit of all, such 
that no-one is truly disadvantaged in New Zealand (see Sharp, 1997: 194-226 
for a development of this point). The egalitarian myth (Nolan, 2007; Olssen, 
1995) and a certain settler pride in the absence of an overt class structure 
(Willmott, 1989) have found ongoing expression in ‘complacent and reassuring’ 
national narratives that offered the ‘warm, comforting assurance of the 
benevolent state’ (McHugh, 1999: 103).   
Critics, of course, have long seen the trope of equal opportunity as a 
rhetorical move that elides the significance of actual inequalities in wealth and 
power (see Stiglitz, 2012: 116 and Taylor-Gooby, 2011:466). John Schaar 
(1967: 233, 237) argues that equality of opportunity offers no more than the 
freedom to become unequal and that, in its profound individualisation, it ‘breaks 
up solidaristic opposition to existing conditions of inequality by holding out to 
the ablest and most ambitious members of the disadvantaged groups the 
prospect of individual success and advancement’ (Schaar, 1967: 237). Sharp 
(1997: 220), noting that people do not have ‘abstract “opportunity” or 
“freedom” but concrete things like houses and incomes and capital and cars and 
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school buildings and teachers and computers’ argues that the distinction 
between opportunity and outcome is tenuous at best. It is a great strength of 
Max Rashbrooke’s (2013) edited collection to develop these points and – 
especially in the chapters dealing with inequalities in terms of housing, 
education and imprisonment – to demonstrate the ways in which unequal 
opportunities are entrenching unequal outcomes. While the trope of the New 
Zealand “egalitarian myth” is typically used to allude to inequalities of 
outcome, these chapters show how visions of New Zealand as a land of equal 
opportunities can also be classified as myth. 
Despite these critiques, the support illustrated in Figure 4 for increased 
public spending on health and education shows that New Zealanders endorse 
the ideal of providing equal opportunities. The puzzle here is that the public are 
increasingly willing to hold people individually responsible for their own 
outcomes,10 while simultaneously believing that more needs to be done (that is, 
that public spending in key areas needs to be increased) to make the ideal of 
equal opportunity a meaningful reality. 
 
Relationships between variables: Why do people think as they do? 
The data we have surveyed thus far has thrown up a series of puzzles. Why, 
when most people would appear to benefit from greater redistribution, is there 
so little support for such policies? Why are there 20% of respondents who are 
uncomfortable with existing levels of inequality but simultaneously opposed to 
political redistribution? Why are there respondents who are committed to 
individual responsibility but simultaneously supportive of increased state 
spending in certain areas? Why, given cogent critiques of the notion of 
“equality of opportunity” has it become such a widely-endorsed principle? 
Referring to a range of authors, Humpage (2008:  227) notes that 
‘contradictions in public opinion are not necessary the result of “illogical” 
thinking but rather demonstrate how “the public” draw upon conflicting sets of 
traditions and moral repertoires when thinking about political issues’ (see also 
Orton & Rowlingson, 2007b: 26-27). It is not necessary, in other words, to 
conclude that respondents are confused or mistaken when they hold what appear 
to be two contradictory views.  
                                                            
10 Recall that in 2004, 73% of New Zealanders believed that the poor were needy due to their 
own laziness and lack of willpower (Collins, 2006, p. A3) 
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A great deal appears to turn on how questions are framed and – more 
broadly – on how respondents draw connections between competing 
considerations. Lelkes (2009: 21-22), for example, observes that the apparent 
broad consensus in Europe in favour of inequality reduction weakens when 
preference for such redistribution is explicitly set in opposition to the role of 
inequality in offering incentives for individual effort. Bartels (2005: 15), 
meanwhile, notes that Americans, while concerned about economic inequality, 
‘largely failed to connect inequality and public policy.’ Consequently, while the 
American public viewed increasing inequality as a “bad thing”, opinion polls 
found ‘high levels of public support’ for tax cuts that Bartels (16) describes as a 
‘massive additional government-engineered transfer of wealth from the lower 
and middle classes to the rich.’ 
In the following section, I explore this question of why people think as 
they do about inequality and redistribution. To do so, I approach the data in a 
slightly different way, exploring the correlations between selected variables to 
test four well-established hypotheses that purport to explain variations in beliefs 
about inequality and redistribution. As part of this analysis, I note where further 
empirical analysis is required, before returning, in a more normative and 
methodological vein, to a consideration of the limitations inherent in the 
existing data, and an argument for supplementary ways of generating data on 
people’s beliefs and opinions. 
Hypothesis 1 (the self-interest hypothesis): support for redistributive 
policies is (negatively) related to one’s income 
It is a basic assumption of neo-classical economics (and certain strands of 
political philosophy) that people are fundamentally rational utility maximisers: 
that they develop preferences and strategies based on a calculation of their own 
self-interest (but see Jasso, 1989; Lelkes, 2009: 20; Orton & Rowlingson, 
2007b: 29-39). Certainly, this is the basic assumption underpinning the “median 
voter” hypothesis discussed above. From this starting point, we might expect 
that wealthy individuals would support lower rates of taxation and welfare, 
while poorer individuals would support a more generous system of 
redistribution. The analysis below tests the correlation between income and 
attitudes towards inequality using household income. Bryan Perry (2012:. 26) 
sets out the case for using ‘equivalised disposable household income’, defined 
as ‘disposable household income … adjusted for household size and 
composition’ as the best ‘proxy measure of a household’s material wellbeing or 
living standards.’ It is acknowledged that there are limitations in respect of the 
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greater tax payments) for reasons of (a) fairness, (b) long-term economic growth 
(Stiglitz, 2012: 85-104) and/or  (c) social cohesion (OECD, 2011b), where the 
later two reasons might be seen as working to the self-interest of all, including 
the wealthy. Similarly, the survey results are of little use in understanding how 
low-income individuals balance considerations of their own self-interest, given 
the competing claims of immediate self-interest (that might support higher 
levels of tax and redistribution) and arguments for the desirability of existing 
levels of inequality couched in the language of long-term self-interest 
(arguments based on, for example, incentive effects, economic necessity or the 
assumption (Alesina & Ferrara, 2005) that one might oneself be a high-income 
individual at a later stage.) Further analysis of the data might profitably take on 
the task of investigating the ways in which people make sense of competing 
arguments to arrive at and justify their opinions. 
Hypothesis 2 (individual responsibility): support for redistributive policies 
is related to judgments about the deservingness of welfare recipients 
This hypothesis is, perhaps, the most intuitively compelling of the four 
considered here. It seems highly likely that opinion on redistributive policies 
will be closely correlated with one’s belief about the deservingness of those 
who will receive the direct benefit of such policies. In his work on 
deservingness criteria, Wim van Oorschot (2007: 36) argues that judgments 
regarding the deservingness of welfare recipients are largely based on 
perceptions of (1) their responsibility for, or their control over their neediness, 
(2) their objective level of need, (3) the extent to which they are seen as sharing 
a common identity with “us”, (4) their docility, gratefulness or attitude towards 
the support they receive, and (5) their proven or potential capacity for 
reciprocity vis-à-vis that support. In line with earlier findings in the U.S., van 
Oorschot’s (2007, 38) work with Dutch respondents found control to be the 
most important criterion, followed by identity and reciprocity. 
        As an initial proxy for deservingness, I used the NZES 2008 question 
‘why, do you think, there are people in New Zealand who live in need?’ 
(possible answers: ‘because of laziness and lack of willpower’ and ‘because of 
an unfair society’ 11 ) and a similarly worded question in the 2004 NZSV, 
because they relate directly what van Oorschot (2007: 38) calls the core 
question of the criterion of control, viz. ‘why are you needy?’  
                                                            
11 In both cases, the stark and rather limiting nature of the choices generated a high response 
in the third, residual category (neither or don’t know). 
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profitably explore why people increasingly consider the poor to be individually 
responsible for their situation, when cogent arguments can be made for 
structural causes of need (Taylor-Gooby, 2013), and when many negative 
opinions about welfare recipients and the welfare system in general are not well 
supported by available data (Centre for Labour and Social Studies, 2013). 
       Given that redistributive policies inevitably effect the rich as well as the 
poor (Rowlingson & Connor, 2010: 2), given Bamfield and Horton’s (2009: 39) 
finding of strong support – post the Global Financial Crisis – for both higher top 
tax rates and curbs on executive compensation, and given Kuziemko et al.’s 
(2013) finding that provision of information had a large positive effect on 
support for the estate tax, further research might profitably explore public 
attitudes to the deservingness of the rich (see Orton & Rowlingson, 2007a; 
Rowlingson & Connor, 2010). As Robert Wade (2013: 51) notes, recent trends 
in the concentration of wealth and income ‘should have prompted a large body 
of social science research and public debate about the question: “When are the 
rich too rich?”’ 
Hypothesis 3 (generalised social trust): support for redistributive policies is 
based on trust in other people in society. 
Many authors (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; 
Uslaner, 2002) have noted the vital role of social trust in the functioning of 
societies and markets. Eric Uslaner (2008: 290) argues more specifically that 
what is really important is ‘generalised social trust’, which relates to people 
‘you do not know’ and represents ‘a belief that other people, especially people 
unlike yourself, are part of your moral community’ (see also Uslaner, 2002). 
Robert Putnam (2001, cited in Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009: 55) discusses the 
relationship between social trust and economic inequalities, arguing that ‘the 
causal arrows are likely to run in both directions, with citizens in high social 
capital states likely to do more to reduce inequalities, and inequalities 
themselves likely to be socially divisive.’ 
Bo Rothstein and Uslaner (2005: 43) accept the mutually reinforcing 
relationship between inequality and low levels of social trust (there, is they say, 
‘little reason to believe that countries with low social trust will establish 
universal social programs precisely because such programs must be based on a 
general political understanding that the various groups in society share a 
common fate’). They argue however, that the causal ‘direction goes from 
inequality to trust but not [directly] the other way around’ (Rothstein & Uslaner, 
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2005: 48). Inequality, they write, ‘is the strongest determinant of generalized 
trust over time in the United States and across the American states.’12 The basic 
argument is that inequality undermines both generalised trust and support for 
collective action, as different parts of society come to feel they have little to do 
with each other (Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Larsen, 2008; Stiglitz, 2012: 82).  
It is surprising, therefore, that the relationship between generalised trust 
and support for economic redistribution (as illustrated in Figure 7, below) is 
weak. As proxies for generalised social trust, I took responses from four 
different surveys to the question of whether people were seen as trustworthy. I 
then checked the relationship between these responses and support for the 
proposition (worded in slightly different ways) that ‘we should tax rich people 
more and redistribute income and wealth to ordinary people’ (NZES, 2005). 
While the numbers vary across the four surveys (a function, perhaps, of 
different question wordings13 - among other differences, the NZES and NZSV 
surveys offered ‘most people can be trusted’ as the first option, the ISSP and 
NZJES surveys offered ‘most people will take advantage’ first) it is striking that 
they all suggest that generalised social trust has no significant positive impact 
on support for redistribution. The lack of support for this hypothesis may appear 
surprising. Intuitively, support for redistribution would appear to imply a belief 
that others can be trusted with this redistributed wealth. However, a lack of 
social trust might also imply less trust in the wealthy, who might not be seen as 
deserving, or as able to be trusted with the powers and freedoms associated with 
wealth. In that sort of impasse, a lack of generalised social trust might  
potentially lead some respondents to want the government to “sort it out”. This, 
in turn, might be traced in cultural-historical terms back to Bruce Jesson’s 
(1999) notion of New Zealand as a hollow society, lacking the institutions of 
civil society that mediate between the state and the individual, and to McHugh’s 
(1999: 103) notion of complacent national narratives of the ‘benevolent state’. 
 
                                                            
12 They note (p. 52) with some puzzlement that ‘of [Putnam’s] seven policy prescriptions for 
increasing social capital in the U.S., none touches upon increasing any form of equality.’ 
13 It is on the issue of social trust, incidentally, that the effects of question wording are most 
noticeable. In the 1993 NZES, for example, 57% of respondents (presented with a 5-point 
Likert scale) agreed that ‘most people would try to take advantage of others’. At the same 
time (i.e. in the same survey, 3 questions later), 64% agreed that ‘most people can be trusted’. 
On this latter question, only 19% disagreed that most can be trusted. This figure of 19% still 
held in 1999 (still using a 5-point scale), but it jumped to 50% in 2002 (and 54% in 2005) 
when (in both years) respondents were presented with a binary option. 
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Perhaps one reason why some people lack trust in the government is because 
they believe that it is not doing enough to discharge its perceived responsibility 
to reduce inequalities and poverty. This hypothetical might well be another 
profitable starting point for further analysis. 
A methodological question: How do we know what people (really) think? 
There is much, then, to be learned by analysing and reflecting on public opinion 
data regarding attitudes to inequality and redistribution. The data show us 
important changes in opinion over time, and offer suggestive insights into why 
some people think as they do. As we have noted, however, the data also leave us 
with a set of puzzles and paradoxes. Why did discomfort with inequality decline 
as actual inequality increased? Why do people who might benefit from greater 
equality oppose redistributive measures? Why has empathy for the poor 
decreased even as the level of poverty has risen? It is not my intention here to 
label these responses as irrational. These are complex issues, and responses 
appeal to multiple considerations of fact and value. There are many plausible 
ways in which one might reconcile, for example, a belief that there is too much 
inequality with a simultaneous opposition to concrete redistributive measures. 
One might invoke an over-riding moral belief that inequalities – while 
unfortunate for others, for society and (perhaps) even for oneself - are 
ultimately the fair result of differential effort and contribution (Deutsch, 1975; 
Miller, 1992). Or, one might hold that the values of individual liberty and 
economic efficiency preclude the value of social equality. 
Nevertheless, these puzzles in the data suggest the utility of two 
complementary paths for future research. Firstly, they suggest the need for more 
– and more sophisticated – quantitative analysis. Further research might explore 
– as discussed above – the relationships between income, education and 
redistributive preferences. Or, in exploring the self-interest hypothesis, it might 
focus not on existing income but on assumptions of future income (see Alesina 
& Giuliano, 2009: 15-16). Alternatively, it might follow international research 
and focus on the role of information in the forming of beliefs by investigating 
the impact of the holding of factually incorrect beliefs (Gilens, 2001) about 
welfare spending (Centre for Labour and Social Studies, 2013) or the impact of 
redistributive measures on one’s own outcomes (Bartels, 2005; Kuziemko, 
Norton, Saez & Stantcheva, 2013). Or it might follow recent experimental 
psychological work in exploring the influence of the psychological motivation 
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to believe in the basic fairness of one’s own society (Jost & Major, 2001; 
Napier & Jost, 2008). 
Regardless of the sophistication of quantitative analysis, however, survey 
data, is inherently limited in its capacity to understand how people arrive at and 
justify their opinions. While large-N surveys are indispensable for ‘revealing 
[public] attitudes’, they are poorly suited for ‘exploring what motivates them’ 
(Bamfield & Horton, 2009: 5. See also Dryzek, Goodin, Tucker, & Reber, 2009; 
Lepianka, Van Oorschot, & Gelissen, 2009; Swift, Marshall, Burgoyne, & 
Routh, 1995). And so a second important avenue for future research lies in 
developing a research programme that responds to Adam Swift’s (1999: 360) 
call for attention to ‘the mechanisms by which [people’s justice beliefs] are 
formed.’ Future research might profitably employ a research design that (1) 
actively engages research participants in a process of informed and reflective 
deliberation and that (2) attends to the constitutive influence of elite discourse in 
the formation of public opinion. This sort of approach informs my own current 
three-year Marsden-funded research project which is aligned with Bamfield and 
Horton’s (2009: 5) aim of investigating ‘some of the underlying drivers of 
[public] attitudes’. This project works intensively with a relatively small 
number of participants, allowing them to define key issues on their own terms, 
and to explore the reasons by which they link their beliefs and their policy 
preferences. 
Focussing on processes of interpretation and argumentation, the project 
works to identify and analyse the discourses that people deploy to make sense 
of the complex issues of inequality, fairness and redistribution. The contention 
here is that most existing analyses of the public’s attitudes towards the 
redistribution of wealth have paid insufficient attention to the constitutive 
influence of elite discourse, including the representations of political, business 
and media elites and power relations within society (see Schneider & Jacob, 
2005; Schmidt, 2010). There is a need to supplement the insights generated by 
existing research with an exploration of the potentially distorting influence on 
public opinion of the self-interested perspectives of powerful social actors (see, 
among others Edelman, 1977; Fairclough, 1992; Fischer, 2003; Olson & Hafer, 
2001; Zaller, 1992) and the capacity of informed and engaged deliberation to 
alleviate such distortions (Fischer, 2009).  
Existing survey data stands as a record of public opinion on the 
legitimacy of economic inequality and of various redistributive measures. In 
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forming their opinions, respondents have, presumably, drawn on their 
understanding of relevant facts and values. They have been persuaded, perhaps, 
by certain arguments, and influenced – knowingly or not – by certain framings 
of the issues present in the public sphere. But holding one opinion, and being 
persuaded by one set of arguments implies rejecting other alternative opinions 
and arguments. While it is vital to understand public opinion as it is, research 
might also – for both academic and practical reasons - explore why other facts, 
other values and cogent counter arguments were not found persuasive or 
compelling. Why, for example, are the poor increasingly held to be individually 
responsible for their own outcomes, when alternative, structural explanations 
might appear salient in the context of economic downturns and the exigencies of 
the globalised ‘competition state’? (Cerny, 1997). Why does the individualistic 
trope of ‘hard-working New Zealanders … [getting] ahead from their own 
effort’ (see Brash, 2005: A12) appear so much more widely-resonant than 
collectivist accounts of the ‘unearned, socially created aspects’ of wealth 
creation (Rowlingson & Connor, 2011: 11)? 
Some existing work has articulated a more explicitly normative or 
practical dimension. In his exploration of the link between public opinion and 
political philosophy, Adam Swift (1999: 360) writes of the need to understand 
how people’s justice beliefs are formed and, therefore, how they might be 
changed. And against the backdrop of increasing inequality in the UK, one of 
the key objectives of Bamfield and Horton’s (2009: 5) study was to ‘investigate 
how a public consensus can be built around tackling inequality.’ Further 
research, of course, must remain committed to respecting people’s opinions. 
The risk of privileging the perspective and the position of the researcher must 
be acknowledged and addressed. Still, given the criticism that opinion surveys 
tend to measure ‘passive, individualistic and reactive’ opinion (Dryzek, 1990: 
172), an argument remains for exploring the influence that informed, reasoned 
and reflective deliberation have on the political opinions that people espouse.  
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Abstract  
Social work in New Zealand is currently in the midst of a major 
professionalization project with moves towards greater occupational 
closure, higher entry standards and greater oversight of education.  
Contradictions between the stated social justice focus of social work, 
its space in the intersection of personal lives and public institutions 
and the search for greater recognition emerge. There are complex 
links between perceived status of social work within complex 
institutional settings and the aspirations of practitioners. Bourdieu’s 
(1984) concept of a ‘distinctive space’ proves useful in exploring the 
construct of professional capital in social work in New Zealand.  
 
Introduction 
This article develops an understanding of  professional capital in social work 
following a qualitative study of New Zealand social workers’ involvement in 
continuing education in which raising the status of their profession emerged as a 
motivation for career development (reported in Beddoe,  2010; 2011; 2013). 
The findings of that study revealed social workers conceptualising scholarship 
and research as in part seeking the means to increase the professional capital of 
their profession. The journey starts with a conceptualization of social work as 
uniquely placed in the fabric of social policy; in an intermediary zone between 
service users of health and welfare services and the large bureaucracies that 
maintain them. Social workers and other stakeholders negotiate role and status 
within this zone.  
          Social work shares with other helping professions, (for example, health 
workers and teachers) a location on the margin between the everyday lives of 
citizens and the major social systems. Where social work differs perhaps, is that 
it is a social practice born in modernity, its development propelled forward by 
the shift in focus within social policy from human improvement and social 
need, to the current obsession with risk (Webb, 2006).  Caught up in this shift, 
social work has become more embedded in the state apparatus in some countries 
and in commercial health services in others, and while this expansion has 
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bought some gains, it has led to increasing ambiguity about its core mission  as 
a profession concerned with human rights and social justice (Olson, 2007).  
          Contemporary social theory assists us to investigate and analyse the 
nature of social work in order to better understand practitioners’ understandings 
of the status of their profession and the nature of its journey to date.  
Contemporary social work scholars have drawn on the work of Bourdieu to 
assist in this interrogation (Garrett, 2007a, 2007b; Houston, 2002).  Jenkins 
asserts that Bourdieu regarded social work as a solution for those whose access 
to higher education in the 1960s had “created a disjuncture between their 
subjective expectations and their objective probabilities”.  Educated people 
unable to find middle-class employment who saw “themselves as an 'ethical 
vanguard’, [where] a range of 'cultural reconversion' strategies result in a 
'profession of faith' ending up as a profession (Jenkins, 1992: 144 -145).  
Bourdieu (in Bourdieu et al., 1999) was not unsympathetic to social work and 
recognized the contradictions inherent in the profession very clearly. This 
passage was written following his interview with a municipal social worker in 
the north of France:  
 
Social workers must fight unceasingly on two fronts: on the one hand, 
against those they want to help and who are often too demoralized to 
take in hand their own interest, let alone the interest of the collective; 
on the other hand, against the administrations and bureaucrats divided 
and enclosed in separate universes (Bourdieu, 1999: 190).     
 
In this passage Bourdieu captures a strong element of the day-to-day discourse 
of social workers as they talk about their experience.  Their sense of being in 
authentic communication with clients within complex health and social care 
systems while having to establish  a distinctive  and contested territory within 
those systems resonates with Bourdieu’s ‘fight on two fronts’(Beddoe, 2013).  
The profession’s emancipatory goal is problematised, as in Bourdieu’s analysis 
social work is an agent of the state “shot through with the contradictions of the 
State” (Bourdieu, 1999: 184). The attachment of social work to the modern 
welfare state, and its normative inclinations to manage citizens’ messy 
problems, has intertwined its loftier aims with the drive of the state to intervene 
in the domestic sphere, of citizens. It is an essential player in the ‘policing of 
families’ (Donzelot, 1980). In this current era social work is increasingly 
involved in a broad range of activities beyond child protection (for example, in 
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health education and promotion, parenting ‘training’, sexuality education) that 
further intensifies its normative functions.  
          Bourdieu’s conceptual framework of fields, habitus and capital proved 
helpful in understanding contemporary social work. Social work may be viewed 
as a group of ‘agents’ occupying a field, in Bourdieu’s terms a “structured social 
space, a field of forces” (Bourdieu, 1998: 40).  In his discussion of the 
usefulness of Bourdieu’s work for analysis of social work, Garrett (2007a, 
p.230) writes that fields:  
 are crucial in terms of the evolution of the habitus of those located or 
positioned there. Second, a field seeks to maintain its autonomy. So, 
for Bourdieu …maintaining the autonomy of the fields of cultural and 
scientific production was to become increasingly important, indeed 
urgent, as the forces of neo-liberalism attempt to penetrate them, 
undermining this (relative) autonomy.  
 
A further feature of fields is the competition between players which takes place 
within them for the accumulation of different kinds of capital (Garrett, 2007a: 
230). Within the broad territories of health and social welfare, a profession can 
be seen to be defined by its position relative to other agents and by its ability to 
be competitive in acquiring various kinds of capital, especially social and 
cultural capital. Professions legitimated by the state are in a complex position 
when prevailing ideologies propose leaving many aspects of social and 
economic life to the logic of the market (Bourdieu, 1999).  
The problem of being ‘professional’ 
A review of the literature finds much discussion of the social workers’ 
engagement with occupational closure in order to control, define and manage 
expertise.  A focus on a ‘process’ approach to professional journeys is useful at 
this point, primarily because it suggests a less elitist stance than earlier work 
such as the traits perspectives where professions were defined  as an 
“enumerated series of attributes” (Roach Anleu, 1992: 24-25).  What a 
profession is, is not a fixed, objective matter: a profession is constructed and 
given meaning by the stakeholders who are part of it or interact with it. At its 
core a profession is an exchange, it needs at least two parties to function.  
Modernity, even in the so-called ‘oldest profession’ has brought new 
stakeholders into the relationship: there are risks to be managed, costs to be 
determined and boundaries to be stated and policed.  In modernity everyone is a 
professional (Wilensky, 1964).  A process approach has proved helpful; as it 
allows for the ‘social mobility’ of occupational groups, while recognizing that 
Beddoe 
 
47 
such activity is not entirely independent and autonomous.  Statutory regulation 
of professions, for example, can’t happen without approval of the government.  
Political patronage is usually required for groups to achieve greater control: for 
example, legislation is required for ‘protection of title’ of professions requiring 
regulation.  Functionalist and traits accounts would assume that some tacit 
agreement amongst powerful forces would ensure a balance between 
professional self-interest and the public good, once certain attributes had been 
noted. Such traditional accounts rely on an expectation of trust and: 
 professionalism requires professionals to be worthy of that trust, to 
put clients first, to maintain confidentiality and not use their 
knowledge for fraudulent purposes. In return for professionalism in 
client relations, some professionals are rewarded with authority, 
privileged rewards and high status (Evetts, 2006: 134).  
  
Evetts notes however, that further analysis revealed that high rewards are 
more the result of power and that the earlier interpretation was a 
consequence of “the rather peculiar focus on medicine and law as the 
archetypal professions in Anglo-American analysis, rather than a more 
realistic assessment of the large differences in power resources of most 
occupational groups”(2006: 134).  
          Witz, citing Wilensky (1964), favoured a ‘less static’ approach to the 
examination of “what an occupation had to do to turn itself into a 
profession” (Witz, 1992, p.40) and noted that  “professionalisation is not 
simply a process of occupational closure, but is locked into broader sets of 
structural and historical systems”(p.56). Witz examines the gendering of 
professional projects: “indeed, gender was integral to the very definition of 
a 'semi-profession' which according to Etzioni (1969) has two defining 
features. It is an occupation located within a bureaucratic organization and 
one in which women predominate” (Witz, 1992: 57).  In Witz’s feminist 
analysis, gendered activities of caring and support, developed last century 
into paid roles in health and social services underpin the nature of the 
helping professions. Witz’s case study of midwifery (1992: 104), for 
example, demonstrates the processes in which midwives battled for 
autonomy in childbirth as the medical specialization of obstetrics emerged. 
This remains a potent example of ‘turf-conflict’ many years later (Abbott 
& Meerabeau, 1998). 
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The Professional Project of Social Work 
Social work has attracted the attention of the sociology of the professions 
for many years (Flexner, 1915). Etzioni (1969) coined the term ‘semi-
profession’ to explain a distinct difference in the nature of teaching, 
nursing and social work.  His inference was that they were semi-
professions because they had not developed the degree of monopoly power 
and public esteem associated with medicine, and law. The semi-
professions were occupations that drew on theory and knowledge, 
promoted membership and participation, and adopted codes of ethics, but 
they did not seek to position themselves above the communities they 
worked for.  Freidson (2001: 29) suggested that the professions represent 
the organization of knowledge into 'disciplines' in the Foucauldian sense; 
the constructed notion of: 
Institutions set apart from everyday life. Special groups of intellectual 
workers embody the authority of those disciplines, their work being to 
create, preserve, transmit, debate and revise disciplinary content. The 
formal knowledge of particular disciplines is taught to those aspiring 
to enter specialized occupations with professional standing. 
Instead the semi-professions preferred to keep close to service users along with 
the families and care givers who may also have an interest in the person’s 
welfare. Witz (1992: 88-93) challenges this suggestion of ‘preference’ in 
relation to nursing and midwifery, suggesting that the history of medicine 
includes deliberate attempts to exclude women from medical school. She cites 
as evidence of a continuing androcentric approach to the study of professions, 
Rueschemeyer’s remark (1986: 137) that the “high devotion/low power 
syndrome” of the social service professions “articulates well with women’s 
traditional roles” (Witz, 1992: 58).  The professional project essentially 
challenges this linking of social work with domestic roles.  
          The professional project needs to be seen not as a conscious, articulated 
project in the everyday sense of the word, but as a sequence of activities linked 
to an underlying purpose, which in the field of professions in society, is directed 
at the improvement of the standing and power of an occupational group, often 
over decades with many different actors. Part of this process is creating a 
distance between the practices that are constituted as ‘professional’ by members 
of a group, and those tasks that may be the business of volunteers or 
practitioners of lesser training or different focus. Oerton (2004) reporting 
research undertaken with therapeutic massage practitioners notes the need for 
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such workers to create distance between themselves by boundary setting, 
especially because of the widespread elisions between massage and sex work. 
There is a similar tension for social work (Hamilton, 1974). While social work 
struggles to maintain an egalitarian spirit, if it is to be successful in its journey 
towards greater public legitimacy, it is compelled to distance itself from the 
practitioners of similar work, for which higher education and credentialing is 
not required.   
          In the modernizing states in which social work first emerged it was drawn 
into the system of social policy and the political agenda for greater social 
integration.  Lorenz (2004: 147) asserts that “social work was allocated its place 
and function in relation to the system’s need for setting firm boundaries and 
limits to destabilizing forces”. Thus social work developed a mediating focus 
between radical forces of social justice and the more normative, conservative 
approaches to social reform; the nature of care and control, the call for social 
action and the link to ‘social engineering’ that characterize much of the writing 
about the profession during its 100 year history.  Social work is a phenomenon 
both created and captured by this intermediary function.  This location creates a 
seemingly inevitable marginalization for social work in contemporary society, a 
place further weakened by neo-liberalist approaches to welfare.  Social work 
can be conceptualized as a profession hovering in uncomfortable places, caught 
between aspirations to contribute to social justice and bureaucratic constraints.  
          While other professions were regulated much earlier, social work 
struggled with both the internal and external conditions that would facilitate 
professional registration, in New Zealand as elsewhere (Nash, 2009).  Several 
possible explanations for social work’s position can be offered: gender and 
power constraints on social workers’ ability to influence lawmakers; social 
workers’ qualms about the politics of professionalizing further discussed below; 
the lack of a clearly articulated body of knowledge; the associated low levels of 
autonomy and lastly, the lack of a clearly demarcated social space or field 
(Bourdieu, 1984). This set of circumstances may have lasted for many more 
decades but for the changes in the public sector brought about through the ‘audit 
culture’ (Power, 1997 ) in which governments faced a crisis of trust in the  
professions, discussed further below (O’Neill, 2002).  In spite of the 
marginalized nature of social work, by the turn of the century the importance to 
governments to at least be seen to be ‘doing something’ about ensuring high 
standards for public services outweighed any concerns about adding to the 
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number of occupations able to professionalize. Evetts (2003) notes that for 
service and knowledge based occupations professionalisation is imposed from 
above by managers of the organisations in which these practitioners work.  For 
social workers in New Zealand the professional project was inextricably 
enmeshed with aspirations to greater power and control, while ironically 
achieved via political patronage within a climate of public criticism (Beddoe, 
2013). Even with the advent of limited statutory regulation, the lack of 
protection of title, so important to occupational closure means that being a 
social worker can be claimed by anyone (Harington & Crothers, 2005).   
 
The Crisis of Trust:  Social Work, Public Image and an Anxious Society   
Earlier accounts of professions assumed considerable degree of autonomy in 
professional life. A practitioner’s expertise and clearly delineated territory 
ensured their ability to act independently secured by a code of ethics and the 
commitment to the public good. In contemporary western societies, few 
professionals could truly claim to be fully able to control their own work, or 
even their own knowledge, particularly where their profession exists under the 
control of government systems of delivery of services (Coburn, 2006; Willis, 
2006). This is clearly true of social work, given that much of its legitimization is 
as part of the apparatus of the state.  Roach Anleu (1992) has suggested that, 
rather than conceptualizing strong professionalism and employment in 
bureaucracies as intrinsically incompatible, it is more helpful to examine how 
they work together within different organizational contexts. In the age of 
managerialism, diminished professional autonomy is not uncommon. With the 
advent of new models of public management, technologies of control such as 
evidence-based practice and clinical governance, bureaucracies assert greater 
control of professions—even medical dominance is weakened (Coburn, 2006; 
Willis, 2006).  
          For social work the search for improved status came at a time when the 
power of professionals had been challenged on all sides. In general this 
challenge stemmed from two major standpoints. The first challenge was critique 
of the widespread social acceptance of the knowledge claims and expertise of 
the professions (Illich, Zola, McKnight, Caplan & Shaiken, 1977; Foucault, 
1979, 1980; Donzelot, 1980; Duyvendak, Knijn & Kremer, 2006). Habermas 
(1987) argued that the development of expert bureaucracies that intervene in the 
private lives of citizens was problematic because of the separation of experts 
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from contexts of communicative action in daily life. Such critique leads to 
changing roles of patients and clients and their reconceptualisation as citizens 
and consumers (Kuhlmann, 2006  and  Kremer and Tonkens, 2006) note that 
social workers have been active in challenging the mantle of ‘expert’ and the 
development of less paternalistic approaches to working with people (Harington 
& Beddoe, 2013).  In the new arrangements citizen consumers have increasing 
power and voice in services and are seen as partners in the development and 
governance of health and welfare services, although there is room to challenge 
some of these changes as features of new public management (Heffernan, 
2006). 
          These forces have led to an increased consumerist aspect to the 
relationships between professionals and their clients as consumer movements 
have challenged professional monopolies (Freidson, 2001). ‘Clients’ have the 
potential to rebel against their “systemically defined …client role” (Welton, 
1995: 145). O’Neill’s Reith lectures in 2001 focused on the so called ‘crisis of 
trust’ and brought the challenges of the new arrangements for managing 
professional power neatly into the issue of trust in a risk society, the second 
theme in this review of professions. O’Neill found significant evidence of “a 
culture of suspicion” and suggested that the crisis of trust may represent “an 
unrealistic hankering for a world in which safety and compliance are total, and 
breaches of trust are eliminated” (O’Neill, Reith Lectures, 2001). In Beck’s 
(1992) ‘risk society' professional autonomy is mediated by the heightened 
awareness of the need to identify and reduce risk to others.  Evetts (2006) 
suggests that risk and uncertainty are significant features in categorizing modern 
professions and citing Olgiati et al. (1998): notes that many professions are 
involved in “birth, survival, physical and emotional  health, dispute resolution 
and law-based social order, finance and credit information, educational 
attainment and socialization….and our negotiations with the next world” 
(Evetts, 2006: 135).  Social workers deal with birth, death, assault, homicide, 
rape, mental illness, crime and every other challenging aspect of human life. 
The spectre of risk is ever-present and haunts the profession (Webb, 2006). A 
consequence of prevailing governmental responses to the riskiness of social 
work endeavour is to embed regulation as a tool of managerialism. It is within 
this climate that social work in New Zealand achieved limited registration 
(Social Workers Registration Act, 2003).   
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          The literature abounds with examples of social work suffering the impact 
of the risk-averse culture; paradoxically this occurs at a time when governments 
and profession alike promote strengths-based and ‘empowering’ approaches to 
human services practice.  Contemporary social policy and related managerial 
practices have addressed risk via myriad technologies for identifying, assessing 
severity and managing risk (Garrett, 2005).  For social workers there is a 
particular set of anxieties as fields such as child protection and mental health are 
caught between the ambivalent public discourses of care and control resulting in 
defensive practice, particularly observable in child protection (Parton, 1998; 
Stanley, 2007).  Professional practice is perceived as plagued by technicist 
approaches where risk assessment systems and check lists are put in place to 
minimize practitioner risk of missing something important. A current daily 
reality for those working in human service organizations is the extent to which 
services which aim to empower are at the mercy of contradictory forces that are 
frustrating and limiting for service users.  Knowledge and reflexivity under 
these conditions become key elements in maintaining professional 
trustworthiness in a frightening and uncertain world.  
 
Profession, power and knowledge:  Building professional capital  
Olgiati argues that professionalism in contemporary society is now entering a 
new phase characterized by the coupling of “two contradictory epochal 
frameworks: the one epitomized by the notion of ‘risk society’, the other 
epitomized by the notion of ‘knowledge society’” (2006: 543). In the risk 
society, professionalism has to confront the “outcomes of the vanishing 
guarantees of modernity” (Olgiati: 543) while in the knowledge society, 
professionalism has to respond to the challenges of global and local 
informational systems.  Olgiati suggests that due to the increasing competition 
about organizational domain and rising uncertainty about knowledge: 
 
Western professions… will undergo …a diffuse existential and moral 
insecurity about the contours of their professional jurisdictions, 
mandates and values. In general, to the extent that their entire setting 
and their habitus will be basically devoted to the imperatives of an all-
embracing risk–knowledge management, they will also have to act as 
risk managers of their own sociotechnical competence (Olgiati, 2006: 
543).   
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The conceptual tools of Bourdieu to assist in an analysis of the relationships 
between power, the professions in society, and the role of education in 
establishing and maintaining social privilege. Bourdieu’s concepts of field and 
capital conceptualize these worlds as sites of struggle—for power and the 
domination of knowledge and expertise.  Bourdieu (1999) identified the 
frequent disposition of social work to challenge oppressive practices from the 
inside of bureaucratic organizations .There is a political and moral imperative 
within social work’s stated mission to take this role.   In the current 
environment, social work negotiates this moral activity against a political 
backdrop of modernization of the welfare state itself and the neoliberal project 
of ‘knowledge management’.  
          In many developed countries, including New Zealand, one crucial aspect 
of this modernization is the development of ‘evidence-based’ policy and 
practice. This has its origins in positivist, rationalist means of decision making 
(Sheldon, 2001; Webb, 2001) and in has had considerable impact on thinking in 
social work.  The Evidence-based Practice (EBP) movement in social services 
has endorsed the notion that social work practice should be informed and 
developed from the results of scientifically conducted research (Sheldon, 2001): 
thus allying it more closely with medicine. This project has not been adopted 
uncritically and it is charged that EBP privileges positivist research based on a 
flawed understanding of social sciences research and fails to adequately account 
for the ambiguities and complexities of social work practice (Webb, 2001). 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the voice of social work clients can be 
lessened in EBP:  the interpretation of their world is dominated by external 
disciplinary knowledge (Scheyett, 2006).  
          Thus in the current climate, social work is at the juncture of debates about 
the virtues of practice  grounded in disciplinary knowledge and  positivist 
science versus traditional relational approaches to practice , for example: 
strengths-based collaborative approaches versus medical models of diagnosis of 
problems and treatment; professionalization and bureaucratization versus the 
retention of grass-roots activism, casework intervention or social development. 
Debates about these choices can be construed as shaping the strategies for 
building the professional capital of the social work profession. 
          Professional capital is conceptualized as a form of symbolic capital; 
where prestige, status and influence in both institutional life and the wider 
public discourse are important to social workers, because they perceive 
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themselves as somehow lacking. It is useful at this point to discuss the 
significance of Bourdieu’s work on capital, as some definitional issues are 
important when extending Bourdieu’s concepts: 
According to my empirical investigations [there is] economic capital 
(in its different forms): cultural capital, social capital, and symbolic 
capital . . . Thus agents are distributed in the overall social space, in 
the first dimension, according to the overall volume of capital they 
possess and, in the second dimension, according to the structure of 
their capital, that is the relative weight of the different species of 
capital, economic and cultural, in the total volume of their assets. 
(Bourdieu, 2002: 233-234) 
Bourdieu defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential 
resources” linked to ‘durable networks’ of relationships and group 
memberships: 
 
which [provide] each of its members with the backing of the 
collectively-owned capital, a 'credential' which entitles them to credit, 
in the various senses of the word. These relationships may exist only 
in the practical state, in material and/or symbolic exchanges which 
help to maintain them. They may also be socially instituted and 
guaranteed by the application of a common name (the name of a 
family, a class, or a tribe or of a school, a party, etc.) and by a whole 
set of instituting acts designed simultaneously to form and inform 
those who undergo them; in this case, they are more or less really 
enacted and so maintained and reinforced, in exchanges. (Bourdieu, 
1986: 246) 
 
Symbolic capital can be any of the three forms of capital, as expressed by 
Bourdieu (1991: 230): “symbolic capital, commonly called prestige, reputation, 
fame, …is the form assumed by these different kinds of capital when they are 
perceived and recognised as legitimate”. Swartz notes that “Bourdieu did not 
offer a theory of cultural capital per se. Cultural capital …was always just one – 
albeit a very important one – among a variety of types of power resources – 
capitals – that individuals and groups accumulate and exchange in order to 
enhance their positions in modern stratified societies” (Swartz, 2008: 48).  
          Some brief discussion of the extensions to Bourdieu’s concept of social 
capital is useful here to aid clarity. Portes (1998: 3) describes the various uses of 
the term as ‘a conceptual stretch’ and is critical of the use of the term in an 
“unmitigated celebration of community” (p.22). A decade later Fulkerson and 
Thompson (2008) undertook a meta-analysis of definitions and extensions of 
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‘social capital’ and delineate two ‘camps’ in the usage of the construct. One 
camp is defined as composed of ‘normative social capitalists’; those social 
scientists 
 within the Durkheimian tradition… view [social capital]  as a set of 
features in a social structure that lead to collective action in order to 
bring about mutual benefit for some aggregate of people. (Fulkerson 
and Thompson, 2008: 540)  
This perspective assumes a universal explanation of social development 
incorporating norms of trust, reciprocity and social cohesion (for example, the 
work of Putnam, 2002). Fulkerson and Thompson’s second camp are called the 
‘resource social capitalists’ draw on interactionist and conflict traditions and 
employ social capital as: 
an explanation for uneven patterns in the accumulation of power, 
prestige, and other forms of inequality, in addition to recognizing the 
importance of context (Bourdieu, 1980, 1983, 1984; Schulman and 
Anderson, 1999). For this group, social capital refers to investments 
that individuals make in their networks. (Fulkerson & Thompson, 
2008: 540) 
In developing the concept of professional capital within the profession of social 
work the Bourdieuian approach is intended. The concept is stretched to examine 
the professional project of social work, in this usage there is a debt to Garrett 
and Houston (Houston, 2002; Garrett, 2007a, 2007b).  Professional capital is 
not particularly well developed as a construct beyond the education discipline 
and appeared rarely in the sociological literature until recently (Noordegraaf & 
Schinkel, 2011) although there is considerable attention paid to the application 
of the Bordieuian constructs of social and cultural capital to professional 
practices and the identity of professions (Houston, 2002; Garrett, 2007a, 2007b) 
and cultural capital in relation to education (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977).  
References to ‘professional capital’ are found mainly in discussion of changes 
and challenges in modern professions, for example Sergiovanni  (1998) in 
education; Brodie ( 2003) in midwifery; Chau (2005) in nursing; Goldenberg 
(2005) in bioethics; and Lingard et al., (2007) in interdisciplinary research 
teams.  Social historian Harold Perkin (1990) employed the phrase in his 
discussion of the rise of professional society in the United Kingdom, linking the 
increasing social power of professions to a form of property (economic assets) 
in the manner of social and cultural capital: 
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Since the essence of property is a right to (some portion of) the flow 
of income from the resource owned, professional capital –which is 
manifestly more tangible than corporate shareholdings, less 
destructible than building...and capable of self-renewal and 
improvement – is thus a species of property in the strictest sense. 
(Perkin, 1990: 379) 
It is interesting that Perkin regards professional capital as a renewable resource 
and capable of improvement and this is relevant to use of the construct here.  
The concept of renewal is often applied to professional development and 
implies a continuing exposure to new knowledge. Given that the production of 
knowledge – scientific endeavour – is highly valued, then contributions to 
research and scholarship might be perceived to enhance professional capital 
further.  Sergiovanni, for example, proposed building professional capital 
amongst teachers by suggesting pedagogical leadership as an alternative to 
bureaucratic visionary and entrepreneurial forms of leadership in schools 
(Sergiovanni, 1998).  Sergiovanni defines capital in this context as “the value of 
something that when properly invested produces more of that thing which then 
increases overall value” (p.37).  In midwifery Brodie employed professional 
capital as “a construct that describes the potential enhanced capacity that 
midwives could experience if their work was understood, visible and  
recognised  in the provision of maternity services in Australia” (2003: 203).  
Brodie suggests that “professional capital may be the result of efforts to increase 
trust, self-esteem and self-confidence in individual midwives, which in turn 
creates opportunities for new learning, fresh challenges and change to practice, 
leadership in organizational systems and the culture of the workplace” (2003: 
204).  Chau uses the term professional capital similarly in the summary of an 
unpublished conference paper on knowledge in nursing, stating that she uses it 
“to inscribe a profession’s value, as being recognised and appreciated, by other 
professions” (2005: 671).  Chau offers “a preliminary definition of ‘professional 
capital’ as the value of recognition and understanding of the contributions of a 
profession to include trust, appreciation, reciprocation, and the allowance of 
growth through change within the context of related professions” (p.671).  
Goldenberg (2005: 6) specifically highlights the links between the evidence-
based practice discourse, neoliberal assumptions about ‘best practice’ and the 
building of professional capital: “ the political and professional capital of 
evidence-based medicine cannot be overstated …this evidence-based practice is 
supposed to increase professional responsibility and accountability” . Proximity 
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to knowledge, science and ‘evidence’ for practice then are significant features 
for professional advancement.  
          If social capital has two elements (Bourdieu cited in Portes, 1998: 3-4): 
the first being the social relationships that allow claim to resources and the 
second being the amount and value of such resources, how then does this 
construct work when applied to a profession? Use of the term ‘capital’ implies a 
thing of value that can be invested in some kind of exchange or set of 
relationships that are reciprocal. For Sergiovanni (1998) this is created in 
schools through the notion of communities of practice, where leadership creates 
inquiry rather than rules.  
          We can thus distil from this discussion some the key attributes of the 
professional capital of any given profession within its social milieu. These 
desirable elements include but are not limited to the following: 
1 The profession is trusted by others including users of professional 
services as well as other key stakeholders and other professions; 
2 Mutually rewarding relationships exist within the profession with    some 
cohesion between members and congruent values; 
3 Mutually rewarding relationships exist or can be developed with other 
professional groups; 
4 Members of the profession are able to occupy and perform well, roles of 
leadership, being invited or empowered to provide such leadership  
 Reciprocal relationships exist, with some form of exchange;  
5 Members hold some sense of collective identity and ‘self-esteem’; 
6 Members are able to make a clear and understood knowledge-claim for 
practice and this requires both the application and production of 
knowledge; 
7 The profession and its members hold a clear and well differentiated 
territory of practice; 
8 Opportunities are available for ongoing and fresh learning within a 
profession that adds to the benefit of the wider multidisciplinary team and 
the service environment; 
9 The particular profession is visible in the public discourse of the 
contributions professions make to society and is particular and 
recognizable for its distinctive contribution to social well-being. 
Bearing in mind these attributes professional capital can thus be defined as the 
aggregated value of mandated educational qualifications,  the acquisition of 
social ‘distinction’ within a territory of social practice, and economic worth 
marked by those key artefacts of professional status- occupational closure and 
protection of title. The territory of social practice and social welfare can be 
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viewed as a contemporary field. Gartman (2007: 391) writes that “Bourdieu 
conceives of society not as one big unified struggle for a few common 
resources, but as a conglomeration of relatively independent struggles for a 
variety of resources”.  Modern societies include such fields as economics, 
religion, science, academic institutions and bureaucracies, especially those of 
the state. Bourdieu has rejected a conceptualisation of the state as one large 
body manipulated by the ruling class and Garrett (2009: 7) points out:  
 
The neoliberal state has, in fact, multiple identities and multiple 
boundaries. So, to extend and complicate Bourdieu’s metaphor, the 
state may be less a ‘battlefield’ site and more an expansive terrain on 
which occurs a series of seemingly discrete and unconnected 
skirmishes. 
Many of the places where these skirmishes occur are composed of distinct sub-
fields where those individuals who enter, according to Bourdieu, possess class-
conditioned dispositions “that will determine to a large extent where they will 
be positioned” and these enduring “predispositions condition how actors 
perceive the field’s opportunities” (Gartman, 2007: 391). Shelley (2010) aptly 
suggests that “fields are best understood as fields of forces rather than the 
concept of a static farmer’s field where the boundaries are demarcated by 
fences” (p.44). The boundaries of the field (s) are etched by a complex system 
of individuals and organizations and the relationships within delineate and tend 
to reproduce the dominant social practices.  
          Healy (2009) notes that student social workers have been found to have 
“substantially weaker professional identities than other comparable 
professionals such as nurses and allied health” (pp. 405-406): thus practitioners 
start may commence their careers believing they have less professional capital 
than those in other profession, including those they work alongside.  How do we 
then conceptualize how a weak profession might appear if the desirable 
attributes described above of professional capital are not all present?  Beliefs 
about professional status and power may be transmitted through the system of 
social work education and the relative absence of positive models of social 
workers in media and popular culture (Zugazaga, Surette, Mendez & Otto, 
2006).   Weak professional capital can be described thus:  
     1 Invisibility in the public discourse of professionalism or being associated 
with negative outcomes;  
2 A lack of recognition for its contributions to the public institutions in 
which the profession is practised; 
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3 A passive role in institutions rather than taking leadership; 
     4   A weak or disputed knowledge claim. 
Conclusions 
The author’s research with social workers following the advent of registration, 
found that the practitioners’ sense of being valued within their site of 
organisational practice was found to be highly significant (Beddoe, 2011, 2013). 
In highly differentiated multidisciplinary environments such as the health 
sector, social workers saw gaining higher qualifications and the conduct of 
research as strategies to develop greater capital.  Complex links between 
perceived status within complex institutional settings and the aspirations of 
individual practitioners reflected a search for status that is ‘felt’ and expressed 
as a collective struggle.  For social work, the dominance gained by the capture 
of specialist knowledge has never been achieved and its programmes have 
almost always been mediated via third parties.  Thus it can be argued the 
profession has a weak and potentially disputed knowledge claim. As a 
consequence social work finds itself often in a circular relationship with 
knowledge use and production, facing considerable organizational barriers and 
constraints in both aspects (Beddoe, 2011).  Social workers argue that they can’t 
compete for professional status because they lack the credentials of other 
professions and yet can’t gain access to valuable credentials because they can’t 
compete for resources against other professionals with higher status.   
          For social workers in New Zealand the professional project seems to offer 
some greater control, as they expected registration would mandate and 
legitimize their aspirations for further education (Beddoe, 2010). In order to 
achieve oft-stated aspirations to act as passionate advocates for clients and 
communities (O’Brien, 2011) social workers aim for greater voice in policy and 
decision making. It is clear that the profession need employ a more conscious, 
deliberate strategy of development to ensure access to and engagement in 
scholarship, research and professional development in order to further its stated 
aims. 
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No longer more educated: Changes amongst those of no religion 
in New Zealand 
 
Nigel V Smith 
 
Abstract 
This study used data collected in three rounds of the ISSP: Religion 
series of surveys (1991, 1998 and 2008) to explore differences 
between New Zealanders identifying themselves as having ‘No 
religion’ and those identifying as ‘Christian’, being the two largest 
categories of religious affiliation in the country. Factor analyses were 
used to identify composite measures of ‘strength of religious beliefs’ 
and ‘religiosity’. Differences between those identifying as ‘No 
religion’ and ‘Christian’ on these measures as well as a range of 
demographic variables are compared and discussed. Strength of 
religious belief, religiosity and frequency of childhood church 
attendance emerged in regression analyses as the most significant 
predictors of religious affiliation. Level of education and gender 
appear to no longer contribute to the differences between those 
identifying as ‘No religion’ and ‘Christian’. These trends signal a 
shift in the dynamics of religious affiliation in New Zealand. 
 
Introduction 
The proportion of people professing no religion has increased markedly in 
western countries in recent years (Giddens, 1997; Zuckerman, 2007). This trend 
began in the early 1960s (Brown, 2011) and in New Zealand has been 
documented in a number of studies based on census data. Comparing the 1986 
and 1991 census data, Wilson (1993) pointed out a large increase in ‘No 
religion’ responses. Capturing a larger time period (1991 – 2001), Crothers 
(2005) argued that secularism was increasing, also identifying the decline in 
affiliation with major denominations. Between 1991 and 2006, census data 
records a decrease in general Christian adherence from 71% to 54% 
(Nachowitz, 2007). This trend has been shown to run parallel with an increase 
in religious pluralism (W. J. Hoverd, 2008; Lynch, 2008). There remains some 
disagreement about the extent of such changes, with other research suggesting 
that the census data does not accurately capture the complexity of the changes 
(W. Hoverd & Sibley, 2010; Lynch, 2008), and that significant growth in 
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religious adherence has occurred among some denominations (Kavan, 
Vaccarino, & Gendall, 2011).  
However, what is clear across much of the literature is that an increasing 
group of New Zealanders profess no religion. Indeed, understanding this group 
has been identified as a pressing need, both internationally (Brown, 2011) and 
in New Zealand (Kavan et al., 2011). There has been significant exploration of 
the way that spirituality has become detached from organised religion (W. 
Hoverd & Sibley, 2010; Webster & Perry, 1989). This decoupling helps to 
explain the increase in spirituality reported by several commentators (Kavan et 
al., 2011; Lineham, 2003; Ward, n.d.), who note that this rise is separate to the 
decline in general religious adherence. Other work has explored gender 
differences in religious participation in New Zealand, noting that religiosity is 
higher among women than men (Adsera, 2006), and that religion is more 
strongly of interest to women than men (Stark, 2002; Walter & Davie, 1998). 
More tentatively, shifts in religiosity, religious adherence and reported 
spirituality have been attributed to the effects of feminism (Brown, 2011), levels 
of education (Kavan et al., 2011), family religiosity (Kelley & De Graaf, 1997) 
and age changes within populations (W. Hoverd & Sibley, 2010). 
However, little research has examined the relationships between these 
potentially relevant constructs and religious belief and practice amongst those 
professing no religion. The present study seeks to partly address this gap, by 
comparing the characteristics of this newly emerging group with those 
identifying as ‘Christian’, still the largest religious affiliation in the country. 
Data from the ISSP: Religion survey in New Zealand is strongly positioned to 
provide some clarity, as New Zealand has one of the highest proportions of 
people professing no religion (Hoverd & Sibley, 2010; Kavan et al., 2011). The 
ISSP is an international survey programme which has focused on religion three 
times; in 1991, 1998 and 2008. New Zealand has been part of the programme in 
all three rounds.  
On each occasion, the main findings of the survey have been published 
(Gendall, 1992; 1999; Kavan et al., 2011), with the most recent findings from 
the ISSP: Religion series being particularly striking. The increasingly secular 
nature of New Zealand society was confirmed, constituted in both a decline in 
adherence to religious institutions and a reduction in the numbers of those who 
have faith in a traditional God-concept (although the proportion of those 
believing in a ‘higher power’ remains similar) Those professing no religion 
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increased from 29% in 1991 to 40% in 2008. The authors explicitly call for 
more research to understand the non-religious stream of New Zealand society, 
in particular the potential role of education in contributing to it. They also 
identify the gendered nature of religious participation as a key area for further 
exploration. 
The present study seeks to partly address these issues by exploring the 
following questions: 
1. How are those professing ‘No religion’ different from ‘Christians’ 
(being the largest two religious groups in New Zealand society) 
2. How have these differences changed between 1991 and 2008? 
3. What are the key relationships between contributing (a) 
demographic, and (b) religious variables and religious affiliation in 
New Zealand? 
 
Method 
Participants 
In all three rounds of the ISSP: Religion in New Zealand, a simple random 
sample was selected from persons over 18 years old listed on the election 
register. Also in all three rounds, a physical questionnaire was mailed out to 
respondents, and they mailed it back to the researcher. In 1991, a total of 
N=1070 valid responses were received (response rate = 66%) In 1998, N=998 
valid responses were received (response rate = 65%) In 2008, N=1027 valid 
responses were received (response rate = 53%) In 1991 and 1998, the obtained 
demographic proportions in the sample were sufficiently close to the population 
figures as established by the most recent national census that no weightings 
were required. In 2008, females and older people were slightly over-
represented, and a weighting was applied to bring these demographics into line 
with the census proportions. The present study follows Kavan et al. (2011) in 
applying a weighting (the same as originally calculated) to the 2008 dataset, but 
not to the 1991 or 1998 datasets. 
Measures 
Measures of religious belief and practice 
This study sought to take an exploratory approach, and therefore variables were 
retained or excluded from each stage of the analysis on statistical, not 
theoretical grounds. Factor analysis was used to ascertain which items coalesced 
into constructs that were comparable across the three datasets as well as a 
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dataset in which all three individual datasets were combined. The process by 
which these measures themselves were identified is as follows:  
1.  All items not identical across all three surveys were excluded from 
further analysis.  
2. A Harman test (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003) 
was used to identify constructs that exhibited clear unidimensionality 
(Eigenvalues > 1 for primary extracted component only, no 
significant loading on secondary extracted components) 
a. All items not contributing to constructs were excluded from 
further analysis. 
b. The remaining items were combined into constructed 
variables (by being converted into z-scores, summed and then being 
divided by the number of items)  
 3. Reliability of the constructed variables was checked, and all 
constructed variables with Cronbach’s alpha values of less than α=.7 
were excluded from further analysis. 
Two unidimensional constructs emerged as valid across the three datasets 
(construct component analyses are presented in Results) ‘Strength of religious 
beliefs’ was assessed by 6 items with a mixture of 4-point and 6-point Likert 
scales. These individual items have been checked for individual reliability and 
consistency by a number of researchers working with the ISSP and findings 
based on the resultant data published in a number of leading journals since 1984 
(Kavan et al., 2011). ‘Religiosity’ was assessed by 4 items with a mixture of 11-
point, 9-point, 7-point and Yes/No response scales. These individual items are 
common across many surveys of religiosity. As Voas (2007) has pointed out, 
when measuring religious concepts, including both religious beliefs and 
religiosity, there are many challenges to establishing the validity and clarity of 
constructs when measuring them quantitatively. The strength of the constructed 
variables in the present study rests on their face validity, the clarity of the factor 
analyses and the reliability observed across the three datasets.  
Measures of demographics 
A number of single questions asked respondents to provide demographic 
information including age, gender, marital status, education level, employment 
status, political affiliation, religious affiliation, personal and family income, 
frequency of church attendance at age 11-12, household size and community 
size 1 . Religious affiliation was recoded into three groups (‘Christian’, ‘No 
                                                            
1 The wording and response options for these demographic variables are available via the 
GESIS data archive at http://www.gesis.org/en/issp/. In some cases coding categories were 
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religion’, and ‘Other’)2. All other measures except age and political affiliation 
were converted to z-scores where 0 represented the lowest level of the variable 
and 1 represented the highest level of the variable. 
 
Results 
Assessing construct performance: component analysis 
Strength of religious beliefs 
The analysis resulted in a unidimensional construct consistent across all three 
individual datasets, which in Table 1 I have labelled ‘strength of religious 
beliefs’. All items loaded on the first unrotated component.  
 
Table 1: Component structure of ‘strength of religious beliefs’ 
Constructed variable Item wording Primary component loadings 
  1991 1998 2008 Combined 
Strength of religious beliefs Do you believe in God?* .88 .90 .92 .90 
Have you always believed in God?** .82 .84 .86 .84 
Do you believe in life after death? .82 .83 .82 .83 
Do you believe in heaven? .92 .92 .94 .93 
Do you believe in hell? .79 .82 .88 .83 
Do you believe in religious miracles? .85 .86 .91 .87 
First Eigenvalue  4.33 4.48 4.74 4.51 
% Variance   72.20% 74.75% 78.92% 75.15% 
Cronbach’s α  .92 .93 .94 .93 
Mean .68 .69 .65 .67 
S.D. .25 .25 .27 .26 
Note: Because a Harman test was used to identify unidimensional constructs, items which did not load clearly on to the first extracted 
component were excluded from analysis. Component loadings for secondary components of remaining items (all non-significant) are 
omitted from this table. 
* This item was worded “Please indicate which statement below comes closest to expressing what you believe about God?” The response 
options ranged from “I don’t believe in God”, to “I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it”. The item is paraphrased here for 
clarity. 
** This item was worded “Which best describes your beliefs about God?” The response options ranged from “I don’t believe in God now, 
and I never have”, to “I believe in God now and I always have”. The item is paraphrased here for clarity. 
 
Religiosity 
The analysis resulted in a unidimensional construct consistent across all three 
datasets, which in Table 2 I have labelled ‘religiosity’. All items loaded on the 
first unrotated component.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
collapsed where one dataset had more fine grained detail than another, in order to ensure 
comparability. In other cases, coding was reversed to ensure that a higher value equated with 
‘more’ of the variable in question. 
2 Note that cases coded as ‘Other’ are included in subsequent whole sample analysis, but not 
in analyses comparing ‘No religion’, with ‘Christian’. These cases represented 9.1% (1991), 
6.9% (1998) and 8.3% (2008) of the three respective whole samples. 
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Table 2: Component structure of ‘religiosity’ 
Constructed variable Item wording Primary component loadings 
  1991 1998 2008 Combined 
Religiosity About how often do you pray? .88 .89 .89 .88 
 How often do you take part in religious activities? .82 .83 .83 .83 
 How religious would you describe yourself to be? .78 .81 .80 .79 
 Have you had a “born again” experience? .71 .70 .72 .71 
First Eigenvalue  2.54 2.61 2.65 2.60 
% Variance  63.42% 65.26% 66.36% 64.96% 
Cronbach’s α  .77 .79 .80 .79 
Mean  .34 .37 .35 .36 
S.D.  .21 .24 .24 .23 
Note: Because a Harman test was used to identify unidimensional constructs, items which did not load clearly on to the first extracted 
component were excluded from analysis. Component loadings for secondary components of remaining items (all non-significant) are 
omitted from this table. 
 
Describing the differences between those identifying as ‘No religion’ and 
‘Christian’ 
Using ANOVA analysis, those identifying as ‘No religion’ and ‘Christian’ were 
not significantly different on a number of demographic measures, including 
political affiliation, personal income, household size and community size. These 
variables were therefore omitted from Table 3. Variables remaining included 
gender, age, education level, frequency of church attendance at age 11-12, 
marital status, employment status, personal earnings, family income, strength of 
religious beliefs (composite), religiosity (composite). 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics by religious affiliation 
  1991  1998  2008 
  No religion Christian F  No religion Christian F  No religion Christian F 
Fre
que
ncy
 % of sample  28.61 62.29  28.31 64.81  39.35 52.38 
% male (of sample)  15.10 24.86   14.46 28.11   20.52 23.69  
% female (of sample)  13.51 37.43   13.85 36.70   18.84 28.69  
De
mo
gra
phi
c v
ari
abl
es 
Gender (1=male / 2=female) Mean 1.47 1.6 14.25  1.49 1.57 4.67  1.48 1.55 4.42 S.D 0.50 0.49  0.50 0.50  0.50 0.50 
Age Mean 38.65 47.63 61.39  42.31 50.6 48.77  41.68 49.81 53.02S.D 14.7 17.25  14.96 17.16  15.17 18.12 
Education level Mean 0.61 0.53 24.33  0.70 0.64 18.76  0.59 0.58 0.27a S.D. 0.22 0.21  0.18 0.17  0.32 0.31 
Frequency of church 
attendance at 11-12 yrs old 
Mean 0.42 0.74 78.98  0.37 0.62 115.47  0.29 0.59 189.34S.D. 0.32 0.25  0.32 0.27  0.30 0.28 
Marital status Mean 0.78 0.84 5.3  0.66 0.79 21.04  0.65 0.73 8.18 S.D. 0.31 0.26  0.36 0.29  0.36 0.32 
Employment status Mean 0.81 0.66 21.19  0.78 0.73 5.59  0.82 0.76 9.82 S.D. 0.26 0.31  0.27 0.28  0.27 0.30 
Personal earnings Mean 0.39 0.33 9.24  0.45 0.39 6.06  0.58 0.55 1.95a S.D. 0.16 0.17  0.21 0.18  0.22 0.22 
Family income Mean 0.68 0.61 7.17  0.71 0.67 1.90a  0.86 0.80 11.50S.D. 0.25 0.27  0.27 0.29  0.21 0.23 
Co
mp
osi
t
es 
Strength of religious beliefs  Mean 0.43 0.78 432.29  0.44 0.78 347.98  0.42 0.81 589.27S.D. 0.20 0.19  0.19 0.21  0.18 0.20 
Religiosity  Mean 0.19 0.39 260.05  0.20 0.44 264.13  0.18 0.45 394.61S.D. 0.10 0.21  0.11 0.24  0.11 0.24 
Note: All mean differences are significant at p<0.05, unless indicated. aMean difference not statistically significant. 
New Zealand Sociology Volume 28 Issue 2 2013 
 
70 
From Table 3, the differences in age, marital status, employment status and 
family income between those identifying as ‘No religion’ and ‘Christian’ are 
generally stable over time. Those identifying as ‘No religion’ are younger, less 
likely to be married, more likely to be employed and earn slightly more, 
although the difference in personal earnings between the two groups diminishes 
to non-significance by 2008. There was no significant difference in levels of 
education in 2008, whereas in the earlier years, those identifying as ‘No 
religion’ had been more highly educated as a group (F decreases from 24.33 in 
1991 to a non-significant 0.27 in 2008) The gender mix amongst Christians has 
become less skewed over time, with females becoming increasingly less over-
represented, while it has remained consistently slightly skewed towards males 
amongst those identifying as ‘No religion’. The disparity between the two 
groups on frequency of church attendance at age 11-12 yrs has become stronger, 
with those identifying as ‘No religion’ reporting increasingly lower rates of 
childhood attendance than those identifying as ‘Christian’ (F increases from 
78.98 in 1991 to 189.34 in 2008), although rates in both groups decrease across 
the three datasets. As would be expected the differences on strength of religious 
beliefs and religiosity are extremely clear, with Christians holding religious 
beliefs and practicing religious activities (religiosity) much more 
strongly/frequently than those identifying themselves as having no religion. 
These differences are strongest in the 2008 dataset, likely due to the slight 
increases in both mean strength of belief and religiosity amongst those 
identifying as ‘Christian’. 
 
What contributes most significantly to religious affiliation? 
The descriptive statistics above provide an overview of the differences between 
the two largest religious affiliations in New Zealand. In order to answer the 
slightly different question of which factors contribute most to whether a person 
identifies as ‘No religion’ or ‘Christian’, a number of regression analyses were 
undertaken.  
Protocol for regression analyses 
Univariate correlations for all demographic variables (including the main 
dependent variable, religious affiliation) as well as the composite variables 
identified above were assessed3. Regression analyses were conducted for each 
                                                            
3 The univariate correlation tables that informed the regression analyses presented here are 
available from the author. 
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of the three individual datasets and for the combined dataset. Variables were 
entered simultaneously into the analysis if they were significantly correlated 
(p<.05) with the target dependent variable (religious affiliation) in each 
respective dataset. Thus the specific variables entered differed across each 
analysis. Note also that those respondents identifying as ‘Other’ were excluded 
from this stage of the analysis.  
 
Table 4: Regression Analyses: What contributes most to religious affiliation? 
 1991 1998 2008 Combined 
Overall model fit 
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.56 0.44 0.46 
F 44.28 86.38 98.05 39.62 
df [9,494] [8,532] [9,1122] [11,497] 
Predictor variable β 
Strength of religious beliefs 0.47 0.52 0.5 0.51 
Religiosity 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.12 
Freq. church attend at 11-12 yrs 0.13 0.09 0.12 
Age 0.11 0.12 0.11 
Employment 0.13 
Family income -0.11 
Marital status 0.1 
Note: All F values were significant at p<.01. All predictor variable β values had t values significant at p<.05. All non-significant coefficients 
are omitted from this table. 
 
The obtained models account for approximately half the variance in religious 
affiliation (adjusted R2 ranging between 0.44 and 0.56) Strength of religious 
beliefs is consistently the largest predictor of religious affiliation, explaining 
approximately half of the variance accounted for by each model. Religiosity 
also consistently explained a significant proportion of the variance in religious 
affiliation in all datasets. A number of variables were only significantly 
associated with religious affiliation in the 1991 dataset (employment, family 
income and marital status) Conversely, the frequency of childhood church 
attendance only related significantly to religious affiliation in 1998 and 2008, 
although the t value for childhood church attendance approached statistical 
significance in 1991 (p<.07), which partly explains why this was the only 
demographic variable to remain significantly related in the combined dataset, 
despite not being uniquely associated with religious affiliation in the 1991 
dataset. Age was uniquely related to religious affiliation in all three individual 
datasets, but in the combined dataset was narrowly excluded on the basis of a t 
value significance of p<.07. 
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For a number of variables where significant univariate correlations with 
religious affiliation were observed, no significant relationship persisted in the 
regression analysis. For example, no unique relationships between religious 
affiliation and any of gender, education or personal earnings were observed, 
despite significant univariate relationships being observed (in all datasets for 
gender, in the 1991 dataset only for education)   
 
Discussion 
How are those professing ‘No religion’ different?  
The comparison group for those identifying as ‘No religion’ in the present study 
is those identifying as ‘Christian’, who in 2008 still formed the largest religious 
affiliation grouping. It is worth stating that no differences were observed 
between these groups, in any dataset, on levels of general happiness, political 
affiliation or size of community. Those identifying as ‘No religion’ were 
observed to be consistently younger, have higher family income, less likely to 
be married and more likely to be employed than people in the Christian 
subgroup. These differences are consistent with those found by earlier 
researchers (Crothers, 2005; Kavan et al., 2011), but may also reflect the fact 
that the obtained samples are older than the general population as recorded in 
census data (mean age in New Zealand was just over 36 years old in 2008 
(Statistics NZ, 2012)), and the Christian subgroup (with mean ages of 47.63 
(1991), 50.6 (1998) and 49.81 (2008)) consequently includes more retired or 
semi-retired people than the ‘No religion’ group. 
How have differences between those identifying as ‘No religion’ and ‘Christian’ 
changed? 
There are several discernible changes in the differences between those 
identifying as ‘No religion’ and ‘Christian’. The disparity in levels of education 
observed in 1991 (Table 3) has faded by 2008; in that dataset Christians and 
those identifying as ‘No religion’ have mean levels of education that are not 
significantly different. Though tentative, given the limitations of the present 
study, this challenges the idea presented by (Kavan et al., 2011) that education 
continues to contribute to a lessening in religious adherence. While its historical 
impact is clearer, perhaps the levels of religious adherence recently observed are 
being sustained by and for reasons other than a low level of education. 
Similarly, although not as strongly, the over-representation of females 
amongst Christians lessens across the three datasets. Speculatively, this may be 
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linked to gains made for women by feminist movements (Brown, 2011) and 
indicates that the higher involvement and interest by women in religion 
identified by several theorists (Adsera, 2006; Stark, 2002; Walter & Davie, 
1998) may be waning. Differences in levels of personal earnings also wane; 
those identifying as ‘No religion’ no longer earned significantly more than 
Christians in 2008. 
The differences between those identifying as ‘No religion’ and ‘Christian’ 
on both strength of beliefs and religiosity intensified mildly across the three 
datasets. This is consistent with a stronger distinction observed between the two 
groups on the frequency of childhood church attendance. Those identifying as 
‘No religion’ were increasingly less likely to have attended church as a child 
across the three datasets. Given this question asked about attendance at age 11-
12 yrs old, the mean age of the samples, and the continuing decrease in current 
reported church attendance (Crothers, 2005), it would seem likely that this 
distinction will continue to become stronger for at least another generation. The 
divergence in levels of religiosity may have been caused by a mean increase in 
religious practice amongst Christians, rather than a decrease amongst those 
identifying as ‘No religion’: Those who previously identified as Christian, but 
participated relatively little in religious activities may now be more likely to 
identify themselves as ‘No religion’. 
Which demographics matter most? 
The changes noted above in the analysis of mean differences between those 
identifying as ‘No religion’ and ‘Christian’ give one set of insights into the 
changing character of religious affiliation in New Zealand. However, a 
multivariate approach asks the question more precisely: which demographics 
uniquely contribute most to religious affiliation, and how is this changing?  
Perhaps the most striking outcome of the regression analyses on religious 
affiliation in the present study is the absence of any unique relationship between 
either of gender or education and religious affiliation. This is consistent with the 
waning relationships identified above, suggesting a potential contrast with the 
findings of those researchers who have noted significant gender differences in 
the practice of religion (Adsera, 2006; Stark, 2002; Walter & Davie, 1998), and 
those who have identified education as a significant contributor to shifts in 
religious adherence (Kavan et al., 2011). This is particularly distinctive in the 
case of education, where no relationship at all (either univariate or multivariate) 
was observed between education and religious affiliation in either 1998 or 2008.  
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Another key finding is the strong unique relationship observed between 
strength of religious beliefs and religious affiliation. Though this is intuitively to 
be expected, the relative magnitude of this relationship (more than three times 
larger than the next most important relationship) is an important reminder that 
the internal beliefs and attitudes of people have a great deal of influence on their 
identity, alongside aspects of their behaviour and demographic characteristics. 
Less strong, but equally consistent and predictable, is the relationship between 
the doing of religious activities (religiosity) and religious affiliation. The more 
strongly one believes, and participates in religion, the more likely one is to 
identify as religious.  
The emergence of childhood church attendance as the only other variable 
to remain uniquely related to religious affiliation in the combined dataset is an 
intriguing finding. It is notable that its unique influence was negligible in the 
1991 dataset compared with several other characteristics such as employment 
status or family income. Closer examination of the beta coefficients and 
associated t and p values revealed a pattern which may suggest increasing 
influence across the three datasets included in the present study. If so, this 
would align well with earlier research emphasising the importance of family 
religious contexts in childhood for explaining adult religious adherence (Kelley 
& De Graaf, 1997). 
 
Limitations 
A post-hoc analysis such as the present study is limited in many ways. All self-
report data may be inaccurate due to response biases. Given the large sample 
sizes, the consistent methodology employed across the three datasets being 
compared, and the exploratory nature of the present study, this weakness is not 
critical. Though the quality of the original data is of a high standard, exploring 
questions that the data collection instruments were not originally designed for 
may limit the validity of the conclusions reached. The use of factor analysis to 
verify the dependent constructs (strength of religious belief and religiosity) 
before proceeding to subsequent analysis helps to ensure that the findings are 
meaningful, although this approach is less strong than using a purpose designed 
instrument such as those reviewed by Voas (2007). Using statistical and not 
theoretical criteria to guide interpretive decisions may mean that the findings 
risk being ‘cherry picked’, although conservative significance levels and 
statistical thresholds have been used throughout to avoid Type I error. While the 
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focus of the present study was to explore changes between 1991 and 2008, the 
use of only three datasets means that trends and shifts observed may be less 
reliable than if they were based on more regular observations. 
 
Areas for further research 
The persistence of childhood church attendance over other demographic 
influences warrants more attention. The diminishing impact of education on 
religious adherence and participation also needs further exploration. Perhaps 
these are shifts reflecting globalisation and postmodernity; the impact of 
rationally based education on religious faith may be becoming less significant 
than family background, particularly in a New Zealand society increasingly 
characterised as multiethnic and multireligious. Similarly, the waning of gender 
effects noted in this study require more attention, particularly as this contrasts 
with other research. 
 
Conclusion 
This analysis of three historical large-scale surveys of New Zealanders both 
confirms and challenges prior research. Consistent with much of the literature, 
those who identify as having ‘No religion’ are found to be younger and 
wealthier than those identifying as ‘Christian’. However, being more highly 
educated or more likely to be male no longer clearly distinguishes the ‘No 
religion’ group from those identifying as ‘Christian’. Further, these factors 
clearly wane over the 17 year time span between the earliest and latest datasets 
analysed in this study. After the strong importance of strength of religious 
beliefs and levels of religious practice, the next most significant factor in 
determining the religious affiliation of New Zealanders is the frequency that 
they attended church as 11-12 yr olds. While the decline in church attendance 
over the second half of the twentieth century may have been justly attributed to 
increasing levels of education and gender parity, future trends in religious 
affiliation may be more significantly driven by the strength of family religious 
heritage and associated beliefs and practices.  
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Socio-economic factors and suicide:  
The importance of inequality 
 
Bruce Curtis, Cate Curtis and Robert W. Fleet 
 
Abstract 
In this article we argue that socio-economic factors, particularly 
income inequality, have greatly contributed to the increase in suicide 
in a particular cohort. Age specific suicide rates drawn from annual 
mortality statistics are analysed. This clearly shows a cohort effect; 
suicide rates among 15-24 year olds rose markedly during the 1980s, 
peaking ten years later, and were supplanted by 25-34 year olds by the 
late 1990s. The first decade of this century has seen the rise of suicide 
rates among 35-44 year olds. The timing and average age of the 
displacement of the most suicidal group is very suggestive: every ten 
years the next oldest 10 year age-specific group becomes the most 
suicidal. This appears linked to a dramatic downturn in the New 
Zealand economy as these individuals reached adulthood; relative 
poverty and social comparisons seem important corollaries.  This 
cohort continues to engage in suicidal behaviour at a significantly 
higher rate than others. 
 
Suicide is a major public health concern internationally.  It is one of the leading 
causes of death and approximately one million people die by suicide each year 
(Nock et al., 2008). For a number of years New Zealand had very high rates of 
suicide when compared to other OECD countries, particularly among young 
people. Over the last two decades suicide has been a leading cause of death for 
young New Zealanders, accounting for approximately 25% of all youth deaths 
(Accident Compensation Corporation, 2003). The total social and economic 
cost of suicide and self-harm combined has been estimated at more than $2 
billion (Langley, 2010) and suicide is identified as a priority in several key 
health strategies (Accident Compensation Corporation, 2003; Ministry of 
Health, 2000). 
          A proliferation of media items, government reports, and resulting public 
concern has led to a number of initiatives aimed at decreasing the incidence of 
suicide in general, and especially youth suicide.    The efforts underlying the 
Youth Suicide Prevention Strategy, in particular, are to be commended, and it 
seems likely that the reduction in the youth suicide rate from the mid-1990s 
owes something to these efforts.  Broader suicide prevention work that is 
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planned and under way in New Zealand is guided by two key documents: The 
New Zealand Suicide Prevention Strategy 2006–2016 (Associate Minister of 
Health, 2006) and The New Zealand Suicide Prevention Action Plan 2008–
2012. The New Zealand Suicide Prevention Strategy contains seven goals that 
outline the key areas for action to prevent suicide. The Action Plan discusses 
how these goals will be operationalised. 
          However, the focus on the causes and prevention of youth suicide, in the 
first instance, and across ‘all ages’ more recently, has obscured two issues: (1) a 
cohort effect of which the 1990s spike in youth rates is a transitory expression 
(as will be discussed in detail below) and (2) social drivers for suicide rather 
than individual factors. 
         Broader social factors including socio-economic deprivation are identified 
in the academic literature as risk factors for suicide (for example, Beautrais, 
2003; Langley, 2010; SPINZ, 2000).  Socio-economic deprivation is often 
discussed as a link to a more stressful lifestyle, less access to resources 
including health care, fewer opportunities for educational achievement (in 
young people), poor housing facilities and lower self-esteem.  However, it is 
rarely discussed in terms of intervention or prevention.  
         In short, while the social origins of depression and hopelessness may be 
acknowledged, individualistic notions of risk and psychopathology are 
frequently privileged, in terms of intervention and prevention (Curtis, 2003, 
2006). As a corollary to this, key risk factors are conceptualized clinically: 
depression and hopelessness as mental illness rather than reactions to life 
circumstances, and while the correlation to economic deprivation has been 
acknowledged there has been little attempt to analyse it. 
          In this article we further introduce the topic by discussing rates and the 
recent trajectory of youth suicide, and compare these to other age groups and a 
particular cohort.  We then discuss social determinants of mental illness, with a 
particular focus on economic and related factors.  
The Youth Suicide Focus 
In the mid-1990s New Zealand had one of the highest rates of suicide across the 
OECD countries (Ministry of Health, 2005c: 7) Rates of youth suicide in New 
Zealand have decreased during recent years, with the most recent statistics 
indicating that they are very similar to 25 years ago (in 1985 the rate per 
100,000 was 10.0, though the average for the period 1985-1989 was 12.64; in 
2010 the rate was 11.5, also with an average of 11.5 for the years 2006-2012). 
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However, public concern remains high, perhaps inflamed by headlines such as 
“Horror over child suicide rate surge” (Shuttleworth & Theunissen, 2012), and 
youth suicide rates are high when compared internationally. The most recently 
available statistics show that the New Zealand male youth suicide rate was the 
fourth-highest in the OECD and the female youth suicide rate was second-
highest (Ministry of Health, 2012). Though recent media reports (Shuttleworth 
& Theunissen, 2012) appear to suggest that this is due to the New Zealand rate 
rising, this is clearly not the case.  
         The age-specific youth suicide rate for 2010 was 17.7 per 100,000 of 
population; in 2000 it was 18.1 and in 1990 the rate was 22.5, while the mean 
for the period during which rates were highest, 1994 to 1998 inclusive, was 
26.5, with a standard deviation of 1.5. These rates indicate a substantial decline 
between the mid-1990s and the current time.  In contrast, in 2010 while the 
youth rate was 17.7, the rate for the 35-39 age group was very similar at 17.6, 
followed by the 45-49 age group with 17.4 (Ministry of Health, 2012).   
        Suicidal behaviour is a common clinical problem and appears to be 
increasing in the wider community (Jacobson & Gould, 2007).  It is a leading 
cause of hospitalization in many countries, including New Zealand (Ministry of 
Health, 2006). Though the focus on youth suicide has been appropriate, we 
argue that the time has come to analyse the data on older age groups more 
thoroughly. 
 
Methods 
The method used in this article is simple: analysis of suicide rates, as collected 
by the New Zealand Ministry of Health from mortality data. We begin by 
analysing New Zealand age-specific (non-standardised) suicide rates in general, 
before narrowing our focus to youth suicide.  We then discuss the evolution of a 
suicidal cohort and briefly discuss the economic drivers of suicide that may 
underlie the creation of this cohort. As the analysis consists of further analysis 
of pre-existing data, and there has been no interaction with persons who may be 
deemed research subjects, ethics approval is not necessary. 
Results 
Rates of suicide 
The total rate of suicide in New Zealand for 1948-2007 (Figure 1) shows no 
immediate trend beyond an uneven cycling between rates of around 10 and 16 
suicides per 100,000 people.  
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2007 the 35-44 age-specific group (mid-point age 40) became most suicidal and 
it seems that this rate is trending upward. Further, the 45-54 age-specific group 
seems also to be trending up. The timing and mid-point age of the displacement 
of the most suicidal cohort is highly suggestive: every ten years the next oldest 
10 year cohort becomes the most suicidal. The mid-point ages of 20 in 1988, 30 
in 1998 and 40 in 2007 begs the question ‘what happened to create this suicide-
prone cohort?’  
          Before moving on to a discussion of economic and social factors it is 
useful to examine the graph in a little more detail. The identification of a cohort 
effect described in Figure 3 (above) relies on the graphic representation of rates 
of suicide by age-specific groups over time. Table 1 (see appendix 1) attempts 
to control for some elements that might impact the graph in Figure 3. The table 
shows yearly variance from the average rate of suicide for each of the 5 x 10-
year age-specific groups (of working age). The variance is calculated simply by 
subtracting the reported rate of suicide (age specific) from the cumulative 
average. This calculation has two benefits. First, it controls for any trend across 
the age-specific groups over time. Second, it allows for some measure of 
significance.  
          The figures shown in Table 1 confirm the cohort effect. That is, people 
born in 1964-1973 (midpoint 1968-1969) appear to be more prone to suicide, 
insofar as the rates of suicide for the 10 year age-specific groups  fluctuate as 
this cohort ages. Unfortunately the end date for the data series of 2007 only 
allows us to capture the effect in the two youngest groups (15-24 years old and 
25-34 years old). These groups show the only significant variance on the 
average rate (an increase) for the entire data set. Significance is indicated where 
variance exceeds two standard deviation from the average rate. Thus, the group 
‘15-24 years old’ has significant increases in 1987-1999, and the group ‘25-34 
years old’ has significant increases 1996-1998. 
Risk factors for suicide  
The main risk factors for suicide are typically regarded as (1) depression, (2) 
hopelessness and (3) deprivation. However, these causes are treated primarily as 
proximate causes, tending to lead to individualistic or subjective 
understandings. We can see this in the suicide literature which overwhelmingly 
treats depression and other ‘mood disorders’ such as anxiety as pathologies – 
illnesses – rather than reactions to stressful events or social circumstances. As 
Lewinsohn and colleagues discussed (1993), suicidal behaviour in young people 
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is considered to be indicative of psychopathology.  Barwick (1992) reported that 
between 90 and 98% of young New Zealanders who complete suicide had a 
diagnosable (although not necessarily diagnosed) mental illness; Beautrais and 
colleagues (Beautrais et al., 1996) reported rates of 90%, and 20% among 
controls.  These findings were based on clinical studies using DSM-III-R 
criteria.  The risk of a suicide attempt increased with increasing psychiatric 
morbidity. The most commonly diagnosed categories of disorders are affective 
disorders, such as depression; personality disorders; substance dependence; 
conduct disorders; adjustment disorders and psychotic disorders (Ministry of 
Health, 1996).   
         In a New Zealand study of people aged under 25 who made medically 
serious suicide attempts, Beautrais, Joyce and Mulder (1998) found strong 
associations between a range of mental illnesses and increased risk of a 
medically serious suicide attempt or attempts. In total, 90% of males and 89% 
of females were found to fit the diagnostic criteria for a mental disorder.   
Broader social factors including socio-economic deprivation are rarely 
discussed in terms of intervention or prevention. 
 
Socio-economic factors 
Stockard and O’Brien (2002) relate changing suicidal cohorts to  disintegrative 
effects following the baby boom.  However, an alternative explanation might be 
found in the end of the long economic boom. This transition from decades of 
post-war prosperity to decades of relative stagnation and decline seems to us to 
be a clear socio-economic marker and a plausible factor behind the cohort effect 
that is apparent in the suicide data (Curtis & Curtis, 2011).  
          The ending of the long boom threw prevailing political and economic 
rationalities into crisis.  The end of the long boom heralded the rise of neoliberal 
economic and social policies worldwide (Peck & Tickell, 2002). New Zealand 
was one of the first movers in this transformation and arguably moved the 
furthest, at least of the OECD nations (Kelsey, 1995, 2002). After a snap 
election in 1984 Labour came to power with a mandate for change but no 
manifesto. This and the following government transformed policy. There is 
room here only to list some of the most pertinent:  the introduction of user-pays 
in health services and tertiary education; the deregulation of the banking, 
finance, power, telecommunication, infrastructure supply and export agriculture 
sectors; cutting unemployment and disability benefits; and abolishing the legal 
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status of trade unions.  This suite of policies was introduced over a ten year 
period, 1985-1995 and arguably impacted those entering adulthood more than 
other groups. 
         Comparison to other societies facing economic crises in the 1980s 
(notably Finland; Ministry of Health, 2005a) demonstrated that the impacts 
could be ameliorated through social and health policy. However, the policies 
adopted in New Zealand may have further embedded tendencies toward an 
expressive explanatory style, with long-term serious sequelae.   
        The transition to adulthood includes a number of stressors (Curtis, 2010). 
We argue that those young people who were born in the context of prosperity 
and perhaps most importantly, expected prosperity, were least able to deal with 
the realities of prolonged stagnation when they reached adulthood. 
Consequently they constructed a life narrative that emphasises the global 
depressive aspects and coupled this with a sense of hopelessness.  This model of 
narrative has been described as the  ‘depressive explanatory style’  (Abramson 
et al.,1989).  
 
The impact of deprivation 
In general, economic and social determinants of health have been clearly 
established internationally (for example, CSDH, 2008). Deprivation has been 
associated with various adverse health outcomes. From the social inequalities 
literature it is evident that those who are most deprived generally experience 
poorer health (Blakely & McLeod, 2009),   including worse mental health. There 
has been some work done on the socio-economic origins of suicide in New 
Zealand, for example, Blakeley and McLeod (2009) and Blakeley, Collings and 
Atkinson (2003) and it must be acknowledged that the New Zealand Suicide 
Prevention Strategy does mention economic disadvantage as a risk factor (and, 
we should point out, this is an ‘all ages’ rather than youth-focused strategy).  
Ministry of Health reports on suicide also note that suicide rates among the 
most socio-economically deprived are significantly higher than for those who 
are the least deprived and some attempts have been made to review social and 
economic factors (Ministry of Health, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2012). These are 
broad claims based on comparisons of suicide rates among working age-groups 
and rates of unemployment, labour-force participation, income, and most 
commonly, decile rating of individual District Health Boards (as an indicator of 
relative deprivation).  Recent New Zealand age-standardised data showed that 
Curtis, Curtis and Fleet 
 
85 
suicide rates increased with deprivation, though there is some year to year 
variation; in 2005 the suicide rate for the most deprived areas was almost 90 
percent higher than it was for the least deprived areas (Ministry of Health, 
2006), though the 2010 data shows the biggest difference between the second 
most deprived and the least deprived (Ministry of Health, 2012). Beautrais’ 
(2003)  review of risk factors includes an extremely brief discussion of social 
and demographic factors including unemployment, and Blakeley and McLeod 
(2009) consider the potential impacts of the global financial crisis as likely to 
stimulate mental illness, including depression. 
         Links are made in the international suicide literature and in other 
government reports between negative emotional states and/or suicide and 
economic deprivation. We also note that a link between suicide and social and 
economic expectations seems likely, with unemployment and unemployment-
related stress being a particular focus of attention (though with somewhat mixed 
findings, perhaps due to confounding factors) (Meltzer et al., 2011; Ministry of 
Health, 2005a, 2005c; Stack & Wasserman, 2007)  and the Coronial Services 
Unit (the media centre for the Coroners Court)  has indicated that 28 percent of 
those who had committed suicide in the most recent annual figures were 
unemployed (cited by Shuttleworth & Theunissen, 2012).  Blakeley and 
colleagues (2003) postulate an association between unemployment and suicide 
(alongside marital status) among New Zealand  men who were aged 18 to 24 on 
census night in 1991 – young men who fit neatly into the cohort under 
discussion – an association not significant among other demographic groups.   
         Blakeley et al. suggest a link between suicide and social fragmentation 
(echoing Durkheim’s seminal work (Durkheim, 1952 - originally published 
1897)). Bartley (1994) discusses relative poverty, social isolation and the loss of 
self-esteem as precursors to poor mental health. Similarly, Lorant and 
colleagues  (2003) found strong evidence for a link between socio-economic 
inequality and depression while Zimmerman and Bell (2006) suggest that the 
impact of income inequality on health may be the result of social comparison 
and reduced social capital.  Lorant’s later work (Lorant et al., 2007) found a 
clear relationship between worsening socio-economic circumstances and 
depression.  In a related vein, Gjerustad and von Soest (2012) have found a 
relationship between depression and anxiety and the non-fulfilment of 
occupational aspirations. Therefore, links between suicide and socio-economic 
factors may be more complex than previously assumed.   
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        Unemployment and /or poverty per se are not simple drivers of suicidal 
behaviour. Rather, relative poverty, self-esteem and social comparison 
involving both others and the imagined life course seem more pertinent. This 
comparative aspect can be no more evident than for those born at the end of the 
Long Boom, the beginning of a long stagnation. We argue that this produces the 
spectre of unfulfilled expectations on the part of individuals, their families and 
communities. These factors support our argument that a specific cohort has been 
significantly impacted by the ongoing and rapidly changed economic milieu 
facing them as they entered adulthood.  
         We suggest that further focus on economic determinants is warranted, 
particularly in the current economic context. While it is very clear that 
deprivation and /or income inequality impact on depression and suicide rates, 
the underlying mechanisms are not entirely clear.  Most importantly prevention 
and intervention measures rarely, if ever, take these underlying factors into 
account.  
       Rea and Callister (2009) have also noted a significant number of negative 
indicators among the cohort of people born from the mid-1960s to the mid-
1970s. This group experienced many of the long-term social changes 
experienced by the 10-year age groups before and after them, such as increased 
participation in education, and a decline in fertility and marriage.  This 
particular cohort also had the lowest rate of employment (and highest rate of 
unemployment and benefit receipt) and left New Zealand in the largest 
numbers, as well as the highest rates of youth suicide. A number of other factors 
that impacted subsequent cohorts also came to the fore at this time, such as 
increased geographical mobility, use of alcohol and other drugs, and use of 
media. However, despite these potential influences, subsequent cohorts have not 
reached the same levels of suicidality. This suggests that this particular cohort is 
unusual. It is then a little problematic that the Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health 
and Development Study (the Dunedin Study) takes its cohort from 
approximately 1000 babies born in Dunedin in 1972-73. We suggest that cohort 
may indeed overlap the ‘suicidal’ one we have emphasized. This raises the 
possibility that the Dunedin Study may be dealing with an atypical cohort which 
might disbar it as a reference point for health policy.  
         The suicide rates for the atypical cohort as it has matured have not 
reproduced the high rates experienced when it was aged 15-24 years old. Yet 
this now middle-aged group does have rates of suicide comparable to, or 
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exceeding current youth rates. We suggest that this may be due to maturational 
processes (for example, the development of coping and problem-solving 
skills(Curtis, 2003)),  and attrition by completed suicide amongst the most 
vulnerable. 
         Similarly, we agree that depression and hopelessness are frequently 
observable in suicidal individuals.  However, we stress the complexity of 
underlying risk factors and contend that:  
the focus on depression and hopelessness as individual factors 
obscures underlying social factors; 
the stigma associated with psychiatric diagnosis reduces the 
likelihood of help-seeking among those that might benefit from it 
(Curtis, 2010); 
the themes underlying depression and hopelessness discussed by Blau 
(1996) and others (lowered self-esteem, a negative view of the world, 
feelings of powerlessness and external locus of control) can equally 
well be attributed to relative economic deprivation and the associated 
factors discussed above, as individual factors. 
Most importantly, we argue that while the shift in focus from youth to ‘all ages’ 
as heralded in the Suicide Prevention Strategy is an important step, 
consideration should be given to specifically targeting the cohort discussed 
above.   
         Finally, we raise the possibility that a new cohort of people at particular 
risk of suicide will shortly be seen, as a result of the current global financial 
crisis.  Barr and colleagues (Barr, Taylor-Robinson, Scott-Samuel, McKee, & 
Stuckler, 2012) have found such a link with regard to the recent increase in 
suicides in England, suggesting that approximately two-fifths of the increase in 
male suicides during the period 2008-2010 (from 126 to 532) can be attributed 
to rising unemployment.   
 
Limitations 
We acknowledge that the issues raised are not clear-cut. There are a number of 
social factors that came to prominence in the years prior to this cohort reaching 
maturity, and may act as confounding variables, such as increased substance 
misuse, changing population structures, survivability of suicide methods, 
increased social and economic inequity and delayed transition into the 
workforce. We have touched on these above and would welcome further multi-
faceted research on this fascinating cohort. Undoubtedly, this cohort appears to 
have remained at particular risk for suicide. While later cohorts have been 
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subject to the same social factors - which for the most part have increased 
subsequently – the suicide rate within these later bands have not reached the 
same heights.     
 
Conclusion 
We have highlighted the existence of a cohort effect in suicide among those 
born around 1964-1973 (midpoint 1968-1969), noted a correlation with the 
major transformation in socio-economic circumstances around this at this time, 
and suggested that the typical individualised focus on drivers of suicide might 
be enhanced with a better appreciation of this socio-economic transformation 
and the long-term impacts on a cohort who may have felt its affects most 
keenly.  
         In this article we have argued that the decrease in youth suicide seen this 
century is in large part due to this cohort moving into the next age brackets (25-
34, then 35-44), which are markedly higher than previous cohorts.  We suggest 
that young people born at the end of the Long Boom, when reaching maturity, 
faced an environment vastly different to that of the previous generation, in 
which social and economic stressors were prevalent.  We argue for a suicide-
prone cohort that is exceptional rather than typical - a group that, when reaching 
maturity, then also faced an environment vastly different to that of the previous 
age groups, in which social and economic stressors were prevalent.  The marked 
variation in suicide trends indicates that social factors must come into play and 
factors related to social and economic deprivation appear to be correlated to 
increased suicide rates. 
          Comparison to other societies facing similar situations demonstrated that 
the impacts could be ameliorated through social and health policy. However, the 
policies adopted in New Zealand may have further embedded tendencies toward 
a depressive explanatory style, with long-term serious sequelae.   
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Appendix 1: Table 1:Variance in suicide rate from average cumulative suicide rate 
Year 15-24yo 25-34yo 35-44yo 45-54yo 55-64yo 
1949 -0.03094 3.533025 -2.49071 -2.92236 -0.00087 
1950 -1.34808 -4.69362 -0.39432 -5.83671 1.782755 
1951 -1.63686 1.101484 1.167233 3.512788 -0.61572 
1952 -0.86208 1.116971 -1.47774 -2.36582 7.594198 
1953 -1.12262 -4.3783 3.031558 -0.4509 2.631601 
1954 -3.45799 0.52485 -3.06537 -4.73146 2.361678 
1955 -0.47898 0.708348 -0.91653 -0.40646 2.349187 
1956 -1.8782 -1.9794 2.636985 7.696232 -1.61824 
1957 1.022362 2.060383 -1.68803 2.713002 -0.02761 
1958 0.588291 -2.35826 2.828932 6.964505 -4.93572 
1959 0.784525 0.146509 2.757463 -2.63026 -5.57631 
1960 -0.43641 0.295475 5.879027 0.902 1.389291 
1961 0.412614 0.994 0.666079 -3.35451 -5.0314 
1962 -1.09846 1.737968 3.728083 -4.50899 -0.77727 
1963 1.667915 -1.69553 1.309138 4.721719 1.881548 
1964 -1.24425 -1.00054 -3.12058 0.303672 7.122578 
1965 0.631355 0.213684 -0.57275 3.304803 0.889668 
1966 0.720731 -4.17946 1.327445 5.075896 1.309638 
1967 1.696461 1.278137 4.635035 -0.47805 2.574599 
1968 0.836481 -0.14103 3.358455 4.225997 1.401248 
1969 2.991299 2.764069 0.137903 -1.0598 -0.07674 
1970 3.184787 -2.30553 3.391831 -0.63237 -3.41342 
1971 2.194922 -2.25437 -0.04736 0.138668 -4.04636 
1972 2.046352 3.190159 -0.82377 -2.37906 -3.49083 
1973 2.220712 -0.2025 -4.2973 1.929963 -3.70767 
1974 1.468431 0.634506 1.393932 -4.67836 1.782213 
1975 4.197491 0.230357 2.670472 -3.01409 -0.59628 
1976 2.100786 1.143725 0.066733 -3.81788 2.039088 
1977 7.047834 7.236736 4.807608 0.261503 -3.52001 
1978 4.085667 1.778718 0.036357 -1.21539 2.103162 
1979 2.218457 2.929961 -1.12603 0.325857 -3.68434 
1980 8.132228 4.162701 -0.60089 -2.26185 -8.43099 
1981 4.308872 1.496016 0.855986 -4.18632 -2.87279 
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1982 4.501926 4.602567 -0.28938 -4.70545 4.797363 
1983 5.273962 3.099563 2.997327 -5.28208 -5.01135 
1984 5.332917 7.322848 1.466967 -3.2362 -2.85379 
1985 5.726478 2.42002 -2.89349 -3.6794 -6.88088 
1986 8.641226 4.100976 5.231473 -0.70823 -3.0161 
1987 12.36067 8.962781 0.671731 0.816875 -2.40901 
1988 15.09196 8.112013 0.272543 -0.58614 1.010333 
1989 14.85032 7.618172 1.084195 -0.7713 -7.03283 
1990 14.48234 5.833034 3.068136 -2.51767 -3.98627 
1991 13.95653 10.03544 3.72995 1.90653 -9.42534 
1992 14.37696 9.839639 1.732092 -0.70818 1.635159 
1993 13.49547 7.944016 0.678613 -4.11804 -8.12557 
1994 15.40794 9.649623 0.634498 -3.13516 -2.98732 
1995 18.64063 9.508242 2.970899 -0.35307 -7.2173 
1996 16.40004 13.20035 1.459176 -3.10713 -6.84768 
1997 15.5456 14.31275 4.429345 -4.29214 -6.27304 
1998 15.19822 11.33573 5.851768 -4.28096 -3.84551 
1999 11.48742 9.794246 4.872538 -3.72426 -8.00735 
2000 6.769135 10.10961 0.13119 -5.01005 -7.06129 
2001 9.226083 8.965466 5.995779 -7.42747 -7.5523 
2002 5.584423 6.588477 3.539101 -4.53048 -6.85893 
2003 5.048041 5.10743 4.2651 -0.29139 -6.23449 
2004 7.391652 4.14202 2.966469 -5.08455 -6.16011 
2005 6.164295 6.862259 3.201058 -2.31788 -5.70064 
2006 7.487008 5.114979 2.803289 -2.72569 -5.49819 
2007 3.110109 2.928285 3.905776 -2.1295 -7.705 
(Note: the standard deviation for variance from the cumulative average is 5.081505. Two standard 
deviations = 10.16301. )  
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But Wait There’s More: Why Pie Carts are Classic Items of 
Kiwiana 
 
Lindsay Neill 
 
Abstract 
This article proposes a conceptual framework outlining the 
elements identifying an object as “kiwiana” by examining four 
items of existing kiwiana; The Buzzy Bee, jandals, the Swanndri 
and the Wattie’s brand. Using the framework developed from this 
analysis this article then argues that New Zealand’s remaining 
“stinker” shaped pie carts should also be classified as kiwiana 
because of their congruence to existing kiwiana. To achieve a fuller 
understanding of kiwiana and its association to Pākehā (the group 
most associated to it within academic literature) this article 
questions the relationship between Pākehā and kiwiana. The article 
then recommends that in order to fully understand this relationship 
research is needed within the other descriptors of New Zealand’s 
early settler/colonizers, (New Zealander, Kiwi and European), that 
investigates their relationship, thoughts and feelings about kiwiana.  
 
Introduction: 
Kiwiana reflects New Zealand's vernacular culture because it includes everyday 
items of cultural significance that are popularly assumed to be uniquely New 
Zealand (Bell, 1996; Wolfe and Barnett, 2001). Bell (2004: 175) defines 
kiwiana as positive ‘symbols of the nation’, while Wolfe and Barnett (2001) 
note that kiwiana not only provides an aesthetic, but also a vehicle for 
individuals to form and recognize an identity. Consequently, kiwiana enhances 
themes of nationhood that for many Pākehā New Zealanders provides a cultural 
text serving to differentiate them within an increasingly 
cosmopolitan/globalised world (Bell, 1996; 2004; 2012). Wolfe and Barnett 
(1989) note that kiwiana often evokes personal and social narratives reflecting 
the wider social changes that New Zealand and New Zealanders have 
experienced over time.  
        According to Wolfe and Barnett (2007), the classic list of kiwiana 
includes: 
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‐ five mass-manufactured items: the Buzzy Bee, iron roofing, 
jandals, New Zealand Railways cups, the Swanndri;  
‐ ten commercial items: bungee-jumping, rugby, sheep (farming), 
stamps, number 8 wire, Footrot Flats, Four Square shops, the 
‘Taranaki gate’, Black (All) and the bach/crib;  
‐ six food-based items: Wattie’s peas; cheese (Ches and Dale), ice 
cream, baking powder; Lemon & Paeroa and Weet-Bix; and  
‐ seven items reflecting New Zealand’s flora and fauna: grass, the 
godwit, the kiwi, paua, cabbage trees, the silver fern and the 
pohutukawa.  
While these items promote themes of identity, community and nation, they are 
overlaid with a thick veneer of nostalgia. The nostalgia inherent to kiwiana is 
akin to that evoked by Mason's (1962) play The End of the Golden Weather; a 
reflection of times gone by that in retrospect appear to be more comforting than 
contemporary life. This reassurance was ‘officially’ represented in November 
2012 when many items of classic kiwiana were featured as decorations on top 
of cakes made to celebrate Prince Charles’s 64th birthday held at Government 
House in Wellington. 
Many kiwiana items reflect New Zealand’s primary industries: the land 
and agriculture. Items of kiwiana have emerged over time but, generally, have 
gained popularity since the 1940s. This timing is significant because, as Wolfe 
and Barnett (2001) remind us, kiwiana reflects characteristics of our nation’s 
commercial growth and spirit of enterprise - the renowned ability for New 
Zealanders to “turn their hand to anything”, the “number 8 wire mentality”. 
These themes find their genesis with New Zealand's pioneer culture, one 
pragmatically based within the necessities of everyday life. However, the 
identity that kiwiana reflects is one that is firmly anchored in past achievement, 
not future prospect. 
Kiwiana and Pākehā Identity: More Research is Needed 
Kiwiana is a key part of New Zealand’s vernacular material culture. Lowenthal 
(1979; 1995) suggests that material culture provides a focus for shared values 
and narratives. This links to Bell’s (2004, p. 175) notion that items of kiwiana 
are not only ‘symbols of nation’, but also identity touchstones. This recognition 
is especially evident within the Pākehā ‘baby-boom’ demographic because this 
cohort grew up with many of the items that have been later classified as 
kiwiana. However, exposure to items of kiwiana is not limited to this group. 
Subsequent generations are familiar with kiwiana because of their baby-boom 
generation parents and grandparents.  
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         Since kiwiana symbolises and reinforces ways of being that are strongly 
linked with New Zealand’s industry and history it evokes nostalgia. Tannock 
(1995: 454) suggests that nostalgia: 
provokes a positively evaluated past world in response to a 
deficient present world … the positively evaluated past is 
approached as a source for something now perceived to be missing 
… invoking the past, the nostalgic subject may be involved in 
escaping or evading, in critiquing, or in mobilizing, to overcome 
the present experience of loss of identity, loss of agency or absence 
of community … nostalgia approaches the past as a stable source 
of value and meaning. 
Kiwiana spans the categories of mass-manufacturing, food and primary 
industry, as well as commercial items that were most popular between 1914 and 
the 1950s, including the Swanndri (1914); the Wattie’s brand (1934); the Buzzy 
Bee (1940s), and jandals (1950s). Bell (1996; 2004; 2012) has written 
extensively on kiwiana, linking it to Pākehā identity. However, new research is 
needed that enhances and extends Bell’s work. This new research needs to ask 
basic questions that include, to which groups (class) of Pākehā and of what age 
and gender does Bell (1996; 2004; 2012) refer? Further research will illuminate 
which age and gender groups of Pākehā are most interested in kiwiana and 
which groups are not. Not only that, but because the catalogue of kiwiana has 
had no recent additions, new research might reveal that Pākehā identity (in so 
far as it is symbolized by kiwiana) has not only stalled, because of the lack of 
new symbols, but further highlight that it has tended to focus on past 
achievement, rather than future prospect. New research should extend into the 
other domains of classification reflecting settler/colonist descendent identity, 
specifically New Zealander, Kiwi, European New Zealander. Until such 
research is conducted, we must assume that the potency of kiwiana’s meaning is 
a pan-class Pākehā phenomenon.  
Kiwiana: Appropriated Symbols, Invented Traditions 
Almost all kiwiana items have been appropriated from other cultural contexts. 
Excepting flora and fauna, none of the four items focused on this research are of 
true New Zealand origin, rather, each item has been adapted and then marketed 
within New Zealand. The jandal is derived from Japanese traditional footwear, 
the Swanndri from the German Loden jacket, the Buzzy Bee from an early 
American Fisher Price toy and Watties Industries were modelled on other, 
overseas cannery operations. Arguably, the adapted nature of these items 
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reflects New Zealanders’ ability to “turn their hand to anything”; the “number 8 
wire mentality” of innovation founded within earlier times.  
         Bell (2012b) proposes that Māoriana is a category of kiwiana. Māoriana 
refers to objects which draw their design or decoration from traditional Māori 
symbols and artefacts. However a keyword search of academic databases using 
Māoriana (as key word), only recovers articles relating to the ecology of an 
inshore mussel species; Aulacomya Māoriana and not items of popular or 
historic Māori culture. Māoriana, as material culture, lacks the catalogue of 
supporting academic literature that kiwiana enjoys. This lack suggests two 
things; that Māoriana needs research champions like Wolfe or Bell, and/or that 
many academics consider Māoriana to be an unimportant or un-recognised 
research area. 
          Māoriana is considered kiwiana’s “poor country cousin”. This is 
reinforced by Shand (2002) who reminds us that items of Māoriana like the 
koru, have undergone a dislocation within Māori culture, one that has subsumed 
the koru through its appropriation by Pākehā. The koru appears on stamps, 
currency and ‘in the architecture of important institutions [like] the Auckland 
War Memorial Museum [and] the Napier [branch of the] Bank of New Zealand’ 
(Shand, 2002: 50), not to mention the tail branding logo on Air New Zealand 
aircraft. Locating the koru within these contexts presents a unifying image of 
New Zealand, one enhancing the legitimacy of the colonial commercial 
institutions they adorn. Yet, Air New Zealand brands its emblematic koru “the 
Pacific wave” and not koru.  
         Shand (2002) notes that the koru is a primary Māori design this is often 
used in tattooing, whare rafter painting and waka paddle decoration. Shand 
(2002: 51) posits that Air New Zealand’s (re)-branding maintains ‘the goodwill 
of the airlines’ consumer base’ while avoiding the ‘risk of engaging in any sort 
of conflict over asserted interests that different Māori tribal groups might claim 
with respect to this form of the koru.’ While Māori symbols like the koru are 
appropriated and changed to suit a marketing need, their appropriation has 
conveniently, and in the case of the Air New Zealand koru, circumvented Māori 
involvement. The appropriation of the koru shows that constructs of Māoriana 
maybe more mobile than kiwiana. This claim is enhanced by the fact that 
proactive Māori have sought to register themes of authenticity and quality 
within Māori cultural symbols through the development of Toi Iho; ‘a registered 
Māori trademark of quality and authenticity’ (Toi Iho, 2012: n.p.). This move 
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contrasts with the static and retrospective view that kiwiana promotes because it 
indicates that Māori and Māoriana hold a forward and proactive views toward 
items of Māoriana. 
 
Kiwiana: A Conceptual Framework 
 
Figure 1:  
 
Analysis of Wolfe and Barnett’s (2001) research reveals that the Buzzy Bee, 
jandals, the Swanndri, and the Wattie’s brand hold the following common 
characteristics: 
- although popularly believed to be so, they are not unique to New 
Zealand 
- these items have been adapted within (and by) New Zealand 
culture 
- they hold across multi-generational life-spans 
- they began by evoking personal meaning that developed wider and 
national significance 
- they often hold icon status for their stakeholders 
- their significance is fuelled by media. 
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These constructs are illustrated in Figure 1. This conceptual model defines the 
commonality and significance of the four items of kiwiana. 
Pie Carts: Case for Kiwiana Inclusion  
Against this background, this article asks are New Zealand’s remaining eight 
classic shaped pie carts contenders for kiwiana status? This is an important 
question because, as Neill, Bell and Bryant (2008: 11) remind us, pie carts were, 
during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s popular and prominent dining venues: 
In the days of the six o’clock swill, and long before the advent of 
swanky café culture, where else could you be assured of a hot feed 
and a warm welcome, in any New Zealand town or city? 
While Neill, Bell and Bryant (2008) note the abundance of pie carts during this 
period, today classical shaped pie carts are a rarity. The classic pie cart is 
identifiable through a combination of business longevity and their characteristic 
‘stinker’ shape. This shape is an elongated caravan supporting an arched roof. 
Figure 2: The Classical Stinker Shape. 
 
Source: Eastern Southland Museum (2008) 
 
Classification using both shape and longevity (pie carts that have traded for 
longer than 20 years) means that New Zealand has only eight authentically 
shaped pie carts. These carts are located in Kawakawa, Auckland (2), Tokoroa, 
Wellington, Greymouth and Stewart Island. (Alexandra’s pie cart, while 
included in this list, was destroyed by fire in 2012 and its return to trading is 
pending an insurance claim.) While this is not a large number, they and their 
predecessors are, and have been, socio-temporal venues contributing to the life 
narratives of many of New Zealanders. Neill (2009) suggests that pie carts 
provide pan-class social spaces, especially for their staff and customers. 
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Consequently, pie carts have made significant contributions to New Zealand’s 
culture and society, because they have provided venues where customers and 
staff can negotiate and reflect upon the wider socio/political and economic 
changes that have impacted upon them.  
          To appreciate why pie carts should be considered as kiwiana it is 
necessary to understand not only their importance and history, but also how 
they link to constructs of kiwiana. McGill (1989: 101) suggests that pie carts are 
‘caravan(s) with a [top-]hinged side door through which fast foods are 
dispensed, [most notably] pie, pea and pud; [a] mince pie with mashed potato 
and peas sloshed over with gravy’. Jim Geddes, Eastern Southland Museum 
curator, believes that the caravan form of the pie cart was influenced by that of 
the rural ‘stinker’ (Neill, Bell and Bryant, 2008: 143). ‘Stinkers’ were straight-
sided horse-drawn wagons covered by an arched roof. They were used by farm 
and field workers as rest huts. ‘Stinkers’ gained their distinctive title because of 
the heady aroma of combined food and sweat from the bucolic field work that 
permeated them during worker rest periods. 
         Contemporarily, pie carts are commonplace in cities like Santiago, Chile, 
and in Los Angeles where ‘Loncheras’, serve taco-style foods and are operated 
by Latino families (Hermosillo, 2012, cited in Neill, Bell and Hemmington, 
2012: 105). In New Zealand, however, pie carts are in decline — a stark 
contrast to their prolific presence in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Back then, 
most country towns had a pie cart, with many of them located ‘in the heart of 
town, often outside the post office’ (Neill, Bell and Bryant, 2008: 9). Pie carts 
not only served fast food, burgers and the like, but also provided a handy stop-
off point for travellers lost and seeking direction. Pie carts are night-time 
traders, operating from around 7 pm until 6–7 am the following morning. They 
are towed on and off site, often by a small tractor, and use the same trading spot 
because of their electric and water/plumbing requirements. Enhanced hygiene 
regulations, amendments to street trading policy, and intense competition from 
increased ‘mainstream’ food retailers have combined to reduce pie cart 
numbers. 
          Part of the pie cart’s appeal is its customer diversity. Peter Washer’s 
family have operated Auckland city’s White Lady pie cart since 1948. Peter 
recalled: 
they’d come after the six o’clock swill. Then a surge of customers 
followed as the pictures got out, and then in more recent times, as 
nightclubs and bars have stayed open longer, we now have a surge 
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(of customers) at 2am. I remember in the 1970s when marijuana 
use was big, people would arrive at the cart with the ‘munchies’ 
and eat a couple of burgers each. We had great food sales, and 
because everyone was mellow, very little violence. Now 
amphetamine-based party drugs are popular and we have noticed a 
big increase in water and drink sales as takers stave off dehydration 
(cited in Neill, Bell and Bryant, 2008: 46). 
The ritual and diversity of pie cart customers was echoed by a pie cart worker: 
we had everybody [as customers], everybody from sort of street 
workers to management. Really the thing you saw while working at 
the White Lady is that there is not that much difference between 
those people. One might be a millionaire, and with another guy 
boozed to the eyeballs and a lady with a $2000 dress and the $500 
haircut will (all) fill a spot in the gutter (cited in Neill, 2009: 128). 
 
Liebling Hoeflich from Tokoroa recalled how their pie cart reflected ‘families’ 
and the local community:  
our customers are like us, they come and they go. We have seen 
whole families grow up in Tokoroa [while the Hoeflich’s owned 
the cart]. Some leave town and never return. Others are away for a 
while, and then they come home. We have seen our customer’s 
family’s change, just as they have seen our family change over 
time. It’s exciting to think about the part our cart has played in the 
lives of so many people and how much the cart means to our 
community (cited in Neill, Bell and Bryant, 2008: 62). 
 
One pie cart owner succinctly observed:  
my customers ignore the likes of Burger King and McDonald’s to 
eat what they feel is truly indigenous. I like to think that we are 
akin to Marilyn Monroe’s beauty spot-to some an indication of a 
malignant melanoma, to others a defining uniqueness (cited in 
Neill, Bell and Bryant, 2008: 48). 
Specifically, and like kiwiana, pie carts have been adapted by New Zealanders 
for the New Zealand marketplace. Pie carts have endured over time and reflect 
the narratives and lifestyles of their stakeholders, thus generating meaning, 
symbolism and nostalgia. Like kiwiana, pie carts have benefited from media 
coverage. This has served to galvanise support for the carts, rather than detract 
from their public appeal. As well as these parallels pie carts also evoke other 
similarities to kiwiana: 
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‐ New Zealanders’ propensity for innovation; the ‘can do’/ ‘turn your 
hand to anything’ self-sufficiency and adaptability; characteristic 
themes associated with industry and hard work.  
‐ A dynamic cultural link between the cart and its customers. Pie 
carts signify this through more than monetary exchange for goods 
and services rather they represent ongoing and mutually beneficial 
relationships between owner/staff and customers. This promotes 
pie carts as being venues that help stakeholders mediate wider 
social change. 
‐ A relaxed and informal hospitality, promoting relationships formed 
through the materiality of food. These relationships transcend and 
enhance wider feelings of community and identity. 
‐ Lineage and continuance: families as customers, families as 
owners. Many pie cart stakeholder narratives note that visiting a pie 
cart brought about feelings of community as well as individual 
completeness (Neill, 2009; Neill, Bell and Bryant, 2008). 
‐ Constructs of the ‘average New Zealander’, consequent to their 
pan-class appeal within successive generational narrative. 
‐ Icon status is attributed to pie carts by their stakeholders (Neill, 
2009). 
These themes are synonymous to the meaning inherent within items of kiwiana 
and are demonstrated in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: 
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Conclusion: 
While this article has provided evidence that supports the importance of kiwiana 
within New Zealand, it has also revealed that an academic gap exists within the 
link between Pākehā identity and kiwiana. Consequently, this article 
recommends that more research be undertaken examining the relationship 
between kiwiana and Pākehā by not only researching this group but also self-
identifying New Zealanders, Kiwis, and  European New Zealanders within a 
mixed age, gender and socio-economic grouping to solicit their relationship 
with kiwiana. 
        However the aim of this article was to question if the existing eight 
“stinker” shaped pie carts should be considered items of kiwiana. To facilitate 
this, this article has compared the characteristics of four existing kiwiana items 
and then provided a conceptual model of their attributes. Subsequently, this 
model was used to compare the attributes of the eight remaining pie carts. 
Because pie carts parallel the identifiers within the conceptual model of 
kiwiana, this research suggests that “stinker” shaped pie carts should be added 
to the existing catalogue of kiwiana. 
          Within this comparison, the fluidity of Māoriana was noted. This 
contrasts the stultified nature of kiwiana as a symbol of Pākehā identity. If 
Pākehā identity has stalled, as signified by its symbols, then a revision of these 
symbols is necessary. Including pie carts as kiwiana would be a sound starting 
point. The fact that pie carts attract an ethnically and socio-economic diverse 
clientele reinforces their important symbolic contribution to a revised catalogue 
of kiwiana. The inclusion of pie carts challenges the current primacy that 
kiwiana holds and promotes a revision for Pākehā, Māori and self-identifying 
New Zealanders, Kiwis, and Europeans about the symbols that represent them. 
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From Bad Women to Mad Women: A Genealogical Analysis of 
Abortion Discourses in Aotearoa New Zealand 
 
Marita Leask 
 
Although abortion discourses are often polarised into ‘a woman’s right to 
choose’ versus a ‘foetus’s right to life’, mental health is emerging as a 
prevailing paradigm for conceiving of abortion in New Zealand.  Abortion 
remains criminalised in New Zealand and a literal reading of the legislation 
governing abortion would suggest that it is only available in limited 
circumstances.  However, due to a broad interpretation of the mental health 
ground, less than two percent of requests for abortions are refused (Abortion 
Supervisory Committee, 2003).  As Myra Marx Ferree and others argue, the 
institutional context of abortion law affects which discourses become culturally 
resonant (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002). The harnessing of the 
mental health discourse in relation to abortion reshapes women’s status as 
subjects in reproductive decision making.  Whereas in the 1930s and 1960s 
women were morally condemned for making a selfish decision or murdering an 
autonomous foetus respectively, the mental health discourse calls women’s very 
mental capacity to choose into question.  Thus, women are painted as 
unfortunate victims of circumstance who require guidance through the law or 
psychological support.  The argument for a woman’s right to choose conceives 
women as autonomous agents who are best placed to make reproductive 
decisions governing their bodies and their lives.  However, in challenging 
women’s status as moral actors, the mental health paradigm insidiously 
challenges women’s very ability to choose abortion.  
 
Bad Women: Natalist Condemnation of ‘Selfish Women’ 
In the 1930s, abortion was depicted primarily as a selfish act.  As Barbara 
Brookes (1981) has shown, women who ‘selfishly’ had abortions were 
condemned on nationalist, pro-natalist grounds for abrogating their sacred duty 
of motherhood and in doing so threatening the very future of New Zealand’s 
(white) population. The Dominion newspaper’s 1937 polemic that “the selfish 
refusal to bear or rear children is a crime against the nation” is emblematic of 
conceptions of abortion is selfish (Van der Krogt, 1997:16). In 1936 the 
problem of illegal abortions became so prominent that Parliament 
commissioned a Committee of Inquiry into the Various Aspects of the Problem 
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of Abortion in New Zealand, which is often termed the McMillan Report after 
one of its authors’ (McMillan et al., 1939).  
Barbara Brookes (1981: 116-134) argues that the discursive construction of 
women who have abortions as selfish was evident in the submissions to the 
1936-7 Committee.  In the submissions, doctors’ groups and the “bastion of 
motherhood” the Mothers Union challenged abortion on natalist grounds that 
reified women’s ‘natural’ destiny of motherhood (Brookes, 1981: 124). The 
Mothers Union blamed abortion on the selfishness of women, and their families, 
who did not want to be inconvenienced by bearing a child (Brookes, 1981; 
Krogt, 1998). Likewise, Dr Doris Gordon, founding member of the Obstetric 
and Gynaecological Society, called for a ‘return’ to the celebration of 
motherhood wherein “motherhood is their mission and barrenness their 
disgrace” (Brookes, 1981: 124). 
          Conceptions of motherhood were closely tied with nationalist, pro-natalist 
rhetoric.  Thus, the condemnation of women who had abortions as selfish was 
also based on widespread concern about New Zealand’s perceived (white) 
population decline and “race suicide” (Van der Krogt, 1998: 298). The 
government too was concerned about an aging population and a declining tax 
base and considered that it was women’s duty to bear more than one child to 
“counteract race suicide and increased taxation” (Brookes, 1981: 128). Labour 
Minister W. E Perry argued that “self-indulgence and a widespread disregard of 
the moral law” threatened the New Zealand race and accordingly the capacity to 
defend the country in future wars (Van der Krogt, 1998: 326).  Likewise, the 
New Zealand Truth criticised the “pure selfishness” of “white women” who 
violated “the laws of nature” thereby making New Zealand vulnerable to 
“colored races” (as cited in Krogt, 1998: 136). 
Women’s vanity, frivolity and selfishness were important threads in the 
submissions to the McMillian Commission and in the final report.  One 
submission argued that women have abortions for “preservation of the female 
figure and youthful charm [and] social life without juvenile ties” (as cited in 
Brookes, 1981: 128).  The idea that abortion is a selfish act saturated the 
McMillan Report which made an:  
...appeal to the womanhood of New Zealand in so far as selfish and 
unworthy motives have entered into our family life, to consider the 
grave physical and moral dangers, not to speak of the dangers of race 
suicide which are involved (McMillan et al., 1939: 17). 
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These discursive constructions of abortion in the 1930s reified (white) 
motherhood as a national duty and condemned any ‘unnatural’ and ‘selfish’ 
deviation from women’s duties.  This individualistic focus on ‘selfish’ women 
causing the abortion problem diverted focus on the socio-economic factor that 
made raising a large family difficult (Brookes, 1981).  Abortion was seen as a 
moral danger because it countered central ideas about white women’s role as 
“mothers of the race” (Smith, 1989: 12) and thus reproducers of New Zealand’s 
national identity (Nagel, 1998).   
 
Deserving, Unselfish Women 
Alongside the figure of the selfish woman, a conception of the desperate and 
deserving woman developed (Leslie, 2010). This is evident in the McMillan 
Report where women’s abortion decisions were divided between ‘worthy’ and 
‘unworthy’ motives (McMillan et al., 1939). While the Committee condemned 
women’s “selfishness and thoughtlessness” in choosing abortion, they put 
forward certain “heterogeneous” circumstances where having another child 
would place too much of a burden on a mother and her family (McMillan et al., 
1939: 11, 18). Accordingly, they detailed the difficulties of: 
the mother with health undermined and reserve vitality reduced to a 
minimum by the strain of bearing and rearing a large family.  She 
approaches the menopausal stresses with anxiety and apprehension, 
having done her duty to family and race, often having lived an 
exemplary self-sacrificing life, the intolerable contemplation of a late 
pregnancy drives her to desperate measures often for the first time in 
her life and the relatively young, tired, anaemic, debilitated mother, 
with a number of young children born at very close intervals...poor 
housing or domestic arrangements, and completely exhausted with the 
incessant round of cleaning, cooking and the strain of the inevitable 
fretfulness of a number of young children (McMillan et al., 1939: 18). 
In these circumstances, the Committee argued that women should “obtain the 
respite that the health of themselves and their present and future families 
demand” (McMillan et al., 1939: 19).  It is notable that the women who the 
Committee considers worthy of respite from successive pregnancies are selfless 
mothers who act in the best interests of their families. These women, having 
done their duty to race and country, seem exempt from the Committee’s 
exhortation to women who have abortions for “selfish and unworthy motives” 
(McMillan et al., 1939: 17). 
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Charlotte Leslie (2010) argues the figure of the desperate woman became 
increasingly dominant in discourses on abortion in the 1930s.  She contends that 
after the Great War and its ensuing economic upheavals, many were 
sympathetic to women falling pregnant with no social or economic ability to 
raise children.  Thus, abortion activists such as Britain’s Abortion Law Reform 
Association presented unwanted pregnancy as a threat to the woman’s existing 
family which was seen as unable to cope with the added financial strain. 
Furthermore, Leslie (2010: 10) argues that the post-World War One climate 
gave rise to a new era of experiences being conceived in psychological concerns 
which allowed for abortion to be seen in psychiatric terms. 
Opposition to abortion often remained focused on the figure of the selfish 
woman, who sought abortion for frivolous reasons.  This Janus-faced view of 
women seeking abortion as alternatively selfish or desperate is epitomised by 
the trial of Dr Bourne in 1938 which held that it was legal to perform an 
abortion to prevent a girl from becoming a “mental wreck” (R v Bourne [1939] 
1 KB 687). The facts of the Bourne case were unique and compelling - a 
fourteen year old girl who became pregnant as a result of gang rape threatened 
suicide if she was forced to give birth. Leslie (2010: 12) argues that the 
sympathetic facts of the case influenced the English High Court to hold that the 
abortion was legal using highly creative statutory interpretation.  Through 
importing a section from another Act and applying a broad meaning to the term 
“life”, Justice Macnaghten instructed the jury that carrying out an abortion to 
stop the woman becoming “a physical or mental wreck” was legal.  The girl in 
the Bourne case epitomised the figure of the deserving woman: she was 
innocent, sexually chaste and extremely desperate.   
The Bourne decision was adopted in New Zealand in R v Anderson (1951) 
and the test was clarified by R v Woolnough (1977: 519) as whether abortion 
was required to ‘‘preserve the mother from a real or substantial risk [to life] or 
of serious harm to her mental or physical health.” The judicially recognised 
mental health exception became enshrined in legislation in 1977 with the 
passage of the Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act which remains the 
law today.1 Accordingly, the mental health ground can be seen as a way for 
‘deserving’ women to access abortion. However, this is not a neutral way to 
                                                            
1Note that the 1977 legislation included the phrase “the danger [of continuing the pregnancy] 
cannot be averted by any other means”) which proved unworkable.  The legislation was 
altered in 1978 – see Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977. 
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ensure abortion access.  The mental health ground splits women seeking 
abortion into a deserving/undeserving dichotomy which discursively constructs 
women in a very limited way and policies their sexual and moral conduct.  
Discourses linking abortion and mental health can be seen as a strategic truth to 
limit the number of abortions to ‘deserving’ cases.  This allows abortions to 
occur, while pathologising them (Baird, 2001).  These discourses undercut the 
embodied, dyadic nature of pregnancy and women’s autonomy (Naffine, 1990).  
Women are not trusted to make decisions about their pregnancies and thus 
abortion decisions are subject to medical-juridicial authority (Crimes Act 1961; 
Abortion, Sterilisation and Contraception Act 1977). 
It is notable that, in the McMillan Report and newspaper articles, abortion 
is conceived in natalist, nationalist terms and not as a foetal issue.  In the 
submissions to the McMillan Committee, the foetus is mentioned only in 
passing in relation to its potential with contentions that an aborted foetus might 
be a future All Black or defend New Zealand in a future war (Brookes, 1981: 
128, 131; Van der Krogt, 1998: 324).  While these examples mark the foetus as 
important, its importance is based on the extrinsic values of supporting New 
Zealand’s national sporting and military might. Likewise, The Dominion’s 1937 
article entitled “New Zealand’s Unborn Citizens” emphasises foetal potential in 
nationalist terms (as cited in Brookes, 1981: 131).  
Nonetheless, Brookes’ examination of church periodicals in the 1930s 
demonstrates that there was some foetal-based opposition to abortion.  These 
church publications explicitly ground the foetus in their anti-abortion stance – 
terming abortion the “murder of the unborn” (Brookes, 1981: 131-132). 
Accordingly, these church publications are significant for viewing foetuses as 
having moral status. Thus, it is important to note that discourses are fluid, 
overlapping, complex and contradictory.  While there are dominant discursive 
constructions in certain historical periods, this is not to say that these are the 
only discursive formations evident. 
 
Women as Murderers: The Development of Foetal-based Discourses 
The figure of the foetus did not gain prominence in New Zealand until the mid-
1960s.  As Susan Erikson (2007) argues the rise of the personification of the 
foetus was the product of historical forces converging and gaining an 
unprecedented degree of public exposure. Whereas prior to foetal imagery 
technology, the foetus was largely limited to anatomists and the medical 
Leask 
 
109 
profession, anti-abortion activists use of foetal imagery gained widespread 
cultural resonance in New Zealand in the 1960s and 1970s (McCulloch, 2013; 
Molloy, 1996). In 1963, Dr. William Liley, of the National Women’s Hospital, 
brought the foetus into New Zealand’s medical and public consciousness when 
he successfully pioneered pre-natal blood transfusion for foetuses with blood 
diseases (Liley, 1963). After the 1967 passage of the Abortion Act in England, 
New Zealand anti-abortion groups joined together in an effort to prevent such a 
liberalisation of abortion laws. Accordingly, Liley and fellow doctor P.J. 
Downey established the anti-abortion group Society for the Protection for the 
Unborn Child (SPUC) in 1970 (Stone, 1977: 141).   They harnessed their 
medical authority in a popular travelling road-show, wherein they used foetal 
sonograms and foetal heartbeat recordings to convince attendees of the 
humanity of ‘the unborn child.’ Liley’s foetal based arguments were hugely 
influential in the 1970s (McCulloch, 2013, Stone, 1977).  He argued that 
developments in foetal technology transformed obstetrics and gynaecology - 
from being about one patient (the woman) to two (the woman and the foetus) 
(Le Jeune & Liley, 1977: 6). SPUC’s influence became significant and they 
claimed to have 25,000 members by 1972 and 40,000 members by 1975 
(McCulloch, 2013). While Alison McCulloch (2013: 56) notes that leaked 
SPUC papers reveal that SPUC’s membership level was overstated, she 
contends that their perceived membership lead to actual influence in Parliament. 
In response to political pressure, Parliament established a Royal 
Commission to investigate abortion (Sparrow, 2010: 140; Stone, 1977).  The 
Commission’s Final Report was highly influenced by SPUC and has been 
criticised repeatedly for its conservative, philosophically illogical conclusions. 
McCulloch (2013) highlights the Royal Commission’s statement that abortion 
"for reasons of social convenience is morally wrong" occurs on the same page 
as allowing abortion in cases of foetal disability due to the burden on “the child 
and his parents” (McMullin et al., 1977: 17). The Royal Commission’s 1977 
Report viewed the question of when life begins as central to the abortion debate.  
In doing so, as Maureen Molloy (1996: 67) argues, the Commission relegated 
women’s autonomy to a side issue.  Molloy sees the Report as being a “classic 
case of power producing knowledge” (Molloy, 1996: 67). She argues that the 
Commission’s focus on biological, ‘scientific’ truth obviated the value of other 
knowledges. Thus, Molloy argues that women’s views on abortion were 
discredited. Consequently, Molloy sees the Royal Commission’s Report as 
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humanising foetuses and de-humanising women.  She contends that Liley had 
significant influence on the Commission.  This is evident in the Royal 
Commission’s representation of the foetus as “a new human being, a separate 
individual, a man in miniature,” while women were portrayed as irrational and 
incapable of making decisions (Molloy, 1996: 76). Thus Molloy argues that 
“women stand in a double relation to the bourgeois foetal/man as nature to be 
modified and female to be governed” (Molloy, 1996: 79). Despite the 
unprecedented focus on the foetus, there are continuities between the foetal 
rights paradigm and earlier constructions of abortion in the 1930s.  Women in 
both paradigms are depicted as selfish, immoral and making wrong decisions.   
Ultimately, the Commission premised its Report on the status of the 
foetus. It concluded that “unborn life is entitled to a measure of protection and 
that it is wrong, except for good reasons to terminate it” (McMullin et al., 1977: 
198).  The Commission’s view of the status of the foetus led to it seeking to 
limit abortion numbers.  Thus, McCulloch argues that the Commission only 
recommended grounds for abortion that it believed would restrict abortion to 
highly limited circumstances. McCulloch (2013: 171) contends that the 
Commission recommended that rape should not be a ground for abortion 
because it believed that it would incentivise women to lie about being raped in 
order to procure abortions.  In contrast, McCulloch (2013: 171) argues that 
incest was allowed as a ground because the Royal Commission did not think 
that it would open the floodgates for more abortions.  This desire to limit 
abortions can be seen as a continuation of the discursive split between selfish, 
immoral abortions and deserving ones evident in the 1930s. 
The Royal Commission’s findings provided the basis for the Contraceptive 
Sterilisation and Abortion Bill.  In the Parliamentary debates on the Bill many 
MPs made explicit foetal-rights based arguments. Robert Muldoon (1977:  
3524) spoke of “the sanctity of human life” and Mick Connelly talked about the 
“responsibility to protect human life” (1977: 3566).   T.J Young (1977: 3561) 
went even further and posed the question of abortion as a “question of two 
human lives of equal value.” Dr Wall used highly emotive language, stating 
“this is not emotion; it is the hard cold facts of what we are discussing – 
whether that little boy or girl should be sucked out through a sucker” (Wall, 
1977: 3546).   
In the foetal-rights discourse, foetal images are used to claim that foetuses 
are "children" who have been “emotionally abandoned and brutally murdered 
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by their mothers” and that abortion is a sin (Cannold, 2002: 171).  Foetal images 
are coded in the language of positivism and scientific objectivity, consequently 
the ontological claims associated with discourses on foetal images are often 
accepted as reality.  However, as a strong body of critical literature on 
ultrasound argues, the rise of ultrasound is not simply a means to make the 
foetus more visible; it produces meaning.  The dominance of foetal ultrasound 
is not a natural or inevitable phenomenon; rather it is the result of particular 
strategic truths and discursive constructions.   
SPUC’s travelling roadshow and its anti-abortion materials used foetal 
imagery and played foetal heartbeats to ‘prove’ that foetuses are “unborn 
children” (Stone, 1977). However, the ‘proof’ that these materials present is not 
inherent and universal.  This can be seen by Lynn Morgan’s (1998) examination 
of abortion discourses in Ecuador.  When a United States anti-abortion group 
presented foetal-based anti-abortion material to a group of anti-abortion 
Ecuadorians, the Ecuadorian audience was unimpressed because they were 
unfamiliar with claims that foetuses are unborn children.  Their anti-abortion 
views were based on Catholic ideas of motherhood and the foetal images had no 
resonance for them.  Accordingly, the ‘proof’ that foetuses are unborn children 
is a product of contextual interpretation and not as universally true as their 
proponents assert they are.  Likewise, Joanne Boucher (2004) argues that the 
authority of foetal imagery rests on the ontological value placed on science, 
‘biological fact’ and the ocular in Western science.   
As Ingrid Zechmeister (2001) contends, the visual holds a hallowed place 
in Western ontology because we are discursively constructed to believe that 
what we see is the best depiction of reality.  Thus, in a lot of anti-abortion 
materials, the narration does not accurately describe the imagery shown 
(Boucher, 2004). An example of this is when MP Brian MacDonell (1977: 
3538) brought a between eight and twelve week foetus to Parliament in a jar to 
demonstrate foetal personhood.  At this gestational age, foetuses are still in the 
early stages of development and do not resemble a fully formed baby (Verbeek, 
2008).  The ‘truth’ of foetal personhood is not inherent in the foetus. In 
themselves, these images do not have any ‘objective’ meaning and are unable to 
substantiate the ontological claim of foetal personhood (Boucher, 2004). 
Accordingly, claims of foetal personhood can be seen as a performative 
utterance, rather than naming the ‘objective’ truth.  Thus, feminists should 
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challenge the ideological authority of foetal images as well as “its visual 
distortions and verbal fraud” (Petchesky, 1987). 
However, by far the most alarming aspect of foetal imagery is that women 
are erased and the foetus is depicted as autonomous and rights-bearing.  
MacDonell’s argument makes no mention that women’s bodies are necessary 
for the survival of these ‘autonomous unborn children.’  Petchesky (1987) notes 
from the beginning of this technology, women have become marginalised as the 
foetus is ascribed primary value and an autonomous status.    While SPUC was 
successful in advocating a foetal-based opposition to abortion and influencing a 
conservative abortion law, the 1970s represented the zenith of SPUC’s 
influence (McCulloch, 2013).  Voice for Life’s (2012) website and publications 
make no mention of a foetal-rights argument and its website nostalgically 
recalls the “distant memory” of “the heady days of the 70s, when thousands 
rallied to the new cause.”  Nonetheless, the personification of foetuses was 
successful, with courts granting guardianship of foetuses to the High Court and 
newspaper articles depicting foetuses as babies (see Re an Unborn Child, 2003; 
see Ensor, 2013).  Nonetheless, while anti-abortion groups have largely 
succeeded in convincing the general public that the foetus was a person worthy 
of rights and not simply a mass of unimportant cells, many people support 
liberal access to abortion on the basis of women’s autonomy (Cannold, 2002; 
Rose, 2011).   
 
Mad Women: The Development of Post-Abortion Syndrome 
In the 1980s, claims that abortion was harmful to women’s mental health began 
to emerge.  These ‘post-abortion syndrome’ discourses were first developed in 
the United States as a response to the “Achilles heel” of foetal-based anti-
abortion arguments – that these discourses privilege the foetus over women 
(Cannold, 2002; Rose, 2011; Lee, 2003). Due to the institutional context of New 
Zealand, where mental health is the ground allowing 98 per cent of abortions, 
claims that abortion causes mental health problems have gained a unique 
foothold here (Abortion Supervisory Committee, 2011; Ferree, Gamson, 
Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002). Leslie Cannold (2002: 172) argues that many people 
opposed such a foetal-based “condemnation of nearly all aborting mothers as 
immoral, careless and or selfish murderers” and indeed felt protective of women 
in response to these attacks.  Discourses of ‘post-abortion syndrome’ arose out 
of anti-abortion groups’ desire for political efficacy.  The ‘post-abortion 
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syndrome’ discourse, like unsubstantiated claims that abortion causes infertility 
and breast cancer, was constructed to prevent women from choosing to have 
abortions and restricting the availability of abortion (Lee, 2003).  
Post-abortion syndrome activist David Reardon (1996) argues that this 
discourse is their most politically expedient because it mimics the rhetoric of 
pro-choice activists.  Accordingly, women are the focus of this “pro-woman” 
rhetoric and the foetus is ascribed an ostensibly marginalised role (Cannold, 
2002; Lee, 2003).  Thus, Reardon cautions supporters of post-abortion 
syndrome to distance themselves from a foetal-focused framework in order to 
give their claims credence and ‘objective’ scientific legitimacy. However, New 
Zealand based anti-abortion groups seem to prefer a dual-pronged attack with 
claims that abortion harms women and kills babies.  Anti-abortion group, Right 
to Life (2005), simultaneously claims that that abortion causes mental health 
problems and that foetuses have a right to life.  Thus, there is significant overlap 
between the foetal-based opposition to abortion and “pro-woman” claims that 
abortion causes mental health problems. 
 ‘Post-abortion syndrome claims are modelled on definitions of post-
traumatic stress disorder syndrome.  Despite how common abortion is, 
proponents of ‘post-abortion syndrome’ contend that abortion is a significant 
life stressor that lies outside of the normal range of human experience. Alleged 
symptoms of ‘post-abortion syndrome’ disorder include: over-eating, under-
eating, increased promiscuity, decreased sex drive, repeat abortions, having 
children and sadness.  The ‘post-abortion syndrome’ discourse is universalising 
and homogenising.  Indeed, absence of symptoms is constructed as a symptom 
of denial (Lee, 2003).  ‘Post-abortion syndrome’ is presented as a latent trauma 
that will inevitably affect all women who have abortions.  This is troubling 
because it ignores the variation in women’s experiences of abortion and denies 
them agency (Baird, 2001).   
Cannold (2002) observes that in the ‘post-abortion syndrome’ framework 
women are presented as pitiable ‘victims’ and are often analogised with rape 
‘victims’.  She argues that in ‘post-abortion’ syndrome discourse, abortion is 
constructed as a catastrophic event which destroys women’s mental health and 
requires post-abortive women to learn the ‘truth’ about abortion so that they can 
heal.  Thus, “restrictions on legal abortion are necessary to stop weak and 
irrational women from making bad decisions that harm them” (Cannold, 2002: 
174). 
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This ‘pro-woman’ restriction on abortion has been effectual in limiting the 
information and availability of services available in some states in Australia and 
the United States, such as mandated counselling about abortion causing physical 
and mental health problems and mandated wait periods (Richardson & Nash, 
2006; Cannold, 2002: 174).  These provisions deny women agency by depicting 
women who choose abortion as ignorant, not knowing their own minds and in 
need of guidance in order to make the ‘right’ decision.  Accordingly, ‘post-
abortion syndrome’ discourses can be seen as more insidious than foetal-based 
anti-abortion claims. The success of “post-abortion syndrome” claims elsewhere 
should be a warning to those concerned with ensuring access to abortion in New 
Zealand.   
In New Zealand, “post-abortion syndrome” claims should be seen in the 
context of the prominence of the mental health ground in abortion law. The 
legal linking of abortion access with mental health gives these discourses 
institutional weight and renders them culturally resonant (Ferree, Gamson, 
Gerhards & Rucht, 2002).  Most women in New Zealand who seek an abortion 
have to claim that continuing the pregnancy would seriously damage their 
mental health (Crimes Act, 1961, s.187A(a), Abortion Supervisory Committee, 
2012).  Accordingly, women are framed as mentally troubled figures who 
would not be able to cope with the effects of continuing the pregnancy.  This 
framing performatively undercuts women’s status as autonomous subjects. 
Ellie Lee argues that the medicalisation of pregnancy, childbirth and 
motherhood has led to abortion being seen as physically and mentally safer than 
continuing the pregnancy.  In accordance with this view, the mental health 
ground for abortion is interpreted liberally by Certifying Consultants and less 
than two per cent of abortions are refused (Abortion Supervisory Committee, 
2003).  Consequently, claims that abortion causes mental health problems have 
been staunchly denied by the medical profession (Lee, 2003).  This has 
prevented ‘post-abortion syndrome’ from becoming culturally resonant.  
Nonetheless, this medicalisation of pregnancy, abortion and motherhood is not a 
strong foundation for ensuring access to abortion.  The mental health ground 
renders women’s ability to have abortions vulnerable to anti-abortion 
allegations that abortion damages women’s mental health.  New Zealand anti-
abortion groups have expended significant resources, in the form of television 
advertisements and pamphlets in an effort to convince people that abortion 
causes mental health problems (Young, 2013; Collins, 2012).  Anti-abortion 
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groups, such as the Christchurch based Post Abortion Healing Service, often 
performatively name post-abortion syndrome and help women heal from their 
abortions with counselling (Gnad, 2008). Norman MacLean (2012), a former 
Obstetrician and Gynaecologist, made ‘post-abortion syndrome’ claims in the 
media in an effect to prevent an abortion service opening in Southland.  In 2005, 
Right to Life took the body that oversees abortion to court alleging that the 
mental health ground was wrongly applied.  Right to Life (2008) also sought to 
use the affidavits of women affected by ‘post-abortion syndrome’ and 
psychological evidence about ‘post-abortion syndrome’ in court to challenge the 
oversight of abortion counselling provisions. Ultimately, the Right to Life cases, 
which spanned six years and went all the way to Supreme Court, were largely 
unsuccessful.  However, the ability of an anti-abortion group to challenge 
abortion access in New Zealand suggests that access to abortion in New Zealand 
may not be entirely secure. 
There have also been a plethora of scientific studies about whether 
abortion causes mental health problems (see Fergusson et al., 2006).  While 
these studies seek to be objective, they are premised on a view that abortion is 
inherently pathological and a largely homogenous experience.  Thus, they tend 
to only ask whether abortion causes negative mental health effects rather than 
examining whether abortion may have positive effects too (Boyle, 2002). In 
addition, the question of whether abortion causes mental health problems 
continues to be re-researched despite strong evidence that abortion does not 
cause mental health problems (Romans-Clarkson, 1989; Russo, 2008; Charles et 
al., 2008).  The effects of this research are iterative; they promote the idea that 
there is a link between abortion and mental health.   
If the claim that abortion causes mental health problems gains resonance 
then women’s legal access to abortion could be severely limited.  Moreover, if 
these groups convince women that abortion will cause them mental health 
problems, it may have a constitutive effect in dissuading women from procuring 
abortions.  Consequently, mental health, the ground that has enabled relatively 
liberal access to abortion, is also the ground that may challenge women’s ability 
to have abortions.2   
In the discursive construction of women who have abortions as bad moral 
agents in the pro-natalist and foetal based discourses, women are condemned for 
                                                            
2 This claim was influenced by Foucault’s (1980) writings on the body and power – that 
which makes it strong, renders it vulnerable. 
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being moral actors who make bad decisions.  In the discourses linking abortion 
and mental health, women’s status as autonomous decision-makers is 
questioned.  Women who have abortions are presented as victims rather than 
moral agents with the capacity to make decisions. Thus, the ‘post-abortion 
syndrome’ discourse can have a two-fold effect – in colonising women’s minds 
by dissuading them not to ‘choose’ abortion and politically limiting access to 
abortion in ‘women’s interests.’  Accordingly, it can constitutively and 
practically limit women’s ability to choose abortion.  
 
Conclusion 
A critical genealogical account of abortion is important because the history of 
abortion shapes understandings of abortion in the present.  The shifting 
discursive constructions of women, as bad for ‘selfishly’ abrogating 
motherhood or ‘murdering an unborn child’ to ‘mad’ in the mental health 
discourse, have material implications for women’s subjectivities.  The historical 
constructions of abortion are of vital importance in shaping women’s 
subjectivities.  Ultimately, the historically contingent nature of constructions of 
abortion and the women who have them illustrate the potential for transforming 
understandings of abortion.  Only rational, autonomous people are afforded the 
capacity to make decisions.  The framework of New Zealand’s abortion law 
requires most women to state that continuing their pregnancy will cause them 
mental health problems in order to procure an abortion.  Thus, most women 
seeking abortions must name themselves as mentally fragile subjects.  This 
naming performatively undercuts women’s status as autonomous agents.  
Concurrently, anti-abortion groups and outlier positivist scientists claim that 
abortion causes mental health problems.  If this claim becomes resonant, the 
legal basis for most abortions in New Zealand will be eliminated.  Thus, in the 
mental health paradigm, women who have abortions are conceived as mentally 
troubled victims who are incapable of claiming a right to bodily autonomy.   
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Social Movements and Contestation in Post-Crisis Capitalism: 
A Case Study of Syriza 
 
Bartek Goldmann 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
This article explores the potential of radical social movements in 
Greece which have emerged post-2008 to address the perceived 
democratic deficit that characterizes institutional politics at both the 
national and regional (EU) levels. Various empirical and ethnographic 
approaches have examined protest cultures, foregrounding their self-
organization, spontaneity, flexibility and absence of hierarchy as 
characteristics which have allowed them to mobilize such impressive 
amounts of people. This paper critically argues, however, that the 
organisational form of contemporary mass social movements and their 
reluctance to engage with state power has actually inhibited their 
potential and prevented them from realizing their political goals. The 
case of Syriza, a Greek radical leftist political party is examined, 
which intends to contest Troika-mandated austerity in Greece by 
mediating the transformative potential of the street and the square via 
electoral politics in order to effect durable socio-political change.	
	
	
Introduction 
The global financial crisis has manifested itself in a variety of ways in different 
locations and around the world, producing a variety of protest and social 
movements on a massive scale not seen since the late 1960s. The contemporary 
politics of the street and the square are timely mobilizations against financial 
shocks, the commodification of public services, reckless consumerism, rising 
levels of public and private debt, and a widespread perception of malfunctioning 
democracy and elite-driven politics. In occupying squares and other public 
spaces, the multitudes engaged in these new politics contest the claim that ‘there 
is no alternative’ and in doing so, create a voice for themselves by refusing to 
engage with the fake conflicts constructed by neoliberal hegemony. 
Contestation and protest are necessary elements of democracy and civic 
participation, since the electoral process (institutional politics) has proven itself 
to be an insufficient vehicle for class struggle, and requires additional pressure 
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from below (non-institutional politics). The two are both necessary and 
interrelated. Resistance to economic orthodoxy in the post-crisis era is a 
pressing urgency since governments dogmatically pursuing structural 
adjustment are doing away with basic democratic rights and whittling away the 
welfare state—the hard-won products of a long series of struggles.  
This essay argues that we must step back from particular theoretical 
frameworks and concepts of resistance since they have very real ramifications 
on politics and protest movements, in some cases inhibiting their potential. The 
contemporary left, infatuated with anarchist ideology, has developed an allergy 
to the idea of taking state power and is hesitant to consider the state as a site of 
political contestation. Furthermore, there appears to be an emerging tendency 
among today’s activists to fetishise the processual aspects of democracy (self-
organization and horizontal, open-networks, assemblies where all participants 
are free to voice their concerns) at the cost of enduring political gains. This 
trend shall be demonstrated through the case of the Occupy Wall Street 
movement (OWS) which refrained from directly engaging with the state 
apparatus, and instead opted to occupy space on its peripheries, a strategy which 
was ultimately ineffective in shaking the hegemony of neoliberal economics.  
In response, this essay will conceptualise a more suitable theoretical 
perspective by analysing Syriza, a Greek radical leftist party. Syriza is the 
exception to the aforementioned trend because it demonstrates that if social 
movements are to fulfil their aims and induce political change that is not only 
meaningful but durable, they ought to make strategic associations with the state 
apparatus rather than neglect it as a site of struggle. Syriza is in that sense the 
counterpoint to OWS. This is not to say that egalitarian self-organisation at the 
street level is a bad thing, however it is a recognition of the fact that if social 
movements are to contest the social effects of the crisis and generate outcomes 
for large numbers of their populations, for example by means of public policy, 
they must develop from mere carnival and into enduring aspects of their 
respective societies. 
 
Social Movements And Organizational Form: Occupy Wall Street  
The ongoing popular protests around Europe converge in a series of 
demands which, in their very spontaneity and obviousness, form a 
kind of “epistemological obstacle” to the proper confrontation with 
the ongoing crisis of our political system... What we need today, in 
this situation, is a Thatcher of the left: a leader who would repeat 
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Thatcher’s gesture in the opposite direction, transforming the entire 
field of presuppositions shared by today’s political elite of all main 
orientations (Slavoj Žižek, 2013). 
Jeremy Roos, citing the first part of this passage, writes Žižek’s comments off 
as “academese jargon” typical of armchair revolutionaries today (Roos, 2013). 
According to Roos, instead of using the occasion to lambast Thatcher’s 
ideological mantra that ‘there is no alternative,’ Žižek chose to “criticize the 
leaderless anti-capitalist movements that have recently emerged… the only 
serious alternative to have emerged in response to her dogma in the past twenty 
years” (ibid.). While there may be some truth in arguing that neoliberalism has 
not been seriously contested in some places in the past 30 years, for example in 
Britain and Western Europe, the same cannot be said for the transformation of 
Latin America that has been spearheaded by the Bolivarian Revolution in 
Venezuela. “Forget all that fancy stuff about consensus-based decision-making; 
what we really need is a healthy dose of authoritarian leadership” (ibid.). While 
Žižek’s provocation seems to touch a nerve, Roos’ comments go to the heart of 
crucial issues concerning politics after the crisis, resistance and the state. The 
disagreement seems to revolve around the question of whether it is the form of 
the movements that might be the biggest obstacle to their success.  
It would seem that today, as we witness intensifying bouts of capitalism’s 
destruction and the resurgence of mass movements, critical thinking is 
compelled to return to some of the oldest questions about social movements and 
revolution. One is the question of strategic orientation: what type of 
organisation is needed today in order to take the ideas enunciated by various 
mass movements and facilitate their coming to fruition? How should such a 
movement orient itself, what aims should it have, what demands should it make 
of the state? The second is the aforementioned problem of organisational form: 
how should the collective multitudes of protestors be coordinated in order to 
maximize their political force and capabilities? Can protest movements be 
treated as experiments in organisational form in what are perceived to be 
defunct political systems, as microcosms of direct participation which might 
indicate the broader transformations in social relations beyond the street and the 
square that the left should pursue in order to properly address the issues it has 
raised and aimed to resolve? 
OWS is for Roos a case in point, a new form of collective politics that 
“shake[s] off the institutional deadweight of state-oriented and leader-dependent 
activism”, the old party politics that inevitably becomes mired in bureaucratic 
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inertia, “corrupt union-based horse trading” and “the formulation of specific 
demands” (ibid.). His rejoinder to Žižek is that “it was precisely the 
horizontality and spontaneity of the 2011 uprisings that allowed them to spread 
so rapidly and mobilize such impressive amounts of people” and that “it is 
precisely their lack of dependence on centralized leadership that allows them to 
continue adapting to a changing reality in 2013.” There may be a degree of truth 
to this, however one should add that many of today’s uprisings have been 
“blind, naïve, scattered and lacking a powerful concept or durable organization” 
(Badiou, 2012: 5). The structuring framework which theoretically informs them 
is implicated in this lack of focus. 
On the surface, there certainly appears to be a popular antipathy towards 
political parties and trade unions among contemporary mass movements, and 
more generally, scepticism that the state apparatus is capable of little more than 
reproducing the status quo. The context is a contemporary left which is no 
longer premised on resistance to economic issues and which tends not to 
organise on class terms—as was the case with traditional labour-based 
movements which played a significant role in the upheavals of the late 1960s—
but to rather revolve around single, localised issues, or questions of identity. 
Strategically, it proposes to bypass the state completely in their goal of radical 
social transformation and in terms of structure, favouring modes of organisation 
premised on horizontality and direct participation rather than leadership and 
hierarchy, both of which appear to have become dirty words in both activist and 
academic circles. On this account, the state is autonomous from economic 
power and socio-economic relations and is not, as Marxists contend, a 
derivative of class power or simply a political instrument wielded by the 
bourgeoisie to ensure social domination. The oppressive and authoritarian 
functions of the state are the products of its own logic of self-perpetuation. It is 
the state’s form and structural position in capitalist social relations that cause it 
to be an inherently despotic entity. The seizure of the state is thus no more than 
a change of masters since the revolution’s conquest of state power just 
reproduces the tyranny that it seeks to abolish. The state apparatus captures 
revolutionary politics, disarming it and rendering it ineffective, and where 
revolutionary action does succeed, it merely replaces one form of authority with 
another.  
From this perspective then, what is necessary is a type of resistance that is 
based on free forms of association, and whose teleological end-point is stateless 
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society. Since state-power is doomed, revolutionary social movements should 
withdraw from politics since it has become (or perhaps always was) a corrupt 
theatre of domination and pursue transformation through non-institutional 
avenues. As Thomas Frank points out, activists involved OWS as well as the 
Tea Party, have been sensitive to anything they perceived as elitism or 
‘unnecessary’ hierarchy, adding that bureaucracy, routine and boredom are “no 
way to fire the imagination of the world” (Frank, 2012). Today’s activists seem 
to exhibit an aversion to state power and to authority in general; vanguardism 
and leadership are defined as the problem, and hierarchy is identified as the 
opposite of creativity. They prefer to occupy spaces at the peripheries of the 
state (parks and other public commons), and to directly transform the texture of 
social life in an organic manner. The reasoning is that it is these everyday 
practices of cohabitation and deliberation that sustain the entire social structure. 
Such were some of the foremost concerns of the Occupiers of Zuccotti Park. 
However in retreating to the peripheries outside of the administrative ambit of 
the state, and by levelling their critique primarily at a cultural-discursive level, 
the protestors fail to engage the state-capital nexus directly on the planes that 
really matter: ownership over the means of production, consumption, 
environment etc.  
The left has a tendency to become impulsive and enamoured by the 
transformative potential of anything that promises radical social change, and 
risks falling into an “infantile radicalism” (Saad-Filho, 2013). With all the 
capacity for incisive and penetrating critique, it appears to be completely unable 
to put itself under the microscope and recognize the enchanting fantasies and 
ideological mystifications that structure its own field of vision. Witness the 
enthusiasm with which so many narrated OWS and the Arab Spring as 
unprecedented and ground-changing events, for example David Harvey’s 
speech at Occupy London (Harvey, 2011). No doubt, it is difficult to not be 
enthralled by the potential of such a mobilization after a prolonged period of 
economic recession and political inertia. 
It would appear that the transformative potential of the movements, the 
Evental symbolism which has inspired people in distant locations, is at the same 
time hamstringing the prospects for actual political gains and change that is 
durable and entrenched in civil society. A buzz-kill like Žižek is sometimes 
completely necessary to burst the bubble: “We have a nice time. But remember, 
carnivals come cheap. What matters is the day after, when we will have to 
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return to normal lives. Will there be any changes then?” (Žižek, 2011). His 
remarks to the OWS campers are even more relevant now than before. 
In the following section I will identify and demonstrate the tendencies in 
Greek society that might provide a realistic, politically attractive alternative to 
the current post-democratic inertia and the prospect of another decade of 
austerity, which certain politicians and economic ‘pragmatists’ claim to be the 
only viable solution. This will be done by overviewing Syriza’s politics and 
noting its position on two key topics: its economic programme, and its role 
towards the European Monetary Union (EMU).  
 
The Greek Crisis 
After five consecutive years of recession, the Greek economy is in a particularly 
dire situation. The costs of the crisis have been shouldered by a financially 
overextended working class which has been most seriously affected by the 
privatization campaigns which have dismantled social services. Those in the 
public sector in particular have lost their jobs as a result of cutbacks, and many 
have seen their working conditions worsen as the government has contemplated 
6-day weeks and salary cuts in order to accommodate the Troika’s demands for 
a more competitive ‘Euro-compatible’ labour market. As of July 2013, 
unemployment is at a record-breaking 26.8%, over half of which consists of 
workers aged 18-30, and the figure of those underemployed sits at over 50% 
(European Commission, 2013). In its annual report on the employment 
prospects, the OECD has predicted that unemployment in the Eurozone will 
begin fall by late 2014, however Greece’s level is expected to rise to 28.2% 
(OECD 2013). We are again reminded that capitalism never conclusively 
resolves its contradictions but only postpones them indefinitely or moves them 
around geographically. 
The ongoing Greek crisis presents an illuminating case study in how 
narratives are constructed by elites and are used as ideological justifications for 
structural adjustment. Austerity’s organic intellectuals 1  with their divisive 
rhetoric incite a mood of ugliness; anxieties and sufferings are individualised, 
and guilt is burdened on working people. On the 4th April 2012, Dimitris 
Christoulas, a 77-year old retired Greek pharmacist and pensioner committed 
                                                            
1  I use the term organic intellectuals in the Gramscian sense to describe actors which 
represent particular class interests, namely those of neoliberalism by means of ideological 
apparatuses such as the educational, political and legal systems. 
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suicide in Syntagma Square. He had been experiencing financial and health 
problems, and when austerity measures slashed his pension, he experienced an 
increasingly difficulty in paying for his medication. In his suicide note he 
declared: “I see no other solution than this dignified end to my life, so I don’t 
find myself fishing through garbage cans for my sustenance.“ Greece at one 
point had one of the lowest rates of suicide in Europe, however this figure has 
doubled since the crisis began (Hardinghaus and Heyer, 2012). Christoulas’s 
final words echoed the misery and alienation that the politics of austerity have 
brought on: "I am not committing suicide, they are killing me." It would appear 
that the inequalities sparked the Arab Spring (the symbolic self-immolation of 
Mohammed Bouazizi) and the images of deprivation and social breakdown that 
are customarily associated with capitalism’s periphery are now creeping closer 
to its heartlands. I shall argue that the pressing need to address the humanitarian 
crisis unfolding in Greece through increased fiscal spending is not only a moral 
argument however, since it is also a precondition for kick-starting economic 
growth. 
 
Resistance: Syriza and the Greek Left 
In recent years, a combination of protest movements, general strikes and a 
political party—namely Syriza—have coalesced around the idea of resisting 
structural adjustment and mounted a serious challenge to the hegemony of 
neoliberal economics. Strategically speaking, the most striking difference 
between the Greek left and its counterparts elsewhere is the former’s 
willingness to engage with the state apparatus in order to fulfil its aims. Since 
its foundation as a political alliance in 2004, Syriza’s electoral success has come 
in a context of the escalating Greek crisis and the Troika-mandated structural 
adjustment by successive Greek governments. The party is a political coalition 
composed of 13 parties on the Greek left and radical left, composed of 13 
parties, though Synaspismós, the Coalition of the Left and the Ecology and 
Social Movements, led by Alexis Tsipras, makes up 85%. It has been active in 
the social struggles of Greece, the labour movement, both at the level of more 
conventional public and private sector trade unions, as well as in the grassroots 
level of radical new unions of precarious labour, civil rights and social right 
movements and at European and World Social Forums (Spourdalakis, 2012). Its 
success in the May and June 2012 elections—16.8% and 26.9% respectively—
up from 4.6% in 2009 reflects a significant popular shift in Greek politics, and a 
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many voters turning away from the historically dominant parties, the 
conservative New Democracy and the center-left PASOK. Much of Syriza’s 
support came from the latter which enjoyed 43.9% of the vote in 2009 and has 
since fallen to 12.3%. 
At the national level, Syriza’s immediate concerns are Greece’s ongoing 
economic recession and its various social calamities which are amplified by 
austerity. It intends to address these by restoring the welfare state and social 
protections to the working-class, unemployed and poor. That being said, this is 
no novelty in Greek politics where seemingly every party, including the 
fascistic Golden Dawn, appears to mobilize support by appropriating the crisis-
austerity discourse for its own purposes. What sets Syriza apart is its class-
based analysis which recognizes the systemic nature of capitalism’s latest crisis, 
particularly with respect to how blame is attributed and how the costs of the 
crisis are disproportionally shifted onto the most vulnerable parts of the 
population. It is this disenfranchised demographic that constitutes the party’s 
electoral base. Syriza’s political platform is unequivocally premised on resisting 
austerity and the recognition that what is necessary at minimum are new 
democratic mechanisms and policies that break with the status quo—namely the 
decommodification of public services and a greater level of social 
redistribution, notions that have been disavowed even by PASOK, which, like 
most other socialist and labour parties in Europe have capitulated to damage-
control neoliberalism. 
One of Syriza’s proposals is for the banks to be socialized and restructured 
in order to ensure that EU bailout money—which currently goes to Greek 
banks—could be channeled to fund pensions, unemployment and deposit 
insurance as well as core public institutions such as education and healthcare 
which have been marginalized and divested since the onset of the crisis. 
Another is the abolition of EU-mandated labour law reform justified under the 
rubric of a European ‘competitiveness crisis’ (Douzinas, 2013: 5). Prevailing 
neoliberal economic reasoning however sees this as an irrational squandering of 
funds on people who are in such a position because of failed life choices, 
laziness or a lack of personal responsibility. Such logic completely eschews the 
systemic nature of the crisis and neglects the Keynesian insight that if Greece’s 
recovery is to be anything more than a short-lived upturn measured in GDP-to-
debt or deficit ratios, the country’s working population must be financially 
capable of internally generating consumer demand. Unemployment is thus the 
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pressing problem for Greek public policy. The idea of utilizing the various 
mechanisms of social redistribution in order to reintegrate the destitute into the 
labour market however is anathema to the “deficit scolders” (Krugman, 2012) 
which warn that Greece may have to tighten its belt for another decade. It is 
worthwhile to consider why governments do not pursue such seemingly rational 
and modest proposals and why, after a brief interlude they have returned to the 
same climate of financial deregulation that led to the crisis in the first place. 
In addition to conventional public policy responses such as labour reform 
however, Syriza recognizes the necessity of a bottom-up strategy that 
establishes a vision of a new social contract that takes account of the multitude 
of social needs. Eric Hobsbawm writes that “the basic problem of the revolution 
is how to make a hitherto subaltern class capable of hegemony, believe in itself 
as a potential ruling class and be credible as such to other classes… the struggle 
to turn the working class into a potential ruling class, the struggle for 
hegemony, must be waged before the transition of power, as well as during and 
after it” (Hobsbawm, 2011: 324-327). The basic problem of hegemony and the 
success of a social movement, is not so much how it can come to power but 
rather how it garner support and come to be accepted, not only as “the 
politically existing or unavoidable rulers, but as guides and leaders” (ibid.: 328).  
Syriza’s strategy with respect to the current crisis goes beyond tinkering 
with monetary policy and doctrinaire impositions of austerity which simply 
displace the economic crisis onto vulnerable populations, but inaugurate a new 
politics that is premised on mass social mobilization and enfranchisement. In 
doing so it historically breaks with recent governments which have largely 
ignored popular opinion, social concerns and working-class demands 
(Spourdalakis 2012). The conditions for the success of the Greek left are two-
fold: a) the necessity of a strong party with significant clout in parliamentary 
politics which can act on behalf of b) a popular movement consisting of a 
multitude of groups and which is capable of critique and holding this party to 
account. The success of the Greek left thus depends on its ability to construct a 
counter-hegemonic project among the population that is premised on 
empowering the powerless, the inexistent that has no political voice. Some 
suggest that what Greece requires today is a genuinely universal form of 
politics, one that might unify the diverse multitude of groups and organizations 
under a common cause, the kind of purpose the National Patriotic Front served 
as a point of unity for the Greek resistance during the Nazi occupation 
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(Spannos, 2012). 
At the regional level, the Greek case demonstrates the tension between 
multilateral unity and state sovereignty that is brought on through European 
integration. The Greek political deadlock (its eroding sense of sovereignty, the 
assault on citizens’ rights) is also closely related to political decision making at 
the EU-level, especially to the Troika-mandated budget cuts. The monetary 
union does not permit small countries like Greece control over monetary policy 
such as devaluation. Many Keynesian economists such as Krugman (2012) 
argue that this kind of control is necessary for countries such as Spain and 
Greece, yet they are powerless to do so. This suggests that while public policy is 
a key political lever that can be effectively utilized, change must necessarily 
also come at the regional level. 
The dream behind European integration was driven by the desire to combine 
the efficiency of capitalist market-based economies with social justice, to bring 
the continuous increases in material wealth and living standards while 
upholding environmental protection, in an apolitical, technocratic rule, which 
would also be democratically legitimate. It was designed to achieve integration 
and convergence among different EU capitalist states without a full European 
federal union (one government, one budget, one set of tax laws, and one 
banking system) through a monetary union. As the recent history of the crisis 
has demonstrated however, instead of reducing socio-economic discrepancies, 
the single currency has entrenched disadvantage for the nations on Europe’s 
periphery and become an instrument of financial discipline (Offe, 2013).  
While Syriza is not explicitly against the concept of a European monetary 
union, what it takes issue with is its neoliberal structure and its doctrinaire 
approach to the Euro and public debt, which some claim amounts to blackmail 
for bailout recipients (Douzinas, 2011). Its position on the question of European 
(dis-)integration is coloured in class terms, that the coordinated left in Europe, 
in a gesture of solidarity must break with austerity while remaining in the 
Eurozone. Its aim is instead to renegotiate the debt by sharply reducing the 
amounts owed, however without sacrificing a great deal of Greek rights in the 
process. 
 
Becoming-Political: The Road to Syntagma  
“Giving a name is a hegemonic practice, by choosing a signifier that 
will unite the greatest number of people, causes and groups… The 
politics of resistance, like all politics, operates through the giving of 
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names. A demonstration, rally or strike is transient and effervescent. 
To survive and acquire permanence, it must be nominated” 
(Douzinas, 2013: 152-3).  
Douzinas identifies three decisive instances of resistance in Greece’s recent 
history: the December 2008 riots, the Hepatia sans-papiers hunger strikes and 
the Syntagma Square protests during the summer of 2011. He traces a historical 
development where the December protestors, identified by the media as a 
‘rabble’, by 2011 became a multitude. What emerges from the sequence of 
events from December 2008 to Syntagma Square 2011 are new political 
subjectivities. The initial explosion of December 2008 was spontaneous, timely 
response to the killing of 15-year old Alexis Grigoropoulos on Saturday 6th of 
December next to the Polytechnic and Law School in Athens, universities with 
a militant history which were the sites of the 1973 uprising against the military 
junta. Like many other recent uprisings across the western world, it possessed a 
certain carnivalesque element characterized by vibrant street happenings, 
theatrical performances and imaginative forms of protests: the main evening 
news bulletin on state TV was interrupted during a message from the Prime 
Minister and was replaced by banners declaring “stop watching television and 
get out to the streets”, the Christmas tree in Syntagma Square was set on fire as 
protestors declared: “We are revolting. Christmas is postponed” and a large 
banner with the word ‘resistance’ in many languages was hung on the 
Acropolis. 
More profoundly however, the December insurrection was also the first 
micro-event that “disarticulated identities from the circuit of desire-
consumption-frustration and helped the gradual emergence of subjectivities 
committed to resistance, justice and equality”, the ‘political baptism’ of a 
disenfranchised, inexistent population that reclaimed public space and indeed 
politics itself from an order characterized by inertia and exclusion (Douzinas, 
2013: 143). This latent political desire manifested itself in the form of self-
organized neighbourhood assemblies, community events, the types of 
experiments in social organization and collaboration that characterized several 
of the recent protests in Europe and the Arab region. Urban space traditionally 
“given to leisure, commercial activities and mild erotic encounters” was re-
appropriated and turned over to public use, creating a “space where multiple 
singularities lived in common, discussed, decided and acted together” (ibid.). 
The protestors honed their tactics and began to invent new forms of street 
action, improvising with new forms of communication, particularly regarding 
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how to resist police repression. December was the first of recent Greek 
uprisings, however in terms of its material consequences and political gains it 
was incomplete and had to be embedded and deepened through an inclusive 
process of collectivization if it was to transcend the particular and localized 
issue that was its catalyst and attain a universal and durable character.  
The second major event was the hunger strike staged by sans papiers 
immigrants and refugees in the Hepatia building in Athens, many of whom saw 
Greece as a gateway into Western Europe. They are the social surplus, the part-
of-no-part that is routinely subject to political exclusion and kept at arm’s length 
despite its formal inclusion in the capital-labour nexus of exploitation. They 
were the “double victims of boom and bust”, working and living Greece doing 
the jobs that the locals would not take for a fraction of the minimum wage and 
without social security or any of the labour protections offered to legal workers, 
and their lack work and residence permits made them liable to deportation 
(Douzinas, 2013: 144-145). The importance of the protest and its relevance to 
the greater series of events is the way it was identified by the left as part of the 
same common struggle, and how it was incorporated into the growing 
movement. 
The wave of uprisings, beginning in Tunisia and Egypt in the 2011 Arab 
Spring, were by summer echoed in Spain by the indignados and in Greece by 
the aganaktismenoi on Syntagma Square. These events deepened the initial 
December-Event’s project and eventually culminated in violent protests towards 
the end of June as the second Memorandum for further EU bailout funds was 
concluded. The majority of the massive events were spontaneous, grassroots 
gatherings. While the events of December 2008 were not planned or 
coordinated by political parties and leftist groups, they certainly embraced their 
manifestation. Likewise, at the 2011 mobilizations on Syntagma Square, 
political parties and banners were discouraged, though Syriza continues to play 
a fundamental role in communicating the struggles of protestors in a 
parliamentary context (Douzinas, 2013: 148).  
 
Conclusion 
In examining Syriza’s history and development, I demonstrated a case of 
political engagement with existing state and political structures that combines 
the potential of street movements with the authority of parliamentary politics. 
Social movements that are organised this way are able to mutually reinforce the 
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political agency of individual subjects as well as the institutionalised groups 
they form. Syriza is the counter-example to the trend of political disengagement 
from the state which has been present within recent protest movements such as 
OWS. 
Many of the movements that emerged in the USA and around Western 
Europe in 2011 carried with them a hope that they would develop into 
something of a contemporary ‘68, a counter-hegemonic movement to be 
reckoned with that could eventually instigate a broader social transformation. 
Through the example of OWS, this essay argued that for the most part they have 
failed in this, and that a significant cause for this outcome has been the 
movement’s anarchistic ideology, its organizational structure and consequent 
lack of focus. That being said, this essay does not intend to be dismissive of the 
new political culture that is emerging on the streets and squares around the 
world, but rather recognizes it as the ideological basis or precondition for a 
society which gives a voice to the excluded and inexistent, those who exist 
socially but not politically.  
Writing in the context of the struggles of the late 1960s, Herbert Marcuse 
points out that it would be irresponsible to overrate the chances for 
transformation (Marcuse, 1969: ix). What he said still pertains today: critical 
theory should refrain from making utopian speculations about today’s mass 
movements but instead analyse existing societies in light of their own 
capabilities, and to identify and demonstrate the tendencies (if any exist) which 
might lead beyond the current state of affairs. To write these movements off as 
hopeless, utopian or unrealistic leads to cynical resignation to the status quo and 
merely reinforces the ruling ideology. On the one hand the political desires for 
change that so many on the left have placed their hopes in are the multitudes’ 
constitutive driving force, the creativity and enthusiasm which has given these 
movements their character and hopeful tone, in a context where pragmatic 
political leaders stress the reality principle of austerity. At the same time, for 
purely practical reasons, if these movements are to achieve any practical gains, 
the thinly-veiled class warfare of austerity politics demands that we continue to 
be engaged in the struggle, while maintaining a critical distance to the romantic 
spectacle of the square. 
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Top Market Incomes 1981-20111 
 
Brian Easton 
Introduction 
One of the few useful sources of market income information is incomes 
declared for tax purposes. Even so it has limitations. It is administrative data 
and so is sensitive to changes in statute and administrative policy. Thus the 
definition of income is that set by the law. In the New Zealand case the law 
generally omits capital gains. Coverage is affected by administrative practice. 
Low income recipients may not need to report their incomes (the government 
relying on PAYE to tax them).2 The available data excludes trusts and 
companies. 
          Even so it is the best data we have. Robert Solow famously justified some 
statistical work he was doing, by citing the addicted gambler who knew ‘the 
casino wheel is crooked but it is the only one in town’. In any case others have 
used the data.3 This research note reports on and interprets their data in order to 
get a better understand what has been happening. 
 
Data Sources 
All the data used here ultimately comes from the Department of Inland 
Revenue. It is based on a sample of IR3 and IR5 tax returns for each of the 31 
years from 1981 to 2011.4 
          The data consists of a taxable income band, the number of taxpayers in 
the band and their total taxable income.5 The bands vary from year to year, but 
                                                            
1 I am grateful for comments on earlier drafts by Norman Gemmil, Bill Rosenberg and 
Sandra Watson.  
2 For instance, in the 1981 tabulation excludes taxpayers who earned less than $11,500 per 
annum and were not required to file tax returns. 
3 The World Top Incomes Database http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/ 
4 The data for 2002 to 2011 is on their website. I asked the Department to supply me with the 
data file released in 2004 to Andrew Leith and Tony Atkinson from 1981 to 2003, which they 
did promptly. I am grateful for assistance from Sandra Watson, Manager, Forecasting and 
Analysis, Policy and Strategy, Inland Revenue. 
http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/users/atkinson/AtkinsonLEIGH_NewZealand08.pdf, page 46. 
The two sets of series overlap by two years, a comparison of which confirms they are the 
same series. 
5 The data covers natural persons and excludes trusts and corporations. 
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are narrow enough to enable the required calculations to be done with sufficient 
precision.  
 
Defining the Top One Percent and Their Income Share 
It was soon evident that the coverage of those reported in the data base has 
varied, reflecting the administrative decisions of who is required to file a return, 
together with the ability to reconstruct a return for those who are not required to 
file.  
          Taxpayers numbered in 1981 were 70.9 percent of the adult population 
over 15; in 20116 they were 98.2 percent.7 The most important reason for the 
rise has been the inclusion of the PAYE record for individuals who did not file. 
It would be misleading to compare the one percent of tax reporters in 1981 with 
the one percent in 2011. 
          Instead, the one percent is defined here as the top one percent of ‘adults’ 
(over the age of 15)  irrespective of whether they appear in the IRD statistics.8 
That represents about 23,000 individuals in 1981 and 35,000 in 2011 with a 
corresponding (almost) linear growth between. 
          If taxpayer coverage varies over time, then so must the coverage of the 
aggregate incomes which they report. There is no uncontaminated benchmark 
series as for population. The best I could find comes from the Household Sector 
Account from the System of National Accounts of primary income receivable.9 
It does not match taxable income because ‘social security benefits in cash’ and 
‘social assistance in cash’ are included in taxable income.10 
          Table 1 shows the resulting declared taxable income of the top 1 percent 
of adults, together with four other measures as a share of aggregate income. 
 
The Top Ten Percent  
Exactly the same method was used to calculate the share of the top 10 percent. 
The difference between that share and the share of the one percent is the share 
of the next 9 percent which is also shown in Table 1. 
                                                            
6 Tax years. For most taxpayers these are years ending in March.  
7 The 98 percent includes children and those earning wages for part of a year then moving 
overseas. 
8 Under 15s may appear in the list, but there will be very few of them in the top one percent. 
9 It is based on Table 2.11 of national disposal income: the series was kindly supplied by Jeff 
Cope of SNZ. 
10 We are assuming that the top ten percent receive little of these transfers. Some the 
superannuitants do.  
Easton 
 
137 
          The top 10 percent amounted to 350,000 people in 2011. They reported 
more than $71,000 of taxable income in a year when the annual wage was about 
$51,000. The closeness of the two reflects that there is a large tail of adults who 
are not full-time wage earners, including part-time workers, superannuitants, 
beneficiaries and other non-earners. (Only 22 percent of the adult population 
declared more than the annualised average wage.)  
 
The Pareto Coefficient 
Vilfredo Pareto famously proposed that upper incomes followed a power 
probability law which is today called the ‘Pareto distribution’. Its shape is 
characterised by a single parameter, the ‘Pareto Coefficient’, which he thought 
was universally near to 2. While practically top incomes roughly follow a 
Pareto distribution, the Pareto Coefficient itself is much more variable between 
countries and over time. In the case of early post-war New Zealand it was 
typically above 2.5, rising, and near 3.0 in the mid-1970s.11  
          The larger the Pareto Coefficient, the less unequal the distribution. (Thus 
the rising coefficient in the early part of the post-war era indicates that 
inequality was falling.)12 
 
The Top 0.1 Percent13 
Overseas studies often report the share of the top 0.1 percent. Given the 
difficulties with the New Zealand data, any estimation can be treacherous. 
Those with very high incomes can avoid declaring their offshore income for 
taxable purposes by using the residential rules and spending sufficient time out 
of New Zealand.14 The issue of under-reporting for tax avoidance poses even 
more problems. 
          As well as the reporting difficulties, the upper open interval is usually too 
big to enable a direct estimate. For instance in 2011 there were about the 3,500 
in the top 0.1 percent of the population, but those in the upper open interval 
numbered 13,040.15  Instead, the upper income tail is assumed to be Pareto 
                                                            
11 B. H. Easton (1983) Income Distribution in New Zealand: 181. 
12 The coefficients were estimated by using the simple relationship between the mean and the 
bottom income of a Pareto distribution. 
13 The tabulations are derived by sampling. Estimates using them will be less satisfactory 
where the numbers are small and the distribution highly skewed, as applies for the very top of 
the income distribution.  
14 As can those on lower incomes.  
15 See New Zealand tax residence. Who is a New Zealand resident for tax purposes? 
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distributed and the share of the top 0.1 percent is estimated from the share of the 
top one percent using the Pareto coefficient. 
 
What Does the Top of the New Zealand Market Income Distribution Look 
Like?16 
Table 1 provides statistics of the shares for the top income categories and the 
Pareto coefficients for each of the 31 (mainly March) years between 1981 and 
2011 inclusive. Its interpretation is illustrated by consideration of the last (2011) 
year.  
          In 2011 the top one percent of individuals declared about 9.2 percent of 
the total market income of New Zealand. That means that their average market 
income was 9.2 times that of the average New Zealand adult.17 The top 10 
percent declared 35.4 percent share of the total income, so they averaged 3.5 
that of the average New Zealander. The top 0.1 percent declared that they 
received (after avoidance) 22 times what the average New Zealander received.  
          How do these shares compare internationally? Such comparisons are very 
difficult because they may cover different populations (notably taxpayers rather 
than adults) and income aggregates (declared taxable income rather than the 
total). For the record, there is data for 18 OECD countries; their average for 
share of the top one percent comes to 9.8 percent, so the New Zealand share 
appears to be near the average of the reported OECD shares.18 The following 
may be useful benchmarks for the 2011 tax year: 
 10 percent of adults had incomes above about $70.000 
 1 percent of adults had incomes above about $165.000 
 0.1 percent of adults had incomes above about $420,000 
 Annualised average Wages = $51,000 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/a/3/a35bbb804bbe588fbc1efcbc87554a30/ir292.pdf 
The general rule is summarised by  
‘You’re a New Zealand tax resident if: 
 • you’re in New Zealand for more than 183 days in any 12-month period, or 
 • you have an “enduring relationship” with New Zealand, or 
 • you’re away from New Zealand in the service of the New Zealand government.’ 
People who are not New Zealand tax residents (non-residents) are liable for New Zealand tax 
only on their New Zealand-sourced income. 
16 As declared for tax purposes. 
17 On the basis of the handful of countries for which there are estimates the inclusion of 
capital gains might add about 1 percentage point to the top 1 percent’s  income share. 
18 http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/#Home: The denominators may not 
be consistent. 
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The Pareto coefficient was 2.6; it cannot be readily interpreted for these 
purposes. However that the average of 17 OECD countries in 2005 came to 2.1 
so New Zealand was probably less unequal on this measure, although it may be 
easier for rich New Zealanders to move offshore in order to escape the full 
impact of the New Zealand taxation regime.19  
 
Inequality at the Top over Time  
The four indicators change over the 31 years (see Table 1). There is probably 
not a lot to be gained from a year-to-year analysis because of sampling 
variability. However there are distinctive trends. Most fundamentally, the share 
of the top groups is higher at the end of the 31 years than at the beginning, while 
the Pareto Coefficient is correspondingly lower.20 
          Thus the top one percent had a share of 6.0 percent in 1981 and 9.2 
percent in 2011. (The share of the top 0.1 percent rose from 1.2 percent to 2.2 
percent in the same period. The top 10 percent rose from 30.1 percent to 35.4 
percent.)  
          The change over time is not smooth; for all measures most of the changes 
occur in the early 1990s. The share of the top 0.1 percent increases by about 1.5 
percentage points between 1989 and 1993; the share of the top one percent leaps 
from roughly 6 percent to roughly 10 percent between 1989 and 1993 (Since 
this includes the 0.1 percent, it means that the remaining 0.9 percent get about 
an additional 2.5 percentage points between them). The share of the top 10 
percent shows a leap of about 10 percentage points in the same period (so the 
next 9 percent have a lift of about 6 percentage points). Similarly the Pareto 
Coefficient hovers around 3 in the 1980s (a level similar to the late 1970s) and 
then falls to 2.3 in 1993.21  
          After 1993 there seems to a mildly rising trend peaking at the turn of the 
century, and then falling. The lessening of inequality seems to precede the 
                                                            
19 A B Atkinson, T. Piketty & E. Saez (2010) Top Incomes in the Long Run of History 
http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fichiers/public/AtkinsonPikettySaezOUP09summary.pdf, Table 13.1.  
20 There is a marked blip in the March 2000 year. The Labour Government had been elected 
in 1999 on a promise to raise the top income tax rate from April 2000. Many of the rich 
arranged their income flows to pull income forward into the lower tax year. However the 
income shares fall in the following few years and a moving average over the period shows 
only the most marginal peaking in 2000. See I. Claus, J. Creedy & J. Teng (2012) The 
Elasticity of Taxable Income in New Zealand Ne W Zealand Treasury Working Paper 12/03. 
21 Perhaps surprisingly, there is no evidence of the impact of the 1987 sharemarket boom and 
bust in the data. 
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arrival of the Global Financial Crisis. Or it could be argued that the trends after 
1993 are broadly flat.  
 
Why the Increase? 
Before trying to answer the question as to why there has been an increase in 
inequality at the top, three points need to be cleared away: 
 - this is a personal income distribution, it is not the same as the 
household income distribution, which much of the New Zealand 
income distribution debate has focussed on, and does not map easily 
to it.22  
 - this is the market distribution and, subject to the discussion on 
dividend imputation below, does not take into account income tax 
changes which, generally favouring the rich, have increased their 
share of after-tax incomes even further. (Almost all the discussion on 
the household income distribution is after-tax and with cash social 
assistance.) 
 - the dramatic change occurs in a very short period – not earlier than 
1989; not later than 1993. There is little evidence in the data of a long 
term trend (nor – perhaps more surprisingly – of a business cycle).  
What might have been the causes of the widening of the income distribution at 
the top? The main reasons seem to be two fold.  
 
1. The Impact of the Dividend Imputation System 
Until 1989 it was said that corporate dividends were ‘doubled taxed’. First 
corporate profits paid corporation tax and then, dividends paid from the tax-paid 
profits were treated as taxable income of the shareholder. Of course in practice 
things were much more complicated for there was considerable tax avoidance. 
          From 1989 there has been a dividend imputation system in which a 
shareholder receiving a dividend from a company is entitled to an ‘imputation 
credit’, which represents tax paid by the company, and is used to reduce or 
eliminate the shareholder's income tax liability.23 In effect corporation tax 
becomes a withholding tax for shareholders’ dividends.  
                                                            
22 B. H. Easton (2013) Economic Inequality in New Zealand: A User’s Guide, (forthcoming) 
23 Dividend imputation is a corporate tax system in which some or all of the tax paid by a 
company may be attributed, or imputed, to the shareholders by way of a tax credit to reduce 
the income tax payable on a distribution. In comparison to the classical system, it reduces or 
eliminates the tax disadvantages of distributing dividends to shareholders by only requiring 
them to pay the difference between the corporate rate and their marginal rate. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dividend_imputation 
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          The (intended) effect was to encourage the distribution of corporate 
earnings with the consequence that shareholders were less dependent on capital 
gains and other artifices (such as returning to shareholder their capital 
investment) to access their share of corporate profits. The alternatives are 
explicitly designed to avoid reporting personal income; a dividend imputation 
system does not have the same disincentive (while giving the shareholder easier 
access to corporate profits). In effect it puts some previously unreported income 
(including capital gains) on the IRD books. 
         This altered the way that dividends are recorded in the tabulation. Thus 
$100 of corporate profits which were taxed at, say, 33 percent and fully paid out 
were recorded as $67 before imputation but as $100 after the new regime was 
introduced. This is in addition to the encouragement to corporations to pay more 
dividends which get reported for income tax purposes. 24 
          In the 1988 year, (natural) persons declared $152m of net dividends. By 
1993, after the imputation was introduced and had settled in, they were 
declaring $691m in net dividends which grossed up (i.e. with $252m of the 
corporation tax paid on them added back) came to $943m. That meant that 
reported dividends jump from about 0.4 percent of estimated market income to 
2.1 percent.25 
          We are unable to attribute all this increase to those with incomes in the 
top 10 percent since some of the other 90 percent receive some dividends. 
However it would appear that as a result the top one percent declared an income 
boost of about 1 percentage point share of total income. 
          The share of declared dividends in total income continue to rise. By 2011 
they probably amounted to 3.0 percent, up about another 1 percentage point on 
1993.26 However There was an increase after 2000 in income routed through 
trusts. It is possible that the turn down in the share of the top 1 percent in the 
following decade reflects this. In which case it is possible that, had there been 
no acceleration in amounts distributed through trusts in the decade, the share of 
                                                            
24 We could have a vigorous argument at this point as to what extent the declared increase 
reflected a genuine increase in market incomes and to what extent it was the result of closing 
a tax avoidance loophole and an accounting convention of reporting them grossed up, the 
effect of which was to have the effect of reducing their tax liability. The second interpretation 
would suggest the change belongs more to a change in after-tax incomes. We leave the debate 
to another venue. Our purpose is of measurement. 
25 The income indicator measures dividends grossed up.  
26 Additionally 2011 may have been a low year because of changes in tax treatment.  
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the top 1 percent would have been a percentage point (or even two) higher and 
there would have been no fall-off after 2000. 
          Strangely there is no evidence that this later increase in dividends 
increased the top share of incomes.27 In any case it only explains a part of what 
was going on in the early 1990s. 
 
2. Rewards for managers rose relative to rewards for labour  
It would seem that the rewards for managers (and higher professionals) rose 
relative to the rewards for ordinary labour. This can be illustrated by 
considering the ratio between the salary of the Secretary of the Treasury and 
average earnings.28 In 1981 it was about 5.6 times of the average wage but in 
2011 it was almost double that at about 11.1 times. The Secretary’s 
remuneration pattern is little different for many senior civil servants, and was 
justified by a similar shift in top management rates in the private sector. 
          Exactly why this happened is complicated, but how it happened is not. 
The 1988 State Sector Act abandoned the rigid relativities that existed in the 
public service, enabling higher relative remuneration to the top civil servants, 
while most civil servants were experiencing restricted increases (or declines). 
Probably the same thing was happening in the private sector. (An important 
factor may have been the globalisation of the market for management and 
higher professional.) 
          It will be noted this change just preceded the time when the share of the 
one percent increased markedly. Unfortunately however, we cannot estimate its 
total magnitude to assess to what degree that explains the rest of the upshift. 29 
 
Table 1: Shares of Income and Pareto Coefficients 
Tax 
Year 
PERCENT INCOME SHARE OF Pareto 
Coefficient Top 0.1% Next 0.9% Top 1%  Next 9% Top 10% 
1981 1.2 4.8 6.0 24.1 30.1 3.1 
1982 1.3 4.6 5.9 24.1 30.0 3.0 
1983 1.2 4.7 5.9 24.9 30.8 3.2 
1984 1.3 4.8 6.1 24.7 30.8 3.0 
                                                            
27 Of course some dividends are flowing through trusts. 
28 The Secretary of the Treasury was paid $61,953 in 1981 and about $565,000 in 2011. 
29 Tim Hunter of The Dominion Post kindly made available a data base he has been collecting 
of the pay of chief executives of 34 listed companies. It suggests that their remuneration rates 
increased by about 10.7 percent p.a. in the 2009 to 2012 period; the data base shows an 
increase of market income per adult of 1.3 percent p.a. over the same period.  
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1985 1.3 4.7 6.0 24.0 30.0 3.0 
1986 1.3 4.7 6.0 23.7 29.7 2.9 
1987 1.1 4.4 5.3 23.7 29.0 3.3 
1988 1.4 4.7 6.1 24.5 29.6 2.7 
1989 1.3 4.8 6.1 24.2 30.3 3.0 
1990 1.9 5.8 7.7 25.7 33.4 2.7 
1991 3.0 7.0 10.0 28.0 38.0 2.5 
1992 2.6 6.9 9.5 28.3 37.8 2.1 
1993 2.8 7.4 10.2 29.4 39.6 2.3 
1994 2.9 7.6 10.5 29.4 39.9 2.3 
1995 3.0 7.9 10.9 28.7 39.6 2.2 
1996 3.0 7.7 10.7 28.4 39.1 2.2 
1997 3.0 7.6 10.6 28.0 38.6 2.2 
1998 3.2 7.7 10.9 28.1 39.0 2.2 
1999 3.9 8.1 12.1 28.8 40.9 2.0 
2000 6.2 10.0 16.2 29.3 45.5 1.7 
2001 2.4 7.3 9.7 28.4 38.1 2.6 
2002 2.9 7.3 10.2 28.1 38.3 2.2 
2003 2.9 7.4 10.3 27.8 38.1 2.2 
2004 3.3 7.4 10.7 27.2 37.9 2.0 
2005 3.8 7.4 11.2  26.4 37.6 1.9 
2006 2.9 7.3 10.2 26.3 36.5 2.2 
2007 2.5 7.3 9.8 26.0 35.8 2.4 
2008 2.4 6.9 9.3 25.0 34.3 2.5 
2009 2.6 7.3 9.9 25.8 35.7 2.4 
2010 2.5 7.2 9.7 26.4 36.1 2.5 
2011 2.2 7.0 9.2 26.2 35.4 2.6 
(Source: As reported in text; ultimately from Inland Revenue and Statistics New Zealand statistic)
Conclusion 
The purpose of this research note has been to use IRD data to track changes in 
top incomes. Although some calibration is necessary and there has to be caution 
over omissions it has been possible to track from the tax year 1981 to tax year 
2011 (the latest for which IRD data is available). 
          The basic conclusion is that there has been an increase in inequality, in 
that top incomes have increased faster than incomes as a whole. However most 
of this increase occurred in the 1989 to 1991 period probably because of an 
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increase in remuneration margins for management and the introduction of a 
dividend imputation system. 
          There is some evidence that the share of top market incomes gradually 
rose after 1993 through to about 2000 (albeit interpretation of the data is 
complicated by some tax avoidance) and then as gradually fell away. The 
indicators suggest that on the measures of top incomes, inequality was lower in 
2011 than in 1993 but higher than in 1988.30 
          Calibration difficulties make international comparisons difficult, so we 
must be cautious about ranking New Zealand’s top income inequality with 
economies elsewhere. However there is no evidence of a surge in inequality in 
the New Zealand data in the first decade of the twenty first century, as has 
occurred in the UK and the US, probably because New Zealand does not have 
as sophisticated financial sectors as they have. If anything, the share of those 
with top incomes seems to have fallen slightly in that period.   
                                                            
30 However post 2000 is complicated by the 39c rate avoidance - the more fungible income 
moved into other entities, and was no longer declared by natural persons. 
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Distributions, dimensions and Determinants: 
The New Zealand Census 2013 and General Social Survey 2008-
2012 results relating to Inequality 
 
Charles Crothers 
 
1 Introduction 
Adding the 2012 tranche of data to the earlier 2008 and 2010 rounds of the New 
Zealand General Social Survey (NZGSS) generates a large data-set of high 
quality which includes a wide array of measures relating to inequality, the 
distribution of resources and Standard of living (SOL) and which therefore 
provides the information for a usefully sophisticated (i.e. multivariate) 
description of inequality in contemporary New Zealand. Although the quality of 
measurement of some key items is rather thin (often restricted to a single fairly 
‘global’ measure1) the advantages of the NZGSS are its up-to-datedness, the 
solid sample size (n=25,737: confidence intervals for fairly equal distributions 
are under 1%) and the ability (since unit record data is available) to carry out 
multivariate analyses. Access to the NZGSS Curf is provided under the 
conditions of the Statistics Act 1975: the results presented here are the work of 
the author. 
           The NZGSS is a multidimensional, biennial survey on social and 
economic outcomes of New Zealanders aged 15 years and over who are usual 
residents in private dwellings (excluding off-shore islands). General Social 
Surveys are included within the statistical programmes in countries including 
Australia (2002 on), the United Kingdom, Canada (1985 on), and more 
generally in the OECD which thus provides some international comparability. 
The NZGSS uses a three-stage sample selection method, similar to other 
Statistics New Zealand’s household surveys 2 . Response-rates have declined 
                                                            
1  SNZ reports that many of the items in the new GSS include 11-point scales and 
measurement has been brought in line with international best practice. Moreover, while the 
primary content of the survey (the content that will be repeated at each iteration) will still 
largely consist of single item measures due to time restrictions, the survey will have 
supplements from 2014 onwards which will include more in-depth, multiple-item 
measurement of well-being in certain life domains - Social Networks and Support, Civic and 
Cultural Participation and Housing and Physical Environment.  
 
2 In each round: 
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slightly over time and are now below the target of 80% (see Table 1). One 
individual in the household completes the household questionnaire, on 
collective information (e.g. family relationships and household income), and 
one individual in the household aged 15 years or over is randomly selected to 
answer the personal questionnaire. Some questions in the personal questionnaire 
(such as the Economic Living Standard Index: ELSI) questions, including 
adequacy of income to meet everyday needs) are not asked of respondents who 
are under 18 years of age. Interviews are conducted using computer-assisted 
personal interviews and last an average of 45 minutes. The survey has two sets 
of weights attached, one for the household and one for the person3.  
 
Table 1: GSS - Methodological details 
 2008 2010 2012 
Reference	period	 April	2008	to	March	
2009	
April	2010	to	March	
2011	
April	2012	to	March	
2013.	
Sample	size	 8,721	 8,550	 	8,462		
Response	rate	 83%	 81%	 78%	
 
          In addition, early results from the 2013 census allow some updating of 
time-series in relation to labour force status, employment status, occupation, 
education, income and tenure. Attention is also drawn (where available) to 
disaggregations by Maori ethnicity (those people who specified ‘Māori’ as 
either their sole ethnic group, or as one of several ethnic groups) and gender. 
Where possible 2006 and 2001 comparisons are presented (limited in order 
avoid too many complications with backward compatibility of coding 
categories). The main approach to the data is to compare relative proportions at 
each census period, although it can also be interesting to examine other 
measures of changes over time (and an even more sophisticated analysis might 
provide per annum changes bearing in mind the 5 year gap between 2001 and 
2006 censuses, whereas there was a 7-year gap between the 2006 and 2013 
censuses.)   
                                                                                                                                                                                        
-  1,200 PSUs are selected from the Household Survey Frame (HSF)  which are divided 
into standard strata based on selected attributes;  
- eligible dwellings are randomly selected within the selected PSUs;  
-  one eligible individual is randomly selected within each selected dwelling. 
3 Each of these weights is calculated over three stages. An initial selection weight is selected, 
then it is adjusted for non-response, and then for calibration. The population totals for the 
NZGSS are national annual resident population estimates. 
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          This research note describes the results for the NZGSS measures for each 
of these aspects of inequality, including whether there has been substantively 
significant change since 2008, and the extent to which multiple measures ‘hang 
together’ or might form the basis for a summative scale. Commentary is 
necessary to point to limitations in the measurements and how the findings 
relate to other studies. Measures available (those also available from the census 
are marked with an asterisk) include: 
- Personal and household (hh) incomes* 
- Sources of personal income 
- Tenure * 
- Dwelling Size and crowding 
- SOL index summing various nonmonetary advantages/lacks 
- Neighbourhood Deprivation index  
- Educational Qualifications* 
- Employment arrangements*  
- Occupation*   
- Subjective SOL. 
This analysis zig-zags between personal and household levels of analysis. 
Household characteristics are important contexts for most respondents and will 
affect their life-chances. On the other hand, household aggregates are composed 
of their members’ characteristics and activities. 
         The following section examines the extent to which the measures on each 
of these aspects correlate as whole; and the next section attempts to validate the 
importance of the ensuing ‘factors’ in terms of its relationship to overall life 
satisfaction. The final major section plots the socio-economic correlates of the 
various inequality measures. 
          The analytical tools used in examining this data include standard 
percentages, chi-square tests of statistical significance, comparison of means 
(including the values of eta – the nonlinear correlation coefficient), factor 
analysis and Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA). Exact changes over three 
rounds are hard to detect correctly as statistical significance testing with such 
large samples picks up more sample variation than is substantively useful, so 
measures of association were also used. The factor analysis uses the standard 
Rotation Method of Varimax with Kaiser Normalization following PA 
factoring. Multiple classification analysis (MCA) provides a multi-variate 
account of the impact of a set of independent (at any level of measurement) 
variables on a (scaled) dependent variable. MCA can show the effect of each 
predictor on the dependent variable, both before and after taking into account 
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the effects of all other predictors. (Multiple Regression and Discriminant 
Analysis can also do this, but under certain restrictive conditions such as 
requiring that all predictor variables are measured on interval scales and the 
relationships are linear.) The format in which the results are presented are that 
all coefficients are expressed as deviations from the overall mean, not from 
unknown mean of the excluded class in each set. Since adjusted and unadjusted 
subgroup means are available in the same table, the amount of intercorrelations 
between the predictors can be detected4. 
          Theoretical models which might guide interpretation are not made 
explicit, but include the status attainment model (in which family context affects 
long-term outcomes such as income particularly through the effect of education, 
occupation and ‘family resources’), family life cycle (the various stages of 
family formation and deformation – cf. New Zealand study by Crothers and 
McCormack, 2006) and the family asset development cycle.   
          The intent of this research note is largely descriptive, while endeavouring 
to dig below the surface level of each of the measures to examine their 
interrelationships and the extent to which they are socially distributed. No 
particular theoretical models are tested and no particular research questions 
thoroughly focused on. However, this descriptive picture should be a sound 
platform for further analyses. In my view, analysis which attempts to be more 
sophisticated than the measurement and sampling ;limitations of data is in 
danger of providing ‘spurious accuracy’ and the broad relationships depicted 
here should prove robust. 
 
2 Results: Aspects of Inequality:   
(2.1) Personal and household incomes 
As might be expected census data show that median personal income has 
steadily increased over the period as indicated by the medians, and the general 
tilt towards higher income brackets. (Controlling for inflation would give a 
better sense of how relative incomes have fared.)  By 2013 (see Table 2) well 
over 12% were in the top 2 income brackets compared to under 5% in 2001. 
The distribution amongst the lower categories is smaller up to about an income 
of some $15,000, with 2013 witnessing quite an increase in those reporting zero 
                                                            
4 These detailed tables are not presented but are available from author: 
charles.crothers@aut.ac.nz. For further on MCA see 
http://www.unesco.org/webworld/idams/advguide/Chapt5_3.htm 
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income. Incomes for Maori remain lower with Maori median (see Table 3) as a 
ratio of Overall being 80% in 2001, 86% in 2006 and reverting badly to 79% in 
2013. The comparable ratios for median women as a proportion of median men 
are 58% for 2001, 61% in 2006 and 63% in 2013, showing a steady progression.  
 
Table 2: Personal Income (%s) 
                             2001    2006     2013 
______________________  ________  ________  ________ 
 
Loss                         .59       .55       .50 
Zero Income                 4.18      4.59      7.18 
$1–$5,000                   8.32      7.00      5.54 
$5,001–$10,000             11.68      7.18      4.89 
$10,001–$15,000            13.67     11.26      7.93 
$15,001–$20,000             8.43      8.23      8.48 
$20,001–$25,000             7.21      6.95      6.73 
$25,001–$30,000             7.44      6.81      5.65 
$30,001–$40,000            10.78     12.79     10.72 
$40,001–$50,000             6.34      8.30      8.59 
$50,001–$70,000             5.66      8.90     11.71 
$70,001–$100,000            2.37      3.96      7.06 
$100,001 or more            2.16      3.34      5.37 
Total people stated        88.85     89.85     90.35 
Not Stated                 11.15     10.15      9.65 
Total people              100.00    100.00    100.00 
 
Table 3 Median Incomes ($) 2001     2006      2013 
All                       18500     24400     28500 
Maori                     14800  20900     22500 
Males                     24900     31500     36500     
Females                   14500     19100     23100 
 
      In the GSS, both personal and household information were collected asking 
respondents about the previous 12 month period and with a 15-category 
response scale with the open-ended upper interval at $150,000. Restriction to 
two questions has limitations, with respondent recall of income flows not being 
jogged by more specific questions as in the Household Income Survey. 
However, it is likely to provide a robust picture of both individual and 
household incomes. Mid-points of each category were assigned to generate a 
pseudo-interval variable, with the open-ended lower and upper categories being 
set somewhat arbitrarily. While this set of categories seems ample for 
measuring the range of personal incomes for Household incomes it results in a 
skewed heaping towards the higher categories. Another difficulty with the data 
is that it is not related to hours of work: although this is only pertinent for 
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personal income and even then to the unknown ‘market income’ portion of this. 
However, to gain some sense of the relationship of income to hours worked, a 
pseudo-hourly rate was calculated by dividing the midpoint of the personal 
income category by the midpoint of the hours worked categories. (In turn there 
are methodological difficulties here as the information on hours worked varies 
amongst the 3 rounds of data-collection. The 2008 data is capped at 50 hours 
plus and for 2012 categories rather than exact hours are reported. Of course, the 
assumption here that the data reported is sufficiently typical of the year.) The 
most important measurement issue is that household income must be related to 
household size and type, which is normally implemented by applying household 
relative income measure: in this case the Mercurio method was used. (Again, 
different measures might result in slightly different outcomes, although a high 
robustness is to be expected.) 
          It is important to adequately describe the relevant income measures in 
terms of their means, standard deviations and coefficients of variation (covs): 
see Table 4. Average personal income is $37,500 and average household 
income $87,750, reducing to $69,350 when relativised. The measure of hourly 
rate is $27.85. This latter varies the most within the sample, followed by 
personal incomes (where the standard deviation equals the mean) but is less for 
the two household measures (c65% each). None of these measures differed 
significantly across the three rounds of data-collection. 
 
Table 4: GSS Income Measures (2008-2012) 
 Mean Std. 
Error 
Std. 
Deviation  
Skewness Kurtosis  COV 
Personal income 37.4887 .23360 37.47603 2.083 5.744 99.98%
Household income 87.7578 .35607 57.12272 .729 -.458 65.1%
HH Relative Income 69.3546 .27767 44.49525 1.362 2.826 64.2%
HH Relative Size 1.2977 .00296 .47509 .725 .702 36.53%
Personal $ per hr gp 27.8542 .28757 37.44798 14.779 381.641 134.47%
 
(2.2) Sources of Personal income  
Sources of personal income asked about cover market income (as either an 
employee, an employer or both), income from savings/investments and from 
government transfers. Most common sources of income are from (Table 5) 
wages etc. (60%), interest etc. (21%), and from self-employment or Accident 
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payment (c15% each). On average each respondent has 1.4 plus/minus 0.26 
sources. There is a slight fall in number of sources across the period. 
          The factor analysis of these sources (not displayed here) does not produce 
clean results since many sources can be combined, although some are mutually 
exclusive. Presumably because it is so ubiquitous, employee income spreads 
across several factors – in varying combinations with other sources of income. 
The main grouping covers ACC etc. payments, NZ Superannuation and interest, 
negatively correlated with employee income.  
 
Table 5: Sources personal income: 
 
 No Yes 
%  % 
wages, salary, commissions, bonuses etc paid by an employer 40.2% 59.8%
self-employment or business 84.6% 15.4%
interest, dividends, rent, other investments 78.7% 21.3%
regular payments from ACC or a private work accident insurer 85.8% 14.2%
NZ Superannuation or veteran's pension 97.4% 2.6%
other superannuation pensions, annuities (other than NZ 
Superannuation, veteran's pension or war pension) 92.2% 7.8%
Unemployment benefit 91.1% 8.9%
sickness benefit 97.0% 3.0%
domestic purposes benefit 93.9% 6.1%
not stated 97.7% 2.3%
 
(2.3) Tenure  
As the main asset owned by families tenure is a proxy for wealth and asset 
holding more generally, with home ownership sometimes reducing costs, but 
setting up a stream of income or future income. This variable is complicated by 
the advent of family trust as a tenure form (and also by some not-specified 
responses). The census data (Table 6) show that renting (or more technically not 
owned) dwellings have steadily increased as a proportion over the last 12 years, 
as has proportion in family trusts. 
 
Table 6 Tenure                       2001       2006       2013 
______________________________  _________  _________  _________ 
 
Dwelling owned or partly owned      67.80      54.50      49.90 
Dwelling not owned                  32.20      33.10      35.20 
Dwelling held in a family trust       .        12.30      14.80 
Percentage owned/in trust           67.80      66.90      64.80 
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         For the GSS data (Table 7) the categories have been recoded into outright-
owned, part-owned (i.e. still paying mortgage), renting and rent-free households 
to form what is assumed to be an ordinal scale. Some 15 % were in family 
trusts, but these were assumed to be similar in consequences to the more general 
tenure category and so were recoded into either owning or rent-paying 
categories. Renting is rising over the 2008-2012 period. 
 
Table 7: GSS Housing results (2008-2012) 
  % 
Tenure 
Dwelling Owned by Usual Resident(s) 30.2%
Dwelling Part-Owned by Usual Resident(s) 38.8%
Dwelling Not Owned by Usual 
Resident(s):rent 29.2%
Dwelling Not Owned by Usual Resident(s):no 
rent 1.8%
 
 
(2.4) Dwelling Size and crowding 
It is unclear whether dwelling size as measured by number of bedrooms is an 
indicator of the value of a building, but household crowding certainly is (Table 
8). The measure used is the Canadian crowding index in which number of 
bedrooms needed is assigned by a formula that requires that there be adequate 
bedroom space for the family configuration in terms of adults and children and 
the genders involved5.   
         Most dwellings have 3 bedrooms (45%) with another one quarter (27%) 
having 4 with similar proportions of 2 and 5 bedroomed dwellings and a tiny 
proportion only 1 bedroom. In terms of household crowding only a small 
minority of dwellings are overcrowded (6%) while nearly 40% have two or 
more bedrooms to spare. (Mind you, bedrooms can be used for other purposes.) 
Finally, number of major housing problems seemed an important measure as it 
indicated where households might have restrictions on their asset: two-thirds 
have no reported major problems with one-fifth reporting one and another one-
tenth two problems. There was no detectable change over the three rounds of 
data-collection. 
 
                                                            
5 http://www2.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/web/prod_serv.nsf/Response/Indicator+2a:+Equi
valised+Crowding+Index 
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(2.7) Employment arrangements 
Labour force status has two key aspects: the participation rate of those in the 
paid workforce and those who are unemployed (whose definition requires active 
searching for work). It might be expected there would be some influence from 
rising retirements as the population ages. For the overall population (Table 13) 
these rates are rock-steady, without any noticeable aging effect although 2006 
shows a slight kick-up in both fulltime and part-time paid work and a decline in 
unemployment rate. (The 2013 figures are slightly affected by an increased ‘not 
stated’ response.) About 45% are fulltime and another 14% part-time and 4.5% 
unemployed while some 30-32% of adults are not in the paid workforce. Maori 
do less well and their unemployment rate and overall labour force non-
engagement rate have increased considerably between 2006 and 2013. The 
gender-related pattern is starkly different: men’s full-time participation is much 
larger but fairly steady whereas women’s slightly edged up. Men’s part-time 
paid employment has edged up slightly, whereas women’s part-time proportion 
is the same but is a much larger proportion. For 2006 and 2013 the women’s 
unemployment rate was slightly higher than for men, reversing the pattern for 
2001.  
 
Table 13A: Labour force status      2001      2006      2013  Maori 13  Maori 06 
______________________________  ________  ________  ________  ________  ________ 
 
Employed Full-time                 45.96     48.44     45.64     43.43     48.04 
Employed Part-time                 13.81     14.39     13.62     13.07     13.63 
Total people, employed             59.78     62.83     59.26     56.51     61.67 
Unemployed                          4.84      3.37      4.54     10.42      7.63 
Total people, labour force         64.62     66.20     63.80     66.93     69.30 
Not in the Labour Force            32.32     30.43     31.34     33.07     30.70 
Total people stated                96.94     96.64     95.14    100.00    100.00 
Not stated                          3.06      3.36      4.86                 
 
 
 
                                            Female              Female              Female 
T13B: Labour force status by gender Male 01     01   Male 06        06   Male 13        13 
______________________________  ________  ________  ________  ________  ________  ________ 
 
Employed Full-time                 60.35     35.46     62.62     38.55     59.13     37.70 
Employed Part-time                  8.27     19.78      8.85     20.49      8.83     19.37 
Total people, employed             68.62     55.24     71.47     59.04     67.96     57.07 
Unemployed                          5.18      4.82      3.33      3.64      4.58      4.94 
Total people, labour force         73.80     60.06     74.80     62.68     72.55     62.01 
Not in the Labour Force            26.20     39.94     25.20     37.32     27.45     37.99 
Total people stated               100.00    100.00    100.00    100.00    100.00    100.00 
Work and Labour Force Status U      3.22      3.10      3.59      3.38      5.32      4.92 
           
         The NZGSS collects information about employment arrangements as well 
as the occupation: these include number of jobs, whether the main job is 
fulltime or part-time (actually number of hours is asked about and this is then 
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occupants was lower: the net effect is of little change compared to the overall 
workforce.  
 
Table 15: Employment status        2013      2001      2006      1996 
______________________________  ________  ________  ________  ________ 
 
Paid Employee                      77.64     75.08     76.10     74.39 
Employer                            6.49      7.51      7.20      7.50 
Self-Employed and Without Employees11.79     12.34     11.83     11.37 
Unpaid Family Worker                1.88      2.27      1.99      3.31 
 
Main work is classified into 8 main divisions using the ANZSCO classification. 
This does not allow a fine-tuned analysis but at least the conceptualisation of 
the classification is soundly based. To help guide interpretation the scores of the 
NZSEI can be applied. (And for those not in the paid workforce the imputation 
suggested by the NZSEI-06 exercise: see Milne et al., 2013). Those not in the 
workforce increased across the period while the distribution of workers across 
occupations has remained steady (Table 17). 
 
 
Table 16: Occupations (Major groups) 2006     2013     Maori 06  Maori 13 
______________________________  ________  ________  ________  ________ 
 
Managers                           17.15     17.79     10.62     12.20 
Professionals                      18.85     21.32     12.86     15.27 
Technicians and Trades Workers     12.18     11.39     11.37     10.46 
Community and Personal Service      7.88      8.55     10.04     11.00 
Clerical and Administrative        12.13     11.39      9.96      9.91 
Sales Workers                       9.37      8.84      7.81      7.78 
Machinery Operators and Driver      5.76      5.18      9.60      8.30 
Labourers                          11.03     10.52     19.41     18.08 
Total people stated                94.34     94.98     91.67     93.01 
Not elsewhere included              5.66      5.02      8.32      6.99 
 
                                            Female              Female 
Table 16b: Occupations by Gender  Male 06        06   Male 13        13 
______________________________  ________  ________  ________  ________ 
 
Managers                           21.00     12.83     21.44     13.80 
Professionals                      15.80     22.27     17.53     25.48 
Technicians and Trades Workers     18.70      4.86     17.42      4.76 
Community and Personal Service      4.46     11.71      5.10     12.33 
Clerical and Administrative         4.88     20.25      4.84     18.58 
Sales Workers                       7.10     11.92      6.73     11.14 
Machinery Operators and Driver      9.13      1.97      8.56      1.46 
Labourers                          12.94      8.89     12.84      7.99 
Total people stated                94.01     94.71     94.47     95.54 
Not elsewhere included              5.99      5.29      5.53      4.46 
Total people                      100.00    100.00    100.00    100.00 
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Relationship with Overall Life Satisfaction 
Given the considerable array of different measures of resource distribution it 
might be useful to attempt to validate these against overall life satisfaction as a 
summative measure.  This is an unrobust exercise since there are a range of 
experiences and attributes which affect feelings about life. Nevertheless, the 
results may be informative (Table 20). The strongly correlation was with 
subjective SOL with satisfaction with SOL correlating at R=.467 and the next 
highest scoring was with the Elsi scale (at R=.38). More material dimensions of 
inequality correlated at a much lower level of around R=0.15 including 
household income, tenure, crowding with another set of measures relating at  an 
even lower level – around R=0.1 – including personal income, education, 
occupational score and dwelling size. It is interesting that subjective measures 
have such high predictability and that household measure shave higher 
correlations than personal.  
 
Table 20: Correlations of Class-related measures with Overall Life Satisfaction 
Correlations How do you 
feel about your 
life as a whole 
right now? 
Personal income -.108
Personal $ per hr gp -.067
HH Relative Income -.156
Edscale -.097
Tenure .142
NZ Deprivation Score .126
Bedrooms Needed -.126
NZSEI -.104
Employment arrangement .017
Proxy NZSEI -.100
Number of bedrooms -.082
Economic living standard derived variable. -.380
Generally, how satisfied are you with your current standard of living? .467
Generally, how would you rate your standard of living? .338
Would you say you have not enough money, just enough money, 
enough money, or more than enough money? 301
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5 Relationships to Socio-Economic Characteristics 
Finally, the research note attempts to map variation amongst the various 
outcomes in relation to standard social background characteristics. This is 
carried out by relating each to a standard set consisting of: 
- Gender 
- Age-group (5 year age-groups up to 85+) 
- Ethnicity (a combination classification) 
- Region (6 major areas: from North North Island to South 
Island) 
- Urban/rural location (Type of Urban Area) 
- Country of Birth (New Zealand born v rest: this could also be 
disaggregated for more detailed country of birth groupings) 
- Household Size 
- Household type (a combination classification) 
- Educational level (in displaying results a 4 category summary 
is used) 
- Occupation (including not in the paid workforce as a 
category). 
The last two variables are not included in the first table. 
          Differences in education levels are particularly associated with age 
(although its effect falls once controlled for the other variables), ethnicity, being 
born in New Zealand, but also urban location (Table 21). The NZSEI measure 
of occupation has a broadly similar pattern featuring age (which does not fall 
when controlled), ethnicity, both urban area and region but also gender. Being 
unemployed is strongly shaped by age, ethnicity and family type. All three 
equations are substantial, with education most ‘explainable’ and unemployment 
least. 
The three top sources of income were reviewed (Table 22): each with 
strong equations, particularly wage-earners. Occupation influences the first two 
income sources, but also age, urban area, family characteristics and ethnicity. 
Interest etc as a source is shaped by age, educational qualification and ethnicity.  
          Personal, Household, Relativised household and relative wage income 
was examined, yielding several significant overall effects (Table 23). 
Occupation is most prominent in these, reinforced by highest educational 
qualification, age but also ethnicity and region. 
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descriptive overview which foreshadows much further analysis which is needed 
and also points to areas of policy concern which should be addressed.  
 
Table 26: Work-related Measures by Social Characteristics 
 FTPT 
Eta 
FTPT 
 
Hours 
Worke
d 
Hours 
Worked 
Employment 
Arrangement
s 
Employment 
Arrangement
s 
Unemploye
d 
Unemploye
d 
Beta 
Adjusted 
for Other 
Factors 
Eta Beta 
Adjusted 
for Other 
Factors 
Eta Beta 
Adjusted for 
Other 
Factors 
Eta Beta 
Adjusted 
for Other 
Factors 
Sex .194 .077 .280 .247 .004 .008 .032 .013
Age .519 .100 .293 .265 .051 .061 .195 .058
Single and 
Combinatio
n Ethnicity 
.055 .015 .034 .034 .064 .085 .118 .024
Were you 
born in 
New 
Zealand? 
.013 .004 .010 .031 .019 .019 .000 .020
Household 
size .147 .020 .057 .041 .022 .037 .059 .019
Family type 
by child 
dependency 
status 
.183 .039 .112 .098 .021 .034 .175 .039
Region .037 .010 .024 .024 .010 .019 .042 .010
Urban area .058 .006 .049 .025 .012 .009 .045 .024
Highest 
Qual. .198 .008 .075 .037 .039 .046 .086 .015
Person's 
occupation 
in their 
main job 
.924 .869 .276 .165 .059 .064 .837 .822
 Overall 931 867 452 204 120 014 842 708
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Table 27: Subjective Measures by Social Characteristics 
Subjective SOL Would 
you say 
you have 
not 
enough 
money, 
just 
enough.... 
Eta 
Would 
you say 
you 
have not 
enough 
money, 
just 
enough.. 
Generally, 
how 
satisfied 
are you 
with your 
current 
standard 
of living?
Generally, 
how 
satisfied 
are you 
with your 
current 
standard 
of living?
Generally, 
how 
would 
you rate 
your 
standard 
of living? 
Generally, 
how 
would 
you rate 
your 
standard 
of living?
Beta 
Adjusted 
for 
Other  
Factors 
Eta Beta 
Adjusted 
for Other 
Factors 
Eta Beta 
Adjusted 
for Other 
Factors 
Sex .020 .015 .007 .031 .007 .014
Age .125 .148 .160 .210 .061 .132
Single and Combination 
Ethnicity .193 .102 .130 .061 .215 .185
Were you born in New 
Zealand? .049 .033 .031 .024 .051 .020
Household size .162 .055 .109 .039 .120 .058
Family type by child 
dependency status .240 .176 .199 .155 .176 .128
Region .075 .046 .034 .019 .057 .043
Urban area .035 .032 .033 .026 .036 .019
Highest Qual. .178 .136 .093 .086 .193 .162
Person's occupation in 
their main job .234 .216 .131 .142 .215 .152
 Overall .395 .156 .310 .096 .373 .139
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programme. Drawing on decades of research, the author argues that public 
health is both a cult and a science of contemporary society. 
 
Contents 
Chapter 1. Public health theories and theorising public health 
Chapter 2. Myths, morality and modern public health 
Chapter 3. The politics of public health 
Chapter 4. Health promotion settings and health hostile environments 
Chapter 5. Public health and health professionals 
Chapter 6. The political use of public health 
Chapter 7. Public health campaigns 
Chapter 8. The cult of health and its rituals 
 
Geoff Fougere 
This is a deeply interesting book – an appreciation but also a critical dissection 
of public health. It is written by someone who is pre-eminently a sociologist but 
who is also familiar with the practices of public health, both as a long term 
member of a university Department of Public Health and as a researcher 
exploring the effects of these practices across diverse settings. 
          The book opens up the complexity of public health as a ‘collective 
response to threats against peoples’ health’. That complexity includes the 
layering of the ‘old’ public health, with its focus on sanitation and the 
prevention of communicable disease, on the ‘new’ public health, with its focus 
on chronic disease and concerns with health promotion (with the social 
determinants of health running as a thread between the two), the array of 
academic disciplines drawn on by public health and its manifold and ambivalent 
links to the state and to market capitalism. If public health is, in the book’s 
framing, an ‘institution’, it can also be seen as a promiscuous assemblage, 
constantly combining and recombining different forms of knowledge production 
and social, economic and political linkages with interventions operating at every 
scale from the face to face to the global. 
          The approach the book takes is not to eschew this complexity but to run 
with it: to follow public health practices into many of the locales in which they 
have effects, across historical time as well as geographical space. The result is 
to check and constrain both public health’s self-understanding of its enterprise 
and the framing of public health by dominant theoretical currents within 
sociology. Public health is not simply about the, ‘discovery of scientific 
principles and commitment to individual wellbeing’ – a view that elides its 
complex and ambivalent ties with market capitalism and the state. And while 
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sometimes public health provides a handmaiden to exploitative forms of 
capitalism as in Marxist accounts or acts as a powerful disciplinary force, 
joining surveillance and control with the ‘responsibilisation’ of individual 
subjects as in Foucauldian approaches, the framing that the book develops is 
different. Public health, the book argues, operates as, ‘an important moral force 
[which] plays a significant role mediating between different institutions, 
including the state and the market. But like all institutions it needs to be 
tempered and mediated, lest it seek to shape society in its own image’. 
          How then to make sense of public health? Enter Durkheim. For a 
sociologist of my generation, exposed to Charles Tilly’s taunt of ‘useless 
Durkheim’, this is a surprise. But in Kevin’s hands the identification of public 
health as a, ‘cult of humanity’ turns out to be not only surprising but also 
illuminating. For Durkheim, religion is, ‘a system of ideas by which men 
represent to themselves the society of which they are members and the obscure 
yet intimate relations they have with it’, and it’s function is to, ‘make us act and 
help us live’. So far, so analogous. But perhaps the important point is not 
whether Durkheim was a prophet whose concept of the ‘cult of humanity’ 
anticipated the rise of public health or the theorist who provided the most useful 
conceptual resources for its analysis, but the way in which the analogy with 
religion highlights the moral force of public health. In Kevin’s words ‘public 
health not just as a site of power but as a moral force and means of resistance in 
itself’. 
          It’s hard to think of a more stark demonstration of this moral force than 
the core claim, quoted in the book, of the World Health Organization’s 
Organizing Committee on the Social Determinants of Health: ‘Social injustice is 
killing people on a grand scale’. This claim is based on the deployment of the 
powerful statistical tools of epidemiology. As Kevin argues, ‘the capacity of 
epidemiology to graphically represent patterns of morbidity across time, social 
classes, ethnicity and a host of other variables can forcefully highlight the levels 
of social justice within … and between nations’. 
          In New Zealand these issues have been most powerfully played out now 
and over the last decade around children and the social determinants of their 
health – a debate in which my fellow critic David Craig and especially his 
epidemiologist partner, Liz Craig, have been key protagonists (so too the 
Department of Public Health at the University of Otago (Wellington) of which 
Kevin was previously a member). Public health painstakingly develops the 
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linkages among the incomes of households with children, the quality of housing 
in which they find themselves and health outcomes – including a meningitis 
epidemic and an outbreak, yet to peak of other infectious diseases among 
children - following the collapse of household income and the rise of 
overcrowding among poorer households in the second half of the 1980’s and the 
early 1990’s. The issue yesterday by the Children’s Commissioner of the first 
annual report linking child poverty with child health and other outcomes will 
help sustain this issue on the public agenda. Of all the critiques of inequality in 
New Zealand, the one from public health is the one that I think has the most 
effect. It uses empirical means to directly undermine the claims to legitimacy of 
present social and economic arrangements. It has resulted not only in a rush of 
uncomfortable rationalisations by political elites but also some policy shifts, 
first under Labour and now under National-led governments. 
          Bringing back Durkheim, bringing into focus the moral force of the 
mundane practices of public health, centres attention more generally on society 
as a moral order and on issues of legitimacy and social justice. Through this 
lens, public health may be seen as ‘cult’ but, in my view and with a slightly 
different angle of vision, more powerfully as an engine of critique: ‘the 
codification of what is not going well and the search for causes of this situation, 
with the aim of proceeding to solutions’ (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005: 41). It’s 
focus on our shared human vulnerability to disease, injury and death, its 
techniques for tracing causes, its emphasis on devising solutions makes it, at its 
best, a force for the reworking of the socio-material ecologies in which we are 
enmeshed so as to better realise claims of social justice.  
          The analysis of how, when, where and why this moral force translates 
into substantive social change is largely a lacuna within public health and falls 
outside the scope of this book. It presents itself as enormously fruitful topic for 
future sociological investigation. 
 
Julie Park 
This is a good book. Kevin Dew takes his innovative, Durkheimian-inspired,  
insight that public health may create collectivities and help to temper 
inequalities,  first developed in his 2007 article, and gives it the book-length 
treatment it deserves.  It is quite a slim book and even in this longer format I 
found myself often wishing for more.  I too am esurient – thanks Kevin, for 
introducing me to a new word – even if it is archaic or humorous according to 
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Oxford! And a further remark on words:  I am very pleased to see him using the 
term public health rather than the apolitical ‘population health’.  Hannah Arendt 
has argued that having or creating public space, a space for public conversation, 
is central to democracy and I take this to apply broadly to democracy in health. 
Those of us who work in the area have a responsibility to maintain the public in 
health and this book advances that cause. 
          As a medical anthropologist, I too count myself a descendant of Rudolf 
Virchow, who Kevin introduces early in the book.  Virchow wrote in 1849 a 
piece we share with our medical anthropology students: 
In reality, if medicine is the science of the healthy as well as of the ill 
human being (which is what it ought to be), what other science is 
better suited to propose laws as the basis of social structure, in order 
to make effective those which are inherent in man himself? Once 
medicine is established as anthropology, and once the interests of the 
privileged no longer determine the course of public events, the 
physiologists and the practitioners will be counted among the elder 
statesmen who support the social structure. Medicine is a social 
science in its very bone and marrow (Rudolf Virchow, 1849, quoted 
from Foster and Anderson 1978:3). 
The juxtaposition of the Rudolf Virchow and John Snow origin stories as 
foundations of public health was very interesting to me, with the radical social 
reform espoused by Virchow and his research methods of participant experience 
contrasting with the more technical solutions and epidemiological enquiry of 
Snow. But both, Kevin points out, located the effort required to bring about 
health equality as collective, not individual only. Both are ancestral to public 
health and social science for public health. 
          Adding Emile Durkheim’s (also an anthropological ancestor) insights into 
religion in the modern world to well established Foucauldian perspectives on 
health, and adding to them a wider range of theorists drawn from diverse social 
sciences, from Mary Douglas, to James C Scott, to Ulrich Beck and Erving 
Goffman, makes this a very rewarding and continually interesting book, 
theoretically.  This theoretical richness is enhanced by enlightening historical 
details (who knew that Dubrovnik in 1377 was the home of quarantine?), 
accounts of the development of statistical epidemiology, and overviews of more 
recent events, such as the unintended consequences of smallpox vaccinations. 
          The more that I wished to hear about was typically ethnographic: Kevin’s 
analysis of fun runs for example, detailed discussions of vaccination and so on 
were enlightening, and I wanted more of the same.  And sometimes I thought 
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more was necessary to give a fuller picture of the role of public health.  For 
example, with migrants from areas that have high TB rates keeping up the rates 
in otherwise low TB incidence countries like NZ, it’s important to add that with 
very few exceptions, migrants do not have active TB when they enter New 
Zealand.  They have latent infection as is common in high incidence countries 
or situations, like refugee camps. It is the conditions of life and other health 
challenges here that turn latent TB into active disease. Social scientists working 
in public health can explain this and help reduce inequalities and discrimination 
by doing so.  So too, describing Beck’s work on Chernobyl, I wished Kevin had 
also used Adrianna Petryna’s work which shows how establishing the 
“Chernobyl  tie” allows some Ukrainians access to public health services that 
that are denied to others.   
          The strong story for me was the ambiguous and dynamic positioning of 
public health and of public health practitioners and social scientists engaged in 
public health research in relation to states, globalising forces and institutions, 
class and other forms of inequality, between individual rights, and more 
communal orientations:  the inescapable duality of public health.  Reflexivity 
about this positioning is essential to critical public health.  But reflexivity about 
personal positioning is important too, and needs to be recognised.  I would have 
liked to see more of this in Kevin’s book.  As the daughter of a man severely 
affected by a polio epidemic in the early 20th century, I recognise that I want 
people to make the ‘right’ choice about vaccination.  As a researcher who visits 
quite a few Pacific islands, I want people to clean up the mosquito breeding 
grounds so I and they don’t get dengue or filariasis – and where it exists – 
malaria. I need to recognise this too. 
          Vector control is interesting in other ways. For it to be effective, every 
family has to help out and on the island as a whole, not just on their family land.  
Collective action is necessary here, as it is in reducing air pollution.  It is 
interesting, I think, to reflect on those public health issues which depend on  
bodily discipline, often in quite solitary contexts,  and those which depend on 
collective action: presenting for a vaccination is not quite the same as joining in 
a working bee and having fun together, but there are similarities, including 
competitiveness, or friendly rivalry as was seen in some historical TB 
campaigns. 
          Some public health efforts can be seen as society celebrating itself, such 
as the quarterly Tutaka, a household and village health inspection, on the island 
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of Atiu, Cook Islands. The health team and other members of the inspection 
group donned matching shirts, creating a festive air, and visited each home in 
turn, checking the physical and social wellbeing of families and their environs.  
This is experienced as care rather than surveillance. This raises the question of 
ethics: what should be the basis for ethics in public health?  As Kevin points 
out, an ethics which privileges individual choice is not terribly suitable for 
public health – in NZ since 1948, people with infectious TB can be isolated, 
whether they like it or not, for example. Perhaps instead of the individualistic 
bioethics mantra we should be thinking more seriously about virtue ethics, or 
ethics of care, or at least debating an ethics   more in tune with a cult of 
humanity. 
          The concept of a cult of humanity in a society marked by organic 
solidarity is a useful framework but public health not the only contender, 
although I accept that Kevin was not arguing for public health as the sole 
contender.  The environmental movement can be analysed as another and the 
intersection between both movements is powerful.  What is health?  Research 
across cultures tells us that it can include preparedness, peacefulness, correct 
relations, happiness, enough good food, a long life, a safe environment -- in 
addition to bodily wellbeing. 
 
David Craig  
I’ve come to the book very much in terms it recognises and describes very well 
indeed: the public health activist, involved in university teaching which in itself 
is a form of public health activism, seeking to motivate students to engage in the 
policy, politics and practice.  
In my teaching and other advocacy around health outcomes for different 
parts of society, I’ve always used some of what I have found to be some of the 
more compelling graphic representations of social difference in health 
outcomes: graphs regularly generated by my partner Liz Craig, a social 
epidemiologist working in health and poverty monitoring and policy advocacy. 
This graph, for example, from the 2013 Children’s Poverty Monitor, shows the 
ongoing rise of mainly respiratory and infectious diseases among New Zealand 
children (measured by hospital admissions) over the years following the global 
financial crisis (GFC).  
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The graph below, generated in the program for monitoring child health 
outcomes which preceded the Children’s Poverty Monitor, depicts the ‘social 
gradient’ for a common respiratory disease among young children, 
Bronchiolitis, showing hospital admissions per 1000 children in 2005, 
differentiated according to their socioeconomic status as calculated by the New 
Zealand Deprivation Index (Salmond, Crampton and Atkinson 2007) .  
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I’ve always found these graphs compelling: present in a visual ‘show don’t tell’ 
way, presenting something Durkheim might recognise as ‘material social facts’. 
The graphs present social facts (social, social difference, inequality), in telling 
terms. They present change over time, affecting different groups differently. 
They register social patterns, trends, social causes: like the difference for 
Durkheim between suicide rates for Catholics and Protestants, they demand a 
social, structural explanation. They suggest, demand social, structural 
explanations too about links between rising inequalities, low wage and benefit 
levels, stress levels, housing market failure, household crowding and health.  
         Both myself, and students I taught were of course very much energised by 
this: to the point where some have gone on to be involved in this crusade on 
regional and national scale. The social determinants view of health and poverty 
taken up by colleges of physicians, children’s commissioners, battlers against 
inequality in all its neoliberal guises, but also to some extent by both sides of 
politics, and watch this space going into the 2014 election. All of them have 
wielded the social gradient as hard and compelling evidence of something being 
wrong.  
          This kind of civic religious enthusiasm in areas around public health is, as 
Kevin’s finely written book makes very clear, nothing new. Public health has 
been characterised, even sometimes plagued by this kind of values meet 
statistics- driven activity, as a kind of low church evangelical version of its 
wider cult of humanity. The wider cult is beautifully and richly described in 
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Kevin’s book: so many of its permutations and priestly (and lay) endeavours are 
sketched and set alongside each other, and weighed for both their ‘esurience’, 
and sometimes raised as warnings against their susceptibility for being caught 
up in what Foucauldians might describe as public health’s absolutist tendencies.  
         The book in various ways tells us a reasonable amount about public health 
enterprise about health inequality. In my frame of mind it underplays a little the 
significance of the current movement and its core terminology and advocacy 
repertoire: the ‘social determinants’ ( a few references, but not in the index or 
featuring as a chapter or section); social gradients (I found two mentions, but 
again not in the index) and health inequalities (a few more references, but again 
nothing in the index or organising machinery of the book, and not quite the 
organising conceit and powerhouse it has become in recent years).  And, I think 
perhaps most tellingly, no graphs to ‘show’ rather than ‘tell’ the health 
inequalities/ social gradient story.  
         Where the story is told, it is told within the book’s overarching Durkheim 
meets Foucault framing, as a ‘position’ taken in relation to other ‘positions’: not 
as something like a social fact, or something really demanding (and taxing of) a 
social explanation. Where, for example, Politics and Public health are 
considered together p34, the discussion is of public health as providing different 
kinds/ forms of representations, rather than whether they are talking about real 
social outcomes driven by real social processes.  
        I certainly did enjoy the rich narrative development of the book. It contains 
an economically yet closely described library of historical, theoretical and 
practical accounts of Public Health, laced with examples and cases. Overall, and 
in highly readable and inviting prose, gives a generous sense of the scope of 
public health enterprise and activism.  It contains a surprising amount in not a 
lot of pages. I did appreciate too how the book was held together too by the 
wider Durkheimian narrative of public health as cult, with its high priests and 
saintly crusaders, its foundation narratives of campaigning for the good; its 
sense of moral agency and fighting evils.  
        The book itself sometimes strains at the edges of this, and you get a sense 
of the author’s own crusading commitments in public health when, as for 
example on pg. 70, it is itself calling for Public health to fulfil its historical 
mission, or where it is seeking to position itself in relation to Foucault and his 
nuanced yet totalising accounts of power relations in human organisation. On 
the other hand, it sometimes seems to succumb just a little to the temptation 
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common in Durkheimian approaches to comparative belief structures, which is 
to ‘happy narrative analogy’. Durkheim’s smart analogous analysis lends itself 
rather easily, of course, to the analogous parody/ cartooning/ lampooning of 
practices of religion or other public endeavour  which want to see themselves as 
serious scientific, truth-seeking or political exercise. Kevin is extremely gentle 
on that: though it’s not hard often to imagine a wry smile creeping across his 
face as, yet again, Durkheim’s analysis by analogy throws up a plausible 
parallel between clerisy and public health, and redefines activists’ activities via 
the rather more grotesque shadow they cast on the walls of their fiery 
workshops and high altars.  
         In the book’s conclusions, what emerges is a focus on Public health in 
terms of ritual and restraint: broadly, exercised with discretion and 
understanding, Public health can restrain the effects of other regulatory 
framings. The conclusion develops as a kind of debate, in the last pages, 
between Durkheim, who considers the ritual aspects, and Foucault, who warns 
us about the absolutist aspects of campaigning. Here the book’s misgivings 
about the ‘esurient’ and absolutist nature of public health are given the final 
word, with tacit calls for more reflection on rituals, and more valuing of 
restraint. As the book finally concludes, public health might “restrict the 
negative impact of other institutions, and restrain egotistic and anomic 
tendencies in society” (p. 146). It might indeed: but it might also achieve a good 
deal more than that.  
          And I think in fact it has. I know they might have been a little less 
conciliatory interlocutors and reflecters, but I would have enjoyed seeing a third 
actor sitting around the fire, maybe an Engels (whose 1855 work on working 
class poverty contains a lovely table showing a social gradient around housing 
and health), or perhaps George Davey Smith and Richard Wilkinson, being a 
little more pressing and, if necessary, ‘coruscating’ in the conclusions.  
          I’m leaning and biased here, certainly. I do think though, that if ever there 
was a social fact in need of understanding and engagement in Aotearoa/NZ and 
beyond, it lies somewhere in the relationship between health and socioeconomic 
forces, health and housing, health and post-colonial political economies of 
marginalisation (and, emerging, of redefining self-determination). Given current 
conservative governments’ record of crippling public health capability within 
government, and undermining it in the third sector, perhaps too the book might 
have been able to shed some more light on the kinds of dragons the St. Georges 
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of public health currently find themselves up against. A chapter, then, on 
conservative reaction, even denial, of public health’s core findings, might have 
helped provide a sense of the context the discipline operates in, and the 
provocations to esurient campaigning it experiences day to day. If there’s 
absolutism and a need for restraint, as Kevin Dew’s book makes clear there is, 
to me it’s at least as significant outside of progressive public health circles as 
inside them. The need to pushback against and restrain reaction exists most 
palpably, I’d suggest, around the right’s dealings with public health science and 
practice, its denialism and obfuscation, and its support for medical-clinical over 
public health measures, day in and day out.  
 
Kevin Dew: response to the critics 
Having one’s book the subject of a symposium feels something like defending 
one’s thesis in an oral examination – particularly when you have no idea of 
what the ‘critics’ are going to say. Having now had the privilege of reading the 
comments from the critics I am delighted with the responses they have had to 
my ‘sociological investigation’. I particularly like the way the critics have 
identified possibilities for enhancements and further research possibilities. This 
fits very much with what I see as an important aspect of the scholarly process – 
a process of dialogue and development of ideas – and for many of us this is to 
promote positive social change. 
          I am particularly taken with Geoff’s reference to public health as a 
promiscuous assemblage, a phrase I would like to have used. This phrase alerts 
us to the tremendous range of approaches and practices that can be related to 
public health and the potentially unrestrained character of public health 
activities. It suggests the great power of public health and also why we should 
remain critical. 
          Geoff has picked up on the idea of public health as a moral force 
providing powerful critiques of social injustice enabled, in part, by its 
grounding in epidemiology. Using the concept of ‘engines of critique’ nicely 
illuminates this aspect of public health, and this is certainly one of the 
conclusions I came to through my attempt to understand the place of public 
health in contemporary society. Public health can provide this powerful critique 
and be a source of social change because its methodologies can be represented 
as neutrally scientific and its focus, on health, is a universal concern. The 
understanding I came to of public health also led me to temper this view by 
noting the sorts of situations where the goal of social justice could be 
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undermined and public health and its methodologies could be used to perpetrate 
injustices. 
          Julie would like to have seen more detail, particularly ethnographic detail, 
to further elucidate the complex issues in public health. The close examination 
of everyday life can bring into focus the powerful forces at play that shape our 
lives, and I agree that there are plenty of opportunities that could be taken to do 
this. Julie has offered some excellent examples of this in her commentary. 
          Julie also notes that there was no explicit positioning of the author in my 
book. I have been somewhat wary of the way ‘reflexivity’ can be presented. I 
am interested in where a sociological investigation leads someone who has an 
attitude that is inquiring. The starting point is not particularly important, except 
perhaps to give a sense of the journey taken. In reality the book is the product of 
very many years of work and of very many research projects, so to even identify 
what my original position was in relation to public health is no easy task. Julie 
mentions the issue of vaccination, an area that I have been interested in for 
some time. But my position is not a stable and unchanging one. Before I 
undertook any research on vaccinations I accepted the standard medical story of 
vaccines and passively submitted myself to the technology. After some initial 
research I started to shift to the opposite pole – being surprised by distortions 
and misinformation that, at times, accompanied the standard medical story. I am 
still dismayed at some of the tactics of pro-vaccinators (see Martin, 2013) but 
would now say I want to promote debate, expose the suppression of dissenting 
voices, make values explicit, and ask whether we should leave decisions about 
something as important as vaccination policy in the hands of a few 
immunologists. So my position has changed as a result of my investigations, 
and may well change again. 
          But I can confidently identify the moment when I decided to explore what 
a Durkheimian focus on public health might do and the sort of issues that were 
troubling me that such a focus helped to resolve. The impetus to my 
‘investigation’ was a conversation I had with a PhD student, Vivienne Ivory, 
when I was a lecturer in the Department of Public Health at the Wellington 
School of Medicine and Health Sciences. Vivienne was using the work of Emile 
Durkheim to consider the role of neighbourhoods in relation to health. We were 
throwing around ideas about what sort of social factors foster solidarity or 
cohesion at a neighbourhood level, and we mentioned religion but moved on 
quickly as religion does not generally operate at a neighbourhood level. But the 
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conversation made me wonder what would happen if we considered public 
health as Durkheim’s predicted ‘cult of humanity’.  Durkheim had argued that 
there would be a new form of religion in contemporary society that would act as 
a moral force enhancing social solidarity. There were a few important aspects of 
this new religion according to Durkheim, including the idea that it would have 
as its point of worship that which we all hold in common, our humanity. 
Another aspect was that this religion would be based on science but go beyond 
science. The more I thought about it the more I thought that this could be a very 
fruitful way of looking at public health. In the department where I was working 
I was surrounded by people committed to improving human health, and 
arguably concerns about health is something we all hold in common. In doing 
so they were in battle with health-deleterious capitalist industries, such as 
tobacco, food and alcohol companies. In addition, health promotion activities 
were aimed at tempering the population’s consumption of fatty foods and 
tendencies to idleness.  
          The moral dimensions of public health were apparent. Some things that 
had puzzled me started to make sense. For example, that public health 
positioned itself as a science with all it critical and sceptical faculties, but went 
beyond science in its advocacy activities when those critical faculties could be 
suspended in the pursuit of bringing about social change. I could now see this as 
the new religion being based in science – but moving beyond science. The book 
was an attempt to develop this insight in a systematic and thorough way. 
Through this analysis I could also position myself better as a sociologist 
working in public health. I had struggled to find a comfortable place in public 
health. As a sociologist I could easily be critical of some of the limitations in 
public health and some of its practices, but I felt that this undermined the efforts 
of my colleagues. This discomfort was apparent from my very first days at the 
medical school. On one occasion, when I was off to find some food, I passed a 
gurney being wheeled through a hospital corridor. On the gurney was a body 
with a sheet pulled over it. My immediate response was something like – ‘how 
can I take on a critical role, sniping away at the work of my colleagues and the 
medical profession, when they are confronting and dealing with death’. In this 
space it was very difficult to see what sociology could contribute, beyond being 
a ‘handmaiden’ to the work of public health and medicine, a role I was also 
uncomfortable with. Using the concepts articulated by Durkheim, I started to 
find a place for the sociologist in this environment, as an important critical 
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voice not to undermine public health, but to challenge it to reflect on its own 
practices. 
          Another puzzle for me was how to understand some of my colleague’s 
adherence to particular positions. This was most clearly demonstrated as an 
issue for me when our department had a debate about a proposal by the 
university to deem it unethical for any staff member to undertake research 
funded by tobacco companies. In this formal debate I argued that although we 
should consider any tool available to undermine the activities of tobacco 
companies, we should not do this at any cost. Academic freedom is not 
something we should throw away in pursuit of public health objectives. 
Following this debate two of my public health colleagues, whom I have great 
respect for and who have done amazing work, said that although they found my 
argument very persuasive it was not going to change their views. In other words 
– there was a certain dogma that was hard to shift. 
          Seeing public health as a cult of humanity meant that I could better 
understand the dogmatic side of public health, but position myself as a critic. 
The dogma and the scepticism both had a place. 
          David suggests that the book underplays the inequalities story in public 
health. His point about the importance and power of this story is well made – 
and one that I tried to convey in the book. But the aim of the book was not 
simply to tell this particular story but to consider the kind of impacts that this 
story, and other health stories, have when they are told from a public health 
perspective. Elsewhere I have been involved in publications that have focused 
strongly on the inequalities story (Dew and Matheson, 2008). But the 
opportunity David has taken to illustrate the power of public health 
representations of social injustice demonstrates very well the argument I was 
trying to make in the book about the capacity that public health has to do this. 
David uses the example of child health and poverty, and if the focus is kept on 
poverty then public health can play a part in positive social change. But there 
are other policy ‘solutions’ that we should be more wary of. If the policy is to 
withhold benefits from parents who do not have their children vaccinated, 
which may be quite acceptable to some public health advocates, then we have 
something else happening. Among other things, we have here public health 
goals enrolled to discipline beneficiaries and, for some, increase their 
impoverishment. Policy responses to public health goals are variable, and as 
with the tobacco example above, I would argue that we should raise questions 
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when institutions are charged with supporting public health goals with whatever 
tools available and at whatever cost. 
          Geoff’s final comment on possible future sociological investigations is 
apposite. My reading of this is that Geoff is asking for specific analyses of 
where and when public health makes a difference at a policy level – something 
that would not only be enlightening for public health advocates but also provide 
further insight into broader social processes that shape public health and that 
public health responds to. Julie raises the issue of a public health ethics which I 
think has been little explored and is important to pursue. David’s suggestion 
that the book could have been enhanced with a chapter on ‘conservative 
reaction’ is well made. There are fleeting references to this throughout the book 
but I have not had the opportunity to explore this in more depth. As David 
notes, conservative reactions to public health policy are an important 
provocations that shape the practices of public health advocacy. 
          All three critics identify ways in which the book could have been 
improved or where some future sociological investigation could be developed to 
further our understanding of public health. This sort of response to the book is 
extremely pleasing. I can envisage excellent research projects on when and 
where public health influences broader social formations, on ethnographies of 
collective public health practices, on public health ethics and on provocations 
that shape public health advocacy. There is much work to be done to further 
develop a sociologically informed understanding of contemporary public health. 
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Forthcoming Funded Research Projects and Recent Honours 
The subnational mechanisms of the ending of population growth. 
Towards a theory of depopulation (Marsden Fund) 
 
Natalie Jackson 
Population growth is theorised to cease globally around 2100, resulting in 
irreversible population shrinkage in most countries. Yet this defining event, 
which is already the experience of Japan and much of Europe, still receives less 
policy attention than its underlying drivers: low fertility and population ageing. 
Currently recognised only when it occurs at national level, the ending of growth 
has not yet been theorised to assist policy responses. The archetype is Japan, 
where national population decline began only recently, but the majority of 
prefectures have been experiencing depopulation for many decades Empirical 
evidence shows that the onset of decline begins sub-nationally, at different 
times, in different ways. Subnational decline is also increasingly driven by a 
new set of dynamics: negative natural increase (deaths exceeding births) 
combining with the old form of decline – net migration loss. Indeed the defining 
feature of these trends is that subnational decline is now likely to be permanent, 
because of a new form of decline caused by the interaction of net migration loss 
(the ‘old’ form) and hyper-ageing arising out of the demographic transition. 
This interaction magnifies the speed and severity of local depopulation, setting 
in motion feedbacks that generate unprecedented demographic and economic 
dynamics. ...threshold into seemingly irreversible decline over the past 15 years. 
In this process, the age structure of migrants becomes an increasingly critical 
factor. This is because the end of growth/onset of decline is primarily driven by 
interactions between the demographic and mobility (migration) transitions. In 
non-metropolitan areas (in NZ, populations less than 100,000), these otherwise 
discrete processes are generating deep-waisted, inverted age pyramids. In such 
populations, mortality declines are resulting in increased numbers at older ages 
(numerical ageing), while fertility declines are reducing the proportions at 
younger ages (structural ageing). Simultaneously, the mobility transition is 
generating net outflows of young adults that accelerate structural ageing, plus 
net inflows of retirees, which accelerate both numerical and structural ageing. 
This pattern eventually results in (i) deficits at key parenting ages that produce 
further decreases in births, (ii) more elderly than children, and (iii) more deaths 
than births, severely limiting the potential for further population growth. In 
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contrast, agglomerations such as Auckland City increasingly account for most 
national growth, due to the in-migration of young adults from both internal and 
international sources. Inflows of young adults generate diamond-shaped age 
structures, which dramatically slow the rate of ageing and sustain growth for a 
longer period, even though metropolitan fertility rates are relatively low.  
          This project will integrate demographic and mobility transition theories to 
develop a first-order theory of depopulation, proposing that the end of growth 
unfolds sequentially from rural to urban locales, the speed and severity of the 
trends magnified by unprecedented demographic-economic interactions. Our 
multi-disciplinary team will generate a substantive account of these mechanisms 
for New Zealand, a country still growing strongly at national level, but where 
decline is already the case in one-third of the 67 Territorial Authority Areas. 
Central to the analysis will be a nation-wide study of industrial labour market 
change, which we posit precedes the new form of decline, and determination of 
the counterfactual conditions under which growth could continue, locally and 
nationally. 
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Researching Ourselves: Social Surveys in Twentieth-Century 
New Zealand (Australian Research Council) 
 
Charlotte Greenhalgh1 
 
In 1940 one of New Zealand’s earliest social surveys made calculations about 
its subjects’ standards of living that were controversial enough to close down a 
governmental social research unit. After reading proofs of the study ‘with its 
information on children working, farmers working 100 hours a week and houses 
in North Auckland with dirt floors’, Deputy Prime Minister Peter Fraser arrived 
on the doorstep of his responsible Minister demanding, ‘the printing is to stop’ 
(Robb, 1987). An act of ‘academic blackmail’ secured publication, but the 
urban survey that would have been its sequel was abandoned. The Social 
Science Bureau disbanded. Yet by the 1970s social scientific facts and theories 
were common currency in the public life of the nation. Research projects 
routinely focused on the hidden problems that surveying and statistics could 
reveal. Between 1965 and 1980 local populations requested surveys of their 
hometowns of Hamilton, Porirua, Aranui, Tokoroa, Petone, Kawerau, and 
Kelburn (Chapple, 1976; Christchurch Public Health Department & Moody, 
1973; Gray, 1978; Gray & McCreary, 1980; James Harding Robb, Carr, Cloud, 
& Victoria University of Wellington Department of Social Administration and 
Sociology, 1969; VandenBerg, McCreary, Chapman, & Victoria University of 
Wellington School of Social Science, 1965). The authors of this research—the 
residents, their local councils, and academics—agreed that social problems 
would be ‘overcome’ when their ‘accurate data’ were known (VandenBerg et 
al., 1965: i).  
         Today the New Zealand government appoints a scientific advisor to foster 
evidenced-based policymaking. The revamped National Library’s inaugural 
programme of exhibitions, seminars, and workshops celebrates our use of ‘Big 
Data’. Yet the events of 1940 remind us that current attitudes to social scientific 
knowledge have a history of resistance, scandal, and negotiation. This project 
                                                            
1 In 2014 Charlotte Greenhalgh will take up an Australian Research Council ‘Discovery Early 
Career Researcher Award’ at Monash University in order to complete this project in 
Australian and New Zealand history.  
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uses the archival records of twentieth-century social surveys to follow the story 
of social research beyond its published pages. It aims to discover how New 
Zealanders responded to social scientific research on the ground and what social 
scientific encounters taught them about their communities, their nation, and 
their own lives.  
         Twentieth-century social research opened a new way of looking at the 
world and its structures of power. At the beginning of the century, surveys of 
poverty in London and York quantified and mapped out a ‘social problem’ for 
the first time (Booth, 1902; Rowntree, 1901). In the decades that followed, 
British economists, political scientists, and sociologists built a social survey 
tradition that recorded and analysed everyday life and class relations. From the 
1920s onwards, sociologists at the University of Chicago advocated 
theoretically grounded community studies that emphasised race and ethnic 
identity instead. These studies informed an international audience that social 
problems were quantifiable, that governments could intervene, that first-person 
evidence was valuable, and that everyday life was complex and worthy of 
academic study. Across the Western world, governments and the academy paid 
increasing attention to social scientific methods, data, and claims to intellectual 
authority (Igo, 2007). European governments were particularly eager to harness 
these techniques after 1939, when they worried about civilian morale during the 
first ‘total war’ in Europe. By the middle of the century, social scientific 
findings and practices were replicated in national institutions of education, 
health, childcare, and welfare as well as in newly established professions 
ranging from marriage counselling to occupational therapy (Thomson, 2006; 
Vernon, 2007; Wills, 2005). New Zealand was part of this international 
exchange of ideas, methods, and personnel, most often employing scholars from 
elsewhere in a ‘distinctly British academic world’ (Pietsch, 2010).  
        While Western understandings of class, governance, welfare, and 
citizenship were remade by twentieth-century social scientists, their precise 
influence is not well understood. Historians have tended to see social 
researchers as observers of modern life, and have paid scant attention to their 
contribution to—as well as recording of—twentieth-century social and cultural 
change. The methods and concerns that directed social science towards 
particular populations, social problems, and theories, and away from others, 
remain under-examined. This project addresses this gap through close readings 
of social scientific research notes (Corti & Thompson, 2004; Fielding, 2004). In 
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doing so, it helps to explain the relationship between experts and individuals—
an interaction that was at the heart of twentieth-century social science and 
welfare politics. 
          This project will be the first to present original readings of historic or 
‘raw’ social scientific data in New Zealand. It spans over forty years from 1938 
to 1980 in order to transform our understanding of the emergence, rise, and 
ultimately the eclipse of social surveying as a tool of policy. The study 
examines the research notes that underpinned surveys carried out for New 
Zealand government departments in the 1930s and 1940s such as those authored 
by Crawford Somerset (1938) and William Torrance Doig (1940). It considers 
the community studies that were completed by postgraduate students in 
departments of medicine, sociology, education, psychology and agriculture in 
the 1950s and 1960s. It analyses the interviews and questionnaires that were 
designed and implemented by volunteers under the auspices of the Society for 
Research on Women from the late-1960s. The project’s research design 
foregrounds the interactions of social researchers with their subjects, 
highlighting their joint creation of social scientific knowledge through 
correspondence, field notes, interviews, and unpublished book drafts. Instead of 
collating and streamlining research data, in the manner of social scientists at the 
time and historians ever since, I tease out the personal interactions that 
generated interviews and statistics. How did New Zealanders receive social 
researchers during the twentieth century? What methods were employed to elicit 
and record personal information? Why did research subjects sometimes refuse 
to comply? How did the meaning of their participation change, as social 
research practices became an expected part of life? I will draw on the rich vein 
of literature that addresses oral history, memory, storytelling, and life history to 
consider what it has meant to give a social scientific interview.  
         My research offers fresh perspectives on New Zealand’s place in the 
world, tracing the migration of New Zealand research methods and findings for 
the first time. New Zealand surveys were part of an export of ideas and 
personnel from Britain and America in particular, but they nonetheless relied on 
face-to-face interaction with resident populations on arrival. The unprecedented 
participatory component of twentieth-century social research—epitomized by 
the social scientific interview—gave New Zealand populations a voice within 
social science during its spread around the globe. In particular, the distinctive 
claims about egalitarianism and social class that circulated in New Zealand 
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during the period provide fertile ground for a consideration of how local 
understandings of the analytical categories of this research—including class 
identity, charity and welfare—altered its form, findings, and international 
reception. To explore this, I will undertake comparative analysis of the projects 
of selected researchers who moved between New Zealand, Australia, America, 
and Britain. While some New Zealand historians have found the nation’s 
academies to be slow moving and derivative, the directions that were taken by 
social researchers on the ground, in response to New Zealand’s particular 
environment and populations, may reposition the country as a unique and 
influential site for social surveying. 
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The Crown: Perspectives on a Contested Symbol and its 
Constitutional Significance in New Zealand and the 
Commonwealth (Marsden Fund) 
 
Cris Shore and David Williamson 
 
Since 1840 the Crown has stood at the heart of New Zealand’s constitutional 
order as the signatory of the Treaty of Waitangi and the embodiment of state 
authority. Yet the Crown itself remains an enigmatic and poorly understood 
concept. Legal scholars acknowledge that it is a ‘contested concept’ and ‘useful 
fiction’ whose meanings ‘differ according to context’.  
          The implications of this contradiction are profound yet have rarely been 
explored: how can the Crown be both a core Treaty signatory and a ‘useful 
fiction’?  Legal scholars recognise that the Crown, as a metonym for 
government and the state, is a ‘shapeshifting symbol’, an abstract entity that 
historically embodied the British Empire but today serves as a ‘compendious 
cloak’ for aligning archaic rules, ceremonies and meanings with the trappings of 
contemporary governmental authority. But if the Crown ‘has different meanings 
according to context’, what are those meanings, how does this ambiguity affect 
those who deal with the Crown in its different guises, and what remains of the 
doctrine of the Crown’s ‘indivisibility’? Despite major legal interest in the 
Crown, particularly Crown-Māori relations, no comprehensive account of the 
Crown as a socio-political institution and cultural entity has yet been written. 
This is an important omission for while the Crown is a familiar icon, it is also a 
constitutional enigma. My hypothesis is that the Crown, as proxy for state 
authority, provides a critical lens for examining the transformation of the 
modern state in post-colonial settler societies. 
           The Constitutional Advisory Panel’s first report due in December 2013 
makes this study both timely and of significant public interest. That Panel 
Report will advise the Government on the views received from New Zealanders 
on a range of constitutional change issues. It then falls to the Government to 
decide on the parameters for reform proposals. This project will therefore have 
the benefit of immediacy and contemporary relevance as it proceeds. 
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          However, to date, there has been no comprehensive account of how it is 
contested or understood, or the implications of its shifting and contradictory 
meanings. This study will combine comparative and ethnographic research 
methods with anthropological and legal approaches and post-colonial theories 
of governance and statehood to address the following questions: For whom for 
is the Crown a useful fiction and how? How does the Crown represent itself in 
New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries? How do policy-makers and 
other actors use the Crown as a strategic and symbolic resource? And what can 
a critical genealogy of the Crown tell us about the evolution of the state in New 
Zealand and other settler societies?  
       This project seeks to combine methodologies of socio-cultural 
anthropology with political science and legal studies to probe questions of a 
symbolic, political and legal nature. Using comparative, ethnographic and case-
study approaches, I aim to generate new insight into the transformation of the 
state in New Zealand and other post-colonial societies. A particular focus for 
this study will be current debates over constitutional reform in New Zealand and 
an analysis of the composition and views of the various pressure groups that 
have formed to campaign around this issue. The results should lead to new 
understandings of the Crown as a socio-political institution and cultural entity at 
a time when constitutional re-ordering is imminent. 
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Social Scientists in New Year Honours 
 
Bob Buckle became pro vice-chancellor and dean of commerce at Victoria 
University's Business School in 2008 was appointed an officer of the New 
Zealand Order of Merit for services to business and education. He had 
previously held previous academic positions mainly at VUW and also with 
Treasury where he was principal adviser from 2000 until 2008. He has 
published extensively on macroeconomics, business cycles, growth and fiscal 
policy. Public positions have included being chair of the economic committee of 
APEC, and chairman of the Tax Working Group, which reviewed the country's 
tax system and contributed to taxation reform.  
See: https://www.victoria.ac.nz/vbs/about/staff/bob-buckle 
 
          Cathy Wylie is a Chief Researcher at NZCER (where she has worked 
since 1987) also became an Officer of the New Zealand Order of Merit. She has 
lectured in social anthropology at Victoria and Auckland universities, carried 
out contract research with a range of government departments,  evaluated of 
social welfare programmes and policy at the then Department of Social Welfare 
and then played a very significant role in education research assessing various 
reforms and developing longitudinal panels while at NZCER. 
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Review Essay: Jon Johansson and Stephen Levine (eds.) (2012) 
Kicking the Tyres: The New Zealand General Election and Electoral 
Referendum of 2011. Wellington: Victoria University Press.  
 
Leon Iusitini     
 
This book is the ninth in a series which began in 1987 and has continued 
unbroken to the 2011 General Election, the subject of the current book. 
Throughout, it has documented New Zealand’s electoral outcomes and recorded 
its political history, including referenda. In fitting with its primary purpose as a 
documentary record of the 2011 election and referendum intended for a wide 
audience of both lay and specialist readers, the book, for the most part, uses a 
‘non-academic’ prose across its 25 chapters, although many chapters take a 
more scholarly style, particularly where original research is presented. 
Contributors are mostly academics or political insiders (MPs and party 
representatives), plus a couple of journalists.  
Section one of the book provides an overview of the 2011 election. 
Chapter 1 by Jon Johansson and Stephen Levine and chapter 2 by journalist 
Colin James together provide a background to the election and a summary of 
the campaign and results. They argue that the election was the government’s to 
lose rather than the opposition’s to win: the public was not exceedingly 
dissatisfied with National; voters had a choice between the status quo or the risk 
of change during uncertain economic times; and there was a widely-held 
perception that the election outcome was a foregone conclusion. These chapters 
contrast National’s ‘presidential-style’ Key-fronted campaign with Labour’s 
downplaying of Phil Goff’s leadership in preference to a focus on policy - both 
their own and, especially, on National’s second-term intentions to partially 
privatise state assets. It is argued that while Labour ran a bold, future-focused 
campaign based on a comprehensive policy platform (key planks were a capital 
gains tax, raising superannuation eligibility, and reducing child poverty), they 
staked too much on a negative campaign mode based on opposition to asset 
sales. 
These chapters also usefully place the results in historical perspective: 
National achieved the best result of any party under MMP to date (47.3%) and 
was re-elected with an increased vote share, a relatively rare event in New 
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Zealand’s electoral history (being only the fourth occasion). The ‘normal 
pattern’ has been for incumbent governments to win a second term but with 
reduced support as voter fatigue and electoral attrition start to kick in. The 
Green Party achieved 11.1%, its best result to date, which Colin James 
attributes to their adoption of a less fringe, more moderate image and an 
emphasis on their economic credibility. This shift in political positioning, 
combined with the party’s successful leadership transition and caucus 
rejuvenation, helped to mainstream the party (see also Edwards & Lomax, 
2012). The Conservative Party also pulled off quite an achievement, winning 
2.7% of the party vote in their inaugural campaign, which failed to bring them 
into parliament but was well ahead of that achieved by ACT, the Māori Party, 
Mana, and United Future. In contrast, Labour’s result (27.5%) was its worst 
since 1928.  
 Johansson contributes a chapter analysing Key’s leadership (provisionally 
to date) in a number of contexts: in terms of New Zealand prime ministerial 
history (measured largely by ability to win elections); in terms of Key’s own 
policy goals; and in terms of the particular political context of his time. By any 
of these measures, Key is found to have some way yet to go to be regarded as a 
historically successful leader. However, his leadership has been circumscribed 
by the need to respond to the massive upheavals of the global financial crisis, 
the collapse of finance companies, the Pike River mine and Rena disasters, and 
the Canterbury earthquakes, the latter having ‘forever redefined the purpose and 
central preoccupation of Key’s prime ministership, which is to lead a 
reconstruction government.’ In this respect, Johansson believes Key’s genuine 
empathy, common touch, and affable personality have hit the right notes. 
Johansson then turns to Goff’s performance on the hustings, agreeing with most 
informed observers that it was competent and that he held his own in leaders’ 
debates with Key, with the exception of the ‘show me the money’ stumble at the 
Christchurch Press debate. 
Stephen Church’s informative chapter, a highlight of the book, outlines 
the process of government formation that took place after the election. He 
comments on this process from a comparative perspective (New Zealand’s 
preference for ‘symbolic gestures’ over more formal European-style pre-
election pacts) and from an historical perspective (its evolution since the 
introduction of MMP). In one of the book’s more ‘academic’ chapters, Church 
sketches some of the theoretical background to government formation and 
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provides an insightful analysis as to why National chose to form an ‘oversized 
coalition’ based on enhanced confidence and supply agreements, rather than 
settle for a ‘minimum winning’ coalition. 
Continuing a series tradition, the second section contains perspectives on 
the campaign from each of the eight parties that secured parliamentary 
representation. Steven Joyce outlines some of the risks National faced during its 
campaign, including the possibility that they may not have had enough allies to 
form a government after the election because ‘many people were taking a first-
past-the-post view’ that National had the election wrapped up before it had even 
begun. Grant Robertson begins his humour-injected rationalisation of why 
Labour lost by pointing out that they were always going to be on the back-foot 
because ‘New Zealanders don’t vote out first-term governments very often’ and 
‘never vote out first-term National governments.’ Voter insecurity about a 
change of government in the midst of a series of crises, and giving National ‘a 
fair go’, are also postulated as explanations. He is critical of Labour’s internal 
disunity and their inability to form a coherent campaign narrative around what 
the party stood for rather than against. 
The importance of polls to electoral outcomes is alleged by both Chris 
Simmons (former ACT party president and list candidate) and Peter Dunne. 
Simmons candidly dissects ACT’s worst-ever election result by reference to a 
disastrous three years in government (Rodney Hide’s misuse of perks, David 
Garrett’s passport fraud, Don Brash’s leadership coup, etc.) and a campaign 
beset by internal wrangling and resignations. The final blow was a poll which 
claimed - misleadingly according to Simmons - that Banks was on the cusp of 
losing Epsom, which led many would-be ACT voters to change their party vote 
to a safer option. The same occurred to United Future, according to Dunne, who 
ascribes their worst result since 1999 largely to the unsubstantiated and 
persistent ‘lie’ that he would lose his Ōhariu seat to Labour (he retained it), 
which likewise repelled voters who felt their party vote would be wasted. Green 
Party perspectives are offered by Metiria Turei and (in the following section) by 
Mojo Mathers, New Zealand’s first deaf MP. True to form, Winston Peters 
(with Joshua Van Veen) attributes National’s success largely to an uncritical 
media who granted National an extended honeymoon period. He puts his own 
party’s late resurgence down to an old-fashioned campaign largely ignored by 
the mainstream media; however he does concede that the Epsom ‘cup of tea’ 
did assist in garnering him increased media coverage. 
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The media’s coverage of the election is the focus of the third section of 
the book, which is largely critical of it. The claim that the New Zealand Herald 
(and Dominion Post) was biased in its visual image treatment of John Key vis-
à-vis Phil Goff is investigated by Claire Robinson. Key received more 
favourable coverage than Goff in terms of number, size, location, and tone of 
images, particularly in the Herald and seemingly over-and-above the normal 
advantage conferred upon incumbents; and there was some evidence of a 
National bias in the Herald’s coverage and a Labour bias in the Dom Post’s. 
However, assessing bias from visual images alone - detached from the written 
context in which they appear – is appreciably knotty. Robinson concedes this 
when she points to critical written coverage of Key during ‘Cuppagate’ which 
was accompanied by positive (or neutral) visuals. Perhaps there simply were no 
negative images taken at this very public photo opportunity? And while 
evidence is cited that visual images can influence voter judgments, none is 
presented for the current research and one wonders whether an investigation of 
bias in editorial stance (as in previous books in the series) would have been 
more instructive. 
With her usual flair, Jane Clifton laments the media’s coverage of the 
campaign as inane and inauthentic, citing the use in televised leaders’ debates of 
the meaningless, ambiguous distraction that is ‘the worm’; the pre-stacked 
audiences at these debates whose on-cue partisan reactions forsake any chance 
of rational discussion; and media complicity and hypocrisy in the cup of tea 
stunt that crowded out coverage of real policy issues. Corin Higgs examines 
television’s use of political pundits as anointed ‘experts’ whose privileged 
positions enable them to construct dominant narratives and shape opinion of 
political events through their ‘authoritative’ commentary and interpretation. He 
presents a revealing empirical analysis of the use of punditry by the major New 
Zealand television networks, finding that a majority of pundits were current or 
former journalists and tended to be male, Pākehā, and aged over 40 years; very 
few were young, female, Asian, or Pasifika. 
Rob Salmond examines polling support for parties over the 2008-11 term. 
He illustrates National’s consistent dominance in the polls with some staggering 
statistics: of 130 polls over the term, 106 showed National with 50% or more 
support, and 128 showed they could govern alone. He notes that this dominance 
is unprecedented in New Zealand and unusual in proportional representation 
systems. The accuracy of the pollsters in predicting the actual election results is 
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compared, with iPredict found to be the most accurate and HorizonPoll the 
least. Jennifer Lees-Marshment evaluates the National and Labour campaigns 
from a political marketing perspective, focusing on their leadership, branding, 
and delivery, while parties’ use of Facebook during the campaign is investigated 
by Anthony Deos and Ashley Murchison via a content analysis of their 
Facebook pages. 
Māori politics receives good coverage and illuminating analysis 
throughout much of the book. Māori Party list candidate Kaapua Smith explains 
how, in an attempt to show new talent coming through, they placed younger 
lesser-known candidates at the top of their list and incumbent MPs further down 
(including the party’s leaders at seventh and eighth). Having placed a distant 
third behind Hone Harawira and Labour’s Kelvin Davis in the Te Tai Tokerau 
by-election in June 2011, it appears the Māori Party attempted to mollify that 
electorate by ranking their candidate in that seat at number one on their list. The 
election result for the Māori Party was alarming: a virtual halving of their party 
vote to 1.4% and the loss of Te Tai Tonga in addition to Te Tai Tokerau earlier 
in the year. 
Having resigned from the Māori Party following internal disagreement 
with his caucus colleagues, Harawira achieved his aim of winning a mandate 
from Te Tai Tokerau for his new Mana movement. As outlined by John Minto, 
Helen Potter, and Annette Sykes, Mana was quickly formed, managing to set 
itself up as a party organisation and field 21 electorate candidates and a 20-
strong list all within a matter of months. While they targeted voters on both the 
Māori and general rolls, they describe their general electorate campaign as 
‘disappointing’ given that 70% of their 24,000 party votes came from the Māori 
electorates. The authors identify the biggest challenge facing Mana as ‘voter 
confusion’ about whether they represent Māori interests first and foremost or 
whether they are a straight left-wing party representing ‘the 99%’ (they are the 
latter). 
The fragmentation of Māori politics is picked up further by Morgan 
Godfery. He explains why the tino rangatiratanga movement finally splintered 
in 2011 into two class-based factions – the existing Māori Party (relatively 
conservative and responsive mainly to the interests of iwi leaders) and the new 
Mana movement (radical and [state] socialist, responsive to the working class 
base). While the split had been brought to a head by internal conflict within the 
Māori Party over difficult policy decisions it faced in government (a recurring 
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refrain in the book is that small parties in government almost inevitably lose 
votes – what Chris Simmons calls ‘the death zone of New Zealand politics’), 
Godfery locates the origins of the split in the treaty settlements process that has 
created a Māori managerial elite appointed to manage iwi assets along private 
sector lines.  
Maria Bargh contributes a chapter on political engagement among Māori 
living in Australia, based on data from an online survey. Most of her 
respondents did not keep abreast of New Zealand politics, didn’t know how to 
vote from Australia, and were not aware of the referendum on the electoral 
system. As many were not Australian citizens, they were effectively doubly 
disenfranchised. In New Zealand, Bargh finds turnout was lower (and informal 
voting higher) in the Māori electorates than in the general electorates. 
The fourth section of the book examines the referendum from various 
perspectives. Sandra Grey and Matthew Fitzsimons (leaders of the Campaign 
for MMP) provide the pro-MMP perspective. They set the 2011 referendum in 
historical context, pointing out that while the 1992 referendum had its origins in 
citizens’ dissatisfaction and lack of trust in the electoral system in the 1970s and 
1980s, there was no such impetus for change in 2011 (though reservations about 
aspects of MMP had long been rife). Their success in the referendum was aided 
by a generally supportive media and the lack of an effective anti-MMP 
opposition, represented in the book by Jordan Williams (spokesperson for the 
Vote for Change campaign). Williams attributes their defeat to the inclusion of 
a review of MMP in the referendum legislation (an insertion which favoured the 
status quo); the timing of the referendum concurrently with the election (the 
latter overshadowing the former and precluding National from criticising the 
instability of MMP when they wished to promote their record of stable 
government); and National’s lack of engagement (while some of their MPs 
wanted to dump MMP, the party as a whole chose not to take a position for fear 
that doing so would be viewed by voters as meddling).  
Therese Arseneau and Nigel Roberts spell out exactly what the Electoral 
Act 1993 and the Electoral Referendum Act 2010 legislated for and how the 
Electoral Commission informed the public through its comprehensive education 
campaign and innovative ‘referendum toolkit’ website. Such a campaign was 
important because previous research has found that while a majority of New 
Zealanders support the principle of proportionality, there is a low level of 
understanding of the connection between electoral systems and proportionality 
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(Vowles, Karp, Banducci, & Aimer, 2002). The referendum results are broken 
down by electorate, revealing that the 14 electorates which ‘voted for change’ 
were all held by National MPs and that the Māori electorates showed higher 
support for MMP than the general electorates. The authors also find that the 
high rate of informal voting in Part B of the referendum was partly attributable 
to suggestions by both the pro- and anti-MMP lobbies that voters should abstain 
in Part B or that it was only applicable to those who wanted change. Of those 
wanting change, first-past-the-post was the most popular choice, followed by 
supplementary member despite receiving late endorsement by Vote for Change 
and the prime minister.  
Since the book was published, the Electoral Commission has completed 
its independent review of MMP. Its recommendations, which included lowering 
the party vote threshold to 4% and abolishing the ‘coat-tails rule’ and overhang 
seats, were submitted to the Minister of Justice in November 2012. In May 
2013, the Minister announced that the proposed changes could not be adopted 
because of a lack of political consensus. Critics claimed the government’s 
disregard of the review was undemocratic, that they made little attempt to seek a 
consensus, and that they were acting largely out of self-interest given that the 
recommendations were likely to limit their coalition options in 2014 had they 
been implemented (Shuttleworth, 2013). 
The book concludes with a chapter by Johansson and Levine which 
returns to the topic of leadership with a look ahead to a new generation of party 
leaders and some of the critical political issues they are likely to face in 2014 
such as rising levels of social inequality. In a post-election column, Jane Clifton 
declared that ‘the punch-line to this election is that National has probably 
already lost the 2014 election’, citing the bleak prospects for National’s 
coalition partners with whom its parliamentary majority is already slender 
(Clifton, 2011). Yet, at the time of writing, Pundit’s poll-of-polls shows 
National retains their commanding lead over Labour and is making overtures to 
the rising Conservative Party. However, they have not polled over 50% since 
prior to the 2011 election and Labour’s support has shown a steady upward 
trend since then (Pundit, 2013). The stage is set for a very close 2014 election.  
Five appendices contain the confidence and supply agreements with 
ACT, United Future, and the Māori Party, as well as a list of MPs in the fiftieth 
Parliament and the composition of the Government. As with preceding books 
since 2002, the 2011 book comes with a DVD containing recordings of leaders’ 
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opening television addresses, party and referendum advertisements, leaders’ 
debates, campaign footage and election night coverage, and photos of party 
billboards. It also contains party manifestos and written material prepared by the 
Electoral Commission for parties and the media. This amounts to a wealth of 
useful information for the interested reader and has been conveniently compiled 
on one easy-to-navigate DVD, providing a good feel for the tone of the 
campaign and a chronicle of its more theatrical moments. 
The empirical analysis featured in the book is mostly fit-for-purpose 
small-scale content and textual analysis. Missing from the book is any robust 
individual-level survey data. Previous books in the series have contained 
chapters by Levine and Roberts examining voting behaviour based on the 
results of their nationwide pre-election surveys, which have provided data on 
party identification, voting choices, gender differences in voting, and voters’ 
most salient political issues. Presumably this survey could not be conducted for 
the 2011 election. Individual-level data with large sample sizes can uncover the 
gross vote movements that lie beneath the net swings between parties presented 
in aggregate data, and can take into account a range of variables such as socio-
demographics and political opinions which are known to affect turnout and 
voting choice in New Zealand. The absence of this methodology makes it 
difficult for the book’s contributors to make any reliable generalisations or firm 
casual or explanatory statements about why electors voted the way they did. For 
example, it is claimed that Key ‘had won, for himself and his party, a second 
term, once again being, through his own personality, the ‘key to victory’…’ (p. 
51). But it is not clear what evidence there is that a plurality of voters supported 
National because of Key’s leadership. What role did policy differences play in 
voters’ preferences? To what extent did National voters support the party’s 
mixed-ownership programme? Was the 2011 election a repeat of the 2008 
election at which National had ‘little or no positional advantage’ over Labour 
but managed to prevail ‘predominantly on valence issues’? (Vowles, 2010a, p. 
379). Without multidimensional post-election survey data, it is near impossible 
to test hypotheses related to these questions and to unpick the independent 
contribution made by policies, personalities, performances, partisanship, and 
social structural effects to voters’ idiosyncratic decisions.  
One of the key features of the 2011 election was the record-low turnout 
(under universal suffrage). Official turnout was 74%, the lowest since 1887, and 
voting-age population turnout was estimated at 68%, which continued a long-
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standing and fairly consistent downward trend (Vowles, 2012). One might 
therefore have expected a separate chapter devoted solely to this imperative 
issue. It is briefly touched upon in chapter 1 and the epilogue, and by Grant 
Robertson who bemoans the level of non-voting as ‘a fundamental problem 
with our political system,’ which hurt Labour in particular because ‘where the 
turnout was the worst, Labour was affected more than other parties.’ Only 
Robertson’s comments express the level of trepidation befitting its import, but 
even his comments are necessarily concise. Post-election survey data collected 
by Colmar Brunton on behalf of the Electoral Commission provides information 
on the reasons why non-voters didn’t vote in 2011 (and in 2008, 2005, and 
2002). The most common reasons were that they had work or other 
commitments, they couldn’t be bothered, or they couldn’t work out who to vote 
for. A lack of trust in politicians, a feeling the election was a foregone 
conclusion, and having little interest in politics generally, were the main factors 
influencing decisions to abstain (Electoral Commission, 2012). These findings 
highlight significant informational and motivational barriers to voting. For 
example, the perception of a predictable win for National reveals ‘a lack of 
understanding of MMP, since polling indicated a combination of the centre-left 
parties would make it a closer contest than the old National vs Labour first-past-
the-post mindset indicated’ (The New Zealand Listener, 2011). Had the election 
been more widely recognised as a competitive contest between potential centre-
left and centre-right coalitions, there is good reason to believe turnout would 
have increased because evidence shows close elections in New Zealand are 
associated with higher turnout, especially among younger people (Vowles, 
2002, 2006, 2010b). However, many New Zealanders lack knowledge and 
understanding of MMP and have low levels of political literacy, which is 
associated with non-voting (Vowles, 2012). Declining political participation has 
significant implications for the legitimacy of New Zealand’s democracy and 
should be widely discussed in the public arena, but doesn’t receive the 
prominence it deserves in Kicking the Tyres. Nevertheless, as a documentary 
record of New Zealand’s 2011 election and referendum, the book is a valuable 
historical resource packed with insights and ideas for future research.  
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Gershon, Ilana (2012) No Family is an Island. Cultural Expertise 
among Samoans in Diaspora Ithaca: Cornell University Press    
 
Reviewed by Cluny Macpherson 
Ilana Gershon is a social anthropologist who carried out fieldwork in Samoan 
enclaves in Auckland and in California between 1996 and 1998.  Her objective 
was to establish how migrant Samoans, define, distinguish between and relate to 
two ‘social orders’ in which they find themselves inextricably connected: the 
‘cultural’, and its classificatory opposite the ‘acultural’.  She concludes, from 
her fieldwork, that Samoans are clear, and could be quite explicit, about what is 
‘cultural’ while they were much less explicit about what is ‘acultural’ which 
means that the latter remains, in effect, a residual category containing 
everything that is not ‘cultural’.  The challenge for Samoans in the diaspora 
comes, she contends, from needing to interact simultaneously in the two social 
orders and to make sense of the systems’ contradictions in order to manage 
them effectively.  In any given context she argues, ‘people’s own reflexive 
engagement with their contexts is a crucial component for how and why interact 
in the ways they do’ (p.7).  
          This leads, in turn, to the central argument in the book which is that, ‘The 
relationship between reflexivity and social orders is a dialogic one. People can 
have different reflexive, or analytical engagements, with social orders while 
social orders also require that people have particular reflexivities. As a 
corollary, not all reflexivities are the same: the kind of reflexive social 
engagement required by a government bureaucracy is different from the kind of 
reflexive social engagement required by Samoan social order...’ (pp.7-8)   The 
ways in which these social orders confront each other in life in the diaspora, and 
the ways in which Samoans engage with them, are explored in three chapters 
which focus on different contexts: the Samoan ritual exchanges or fa’alavelave;   
conversions between different religious denominations and interactions between 
Samoan migrants and government officials. (p.14)  She notes that ‘culture’ is 
invoked in different ways in each of these contexts and that Samoans are 
constantly negotiating and redefining what is ‘cultural’ and ‘acultural’ 
respectively, which captures accurately the fluidity of Samoan migrant world.  
This framework also recognises Samoans ability to recognise non-Samoans’ 
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definitions and perceptions of ‘Samoan culture’ and to present ‘Samoan culture’ 
to these audiences in forms which are calculated to obtain successful outcomes.   
          The book has three principal sections which explore different dimensions 
of this ‘cultural’ ‘acultural’ divide. The first deals with relationships between 
Samoans and within the Samoan social world. It argues amongst other things 
that participation in the ‘cultural’ which is underpinned by a kin-based, 
communitarian  ideology requires people to ignore the parallel ‘acultural’  
which is underpinned by an individualistic, capitalist ideology. This conflict 
between the two leads to strategies which allow people to manage the 
contradictions while participating in both simultaneously. The argument hinges 
on a strategy which is that, during fa’alavelave, people demand resources from 
others without, apparently, any knowledge or awareness of their income and 
ability to contribute.  This for me is highly problematical because it 
misunderstands the logic which operates in these circumstances and over-
emphasises the gap between levels of support sought from individuals and their 
personal income and presents this gap as a source of tension. It is a peculiarly 
western way of thinking about and presenting the issue. 
          The contributions sought of family members in these situations is based 
not solely on personal income, which is a private good,  but on their ability to 
leverage their reputation and relationships to secure additional resources from 
friends, workmates and micro-credit clubs. It also commits those who secure 
this ‘credit’ from friends and workmates to register this debt and the obligation 
to ‘repay’ it at some future time. This means that at any given time people may 
have a personal income with which they are required to meet the expenses of 
the ‘acultural’ and ‘cultural’ and another set of ‘latent’ assets and liabilities 
which arise from the ‘cultural’ sphere. Many Samoans, use and are very 
comfortable with a set of undocumented and highly flexible arrangements 
which give them instant access to ‘credit’ for as long as they continue to 
recognise and discharge their obligations to others. It may be that some young 
New Zealand-raised Samoans to whom the author spoke may aspire to a more 
privatised relationship found this problematical, but this may have more to do 
with the ways they prioritise the ‘cultural’ and the ‘acultural’ spheres rather than 
the nature of the ‘cultural’. 
          The discussion of the ways in which Samoan migrants may change 
religious denominations to replace the high resource demands of ‘traditional’ 
mainline Samoan churches with lower demands of ‘modern’ churches is 
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accurate as far as it goes and captures part of the motivation for moves.  It does 
indeed reflect the availability of a larger range of available denominational 
options, but this is not confined to the migrant enclave and is occurring in the 
same way in Samoa albeit between a smaller range of options. This trend is 
reflected in the movement of Samoans in New Zealand to tithing denominations 
such as the SDA, LDS and evangelical fellowships which effectively limit 
demands on members, but it is more than relative resource demands which drive 
this movement. The ‘modern’ churches are also organised in different ways 
which offer younger people more influence over governance, leadership, and 
religious form roles earlier than the more gerontocratic traditional churches 
which marginalise younger members.  
          The final section, on the ways in which Samoans confront bureaucracy 
over matters of ‘culture’, is very good and points to the value of comparative 
sociology. It discusses the ways in which Samoans in New Zealand and 
California respectively present ‘cultural’ issues to non-Samoan or ‘acultural’ 
bureaucracies from which they require various forms of support and service. 
This section makes the important point that bureaucracies differ in the ways 
they define Samoan ‘culture’ which reflect national histories and discourses 
about ethnic minorities and their rights. It then makes another important point 
which is that Samoans in these circumstances recognise the need to distil, 
condense and present ‘Samoan culture’ in ways which are consonant with 
expectations and definitions of non-Samoans or the ‘acultural’ bureaucracy. The 
cases discussed reflect the ways in which the dialogic relationship between 
‘acultural’ and the ‘cultural’ and the ways in which the acultural ‘environment’ 
defines the ‘content’ of the cultural in certain circumstances. It also points to the 
fact that these encounters lead only to temporary, instrumental, 
accommodations in the content of ‘culture’ which are applied only in these 
circumstances.  
          The book contains some interesting ethnography, data and some insights 
into Samoan culture in migrant enclaves. It has certain problems as a book 
which is that much of the material has been published elsewhere as articles with 
different emphases for different audiences. The author has made a serious 
attempt to integrate these by providing some linking themes but this does not 
always work and the reader is required to make some of the linkages. The 
‘acultural’, for instance, is glossed in different ways and has different meanings 
in the various sections which poses challenges for the reader who has to 
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reconcile these. While the argument and the conclusions deserve a close read, 
the data on which these are based are now some 15-17 years old and, given the 
speed of cultural change in migrant enclaves, this may limit the contemporary 
relevance of some, though not all, of  its conclusions.  
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John Pratt and Anna Eriksson (2013) Contrasts in punishment: An 
explanation of Anglophone excess and Nordic exceptionalism. 
London: Routledge 
 
Reviewed by Ronald Kramer 
 
In Contrasts in Punishment, Pratt and Eriksson seek to explain how different 
modes of responding to those who engage in criminalised behaviours emerge 
and vary over time. The book pursues the problem of divergent punishment 
regimes through an historical-comparative analysis between three Nordic 
countries (Norway, Sweden and Finland) and three Anglophone countries 
(England, Australia and New Zealand) throughout modernity. 
 The first chapter utilises fieldwork and extant statistics to explicate the 
different punishment regimes in place. The fieldwork aspect is especially 
noteworthy for its ethnographic dimensions, which see Pratt and Eriksson visit 
over 40 prisons, during which time they talk to various public officials and 
create an interesting photographic account of the prisons visited. Nordic 
countries reveal significantly lower rates of imprisonment, better prison 
conditions, professional and courteous prison staff, better prison diets and rules, 
a retention of educational and work programs, and less of a polarity between 
prison and outside life.  
 Pratt and Eriksson continue to draw from rich fieldwork and extensive 
document analysis to support the notion that “constellations of social forces” 
produce important “cultural differences” that then shape state policies and 
practices, levels of social cohesion, and penal regimes. To be sure, social forces, 
cultural values, social relations and the state are understood as mutually 
reinforcing elements, thereby complicating any simple causal logic. However, it 
remains the case that these macro social forces work in complicated ways to 
shape the types of punishment regimes that emerge in the different regions 
under scrutiny. 
 Under the rubric of “constellation of social forces,” Pratt and Eriksson 
locate class relations, the degree of homogeneity within a society, understanding 
of education, and the function of the state. In the Nordic countries, it is 
suggested that independent farming was predominant in the early modern 
period, which promoted solidarity. The Nordic countries are also characterised 
by a high degree of homogeneity in terms of ethnicity and religious beliefs. 
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Much like economic independence, the dominance of Lutheranism is held to 
promote strong social bonds. Moreover, Lutheranism promoted the valuing of 
education, rational decision-making, and the notion that the role of the state was 
to support society’s members through active participation in economic and 
social affairs. 
 All of this stands in stark contrast to the Anglophone countries. Here, free 
labour and industrialisation quickly came to dominate the economy and 
generate their accompanying social schisms. There were religious tensions 
between Protestants and Catholics, leading to further social divides. Education 
was more often than not geared towards reproducing distinction and instilling 
discipline, or governed by pragmatic concerns that fostered the well-known 
anti-intellectual streak of the Anglophone world. The state was to play a 
minimal role and abstain from intervening in the lives of individuals, who were 
construed as responsible for their own affairs. The notion of individual 
responsibility had as its corollary the belief that state welfare fostered 
dependency. 
 These different social forces produced two cultural value orientations: In 
the Nordic countries, priority was given to egalitarianism, moderation, and 
social inclusion; in the Anglophone countries, individualism, personal 
advancement, division and exclusion were understood as desirable maxims to 
guide social life. 
In many important respects, these competing value orientations undergird 
the formation of states. Pratt and Eriksson rely on four criteria to demonstrate 
different modes of state crafting. They focus on less eligibility, issues of 
security, images of the state, and population policies. Not surprisingly, the 
argument here largely follows from the differences identified in relation to 
social forces and cultural values. In the Nordic countries, the principle of less 
eligibility is rejected and the presence of poverty is understood as a failure of 
the state. Further, the state is understood as a “saviour,” entrusted to ensure the 
security and wellbeing of its members. This image of the state is so entrenched 
that political parties cannot stray too far from it and remain in power. Finally, 
welfare is understood as necessary to improve the basic living conditions of all 
of society’s members and ensure the nation’s reproduction. 
In contrast, the Anglophone countries accept less eligibility, construing 
poverty as a failure of one’s private morality that deserves punishment. There is 
opposition to “state planning” and the state is understood as an “enemy”; the 
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success of any given political party depends on its ability to portray itself as 
promoting free-markets, individualism and circumscribed state activity. 
With these fundamental divergences illustrated, Pratt and Eriksson can 
turn to the problem of punishment regimes. They start with the notion that 
modes of punishment possess a moral function, but also recognise that this 
function will vary according to the level of social stability and cohesion. In the 
Nordic regions, there are high levels of social cohesion and so punishment seeks 
to reintegrate individuals who have strayed from the flock by violating the law. 
By way of contrast, weak levels of cohesion and solidarity mark the 
Anglophone countries. In such contexts, the state attempts to utilise punishment 
as a strategy to create group cohesion by further excluding law-breakers, 
thereby attempting to reassure anxious and insecure communities. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 unpack the ways in which different cultural 
orientations and significant moments in penal history have shaped modes of 
punishment. The chapters follow a rough chronological order: The fourth 
chapter explores the 1850-1900 period; chapter 5 looks at the 1890-1970 period; 
and chapter 6 considers trends since the late 1960s. 
In the fourth chapter, Pratt and Eriksson focus on the relationship 
between cultural orientations, degrees of social stability, and the introduction of 
modern penal arrangements by considering the plight of the death penalty, 
crowd behaviour, and imprisonment. The findings here are consistent with the 
differences identified in cultural values and the proposed functions of 
punishment. Under the influence of the enlightenment philosophers, the death 
penalty was abandoned much earlier in the Nordic countries and prison was 
regarded as a place to reform prisoners. When public executions did occur, 
Nordic crowds were silent and sorrowful as they understood the ceremony as 
one in which a fellow citizen was being lost. The Anglophone countries were 
much slower in eradicating the death penalty and, consistent with the principle 
of less eligibility, prisons were often construed as places in which suffering 
should transpire. The moderate and restrained nature of punishment in the 
Nordic regions is held to be consistent with a society that is cohesive and 
therefore not in need of punishments that intimidate and threaten those deemed 
to be “outsiders.” 
Chapter 5 focuses on the 1890 through to 1970 time period to 
demonstrate how the emergence of “human science discourses,” or the “welfare 
sanction,” interacted with different cultural orientations. The basic story here is 
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that the “human science discourses,” overwhelmingly concerned with 
normalising rather than punishing deviance, were much more consistent with 
basic Nordic values and therefore effectively embraced and put into practice. In 
the Anglophone countries, the ideas of reform and normalisation did appear on 
the scene, and they did meet with some success, which is evident in the 
relatively low rates of imprisonment during the 1950s. However, within the 
broader Anglophone cultural worldview, which emphasised individual 
responsibility, mistrust of the state, and so on, discourses of reform and 
normalization were ultimately a “counter-culture” of sorts. While they gained 
some traction, this was short lived as they quickly came to be regarded as 
ineffectual and, more importantly, too lenient or “soft” on criminals. 
The book closes with an exploration of the period since the late 1960s. As 
is well known, this period is marked by profound economic and social 
restructuring throughout much of the globe. While neoliberalism was certainly a 
force in the Nordic and Anglophone countries, Pratt and Eriksson demonstrate 
that although it did alter penal policy in the former, it was not powerful enough 
to undermine the cultural emphasis on inclusion and social relations marked by 
high levels of cohesion and solidarity. On the other hand, the Anglophone 
world, already divided, saw its pronounced social inequalities exacerbated 
under neoliberalism. In such a context, punishment became harsher and more 
exclusionary, a notion confirmed by the steady increase in imprisonment rates 
in England, Australia, and New Zealand. 
While much of this analysis is commendable, there are some themes 
within the text that seem to require further exploration. To be sure, that the text 
suggests avenues for further research should be understood as another sign of its 
richness. 
While the comparisons across countries are detailed and intricate, some 
of these may be a little misleading, and generate a rather romantic view of 
Nordic punishment regimes. While the significance of racial homogeneity is 
often acknowledged in the Nordic countries, it does not structure the 
comparisons between regions. This leads to comparisons in which relatively 
homogenous ethnic regions are compared to multicultural regions. From this 
perspective, future research could focus on how privileged and middle class 
whites that become entangled in Anglophone criminal justice systems are 
treated. If the treatment of such social groups more closely approximates Nordic 
exceptionalism, then the theoretical explanation offered for contrasting modes 
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of punishment may need to give more emphasis to racial discrimination and 
how it shapes punishment regimes. 
Even if the idea of Nordic exceptionalism is accepted, and there are good 
reasons for doing so, it seems that when pushed to its logical limits the notion 
suggests one can expect to find a Durkheimian state of fatalism. Although only 
noted as a possibility to round out his theoretical understanding of problems that 
societies confront, Durkheim understood fatalism as a condition in which the 
social norms that regulate society’s members are found to be too constraining 
and overbearing. It seems somewhat remarkable that the Nordic countries do 
not appear to experience this problem given the account given of them. Not only 
would the approach offered by Pratt and Eriksson be strengthened if it were to 
explore and demonstrate how Nordic countries successfully guard against 
devolving into fatalistic conditions, but this would also be of great interest to 
sociologists and criminologists interested in the problems that surround 
punishment. 
One final possibility concerning future research: Much of this particular 
work is grounded in documents that come from literary figures, critics, and 
government reports. While this is certainly an important source for 
reconstructing the history of divergent punishment regimes, it seems that the 
perspective of prisoners is relatively minimalised. This is an understandable 
omission given the difficulty of gaining access to prisoners in six different 
countries. Nevertheless, future research would benefit by seeking out the 
perspective of prisoners to see if their accounts corroborate the notion that some 
punishment regimes are more inclusionary than exclusionary. 
Despite these possible gaps, Contrasts in Punishment is a great book. It is 
concise, yet dense. The authors do a terrific job of weaving a large amount of 
empirical material into the overarching theoretical frame in a way that generates 
a fresh and interesting perspective. Its nuanced and non-reductionist framework 
strikes a delicate balance between economic forces, social cohesion, the role of 
the state, cultural forces, and major trends in punishment. All this makes it a 
worthy addition to any academic library. It will certainly be important reading 
for those interested in understanding punishment regimes in our contemporary 
world, how they vary, and ultimately how they can be organised in different 
ways. It is also a book that should be read closely by anyone who is concerned 
with the operation of criminal justice systems more broadly conceived. 
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Peter Robinson (2013) Gay Men’s Relationships Across the Life 
Course, Foreword by The Hon. Michael Kirby, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, UK. 202 + xvi pages 
 
Reviewed by Timothy Marjoribanks 
 
In the twenty-first century, and continuing long standing trends, understandings 
of human experience, behaviour, relationships and action are increasingly 
framed and shaped by medical and health science discourses, whether that be 
from medicine itself, or from other disciplines such as psychology, genetics and 
neuroscience. Similarly, disciplines such as economics also lay claim to 
providing significant insights into human motivations. While such disciplines 
provide important insights into human behaviour, and dominate much public 
debate in these areas, they can also be limited by downplaying or ignoring the 
significance of social structures and societal contexts, and by also downplaying 
the ways in which the actions of individuals and of groups are both enabled and 
constrained by such structures and contexts. In this regard, with its central 
engagement with the social, sociology has a vital role to play in contributing to 
our understandings of the intersection of human action and social contexts. One 
way in which it can do this is through providing theoretically informed and 
empirically grounded insights into human action, relationships and experience. 
In his book, Gay Men’s Relationships Across the Life Course, Peter Robinson, 
Lecturer in Sociology at Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, 
Australia, has done just that, providing a valuable sociological contribution to a 
crucial set of debates around the life experiences and relationships of gay men. 
         The book is organised around nine chapters, including an introduction and 
conclusion. In addition to a chapter setting out the research approach, six results 
focused chapters are organised around different aspects of the life course, 
including by name, single men, long-lasting relationships, fatherhood, marriage, 
co-habitation, and living in the midst of HIV-AIDS.  
        In setting the foundations for the empirical heart of the book, the author 
engages critically with four theoretically informed assumptions that provide an 
overall framework for his analysis (page 4). These are, first, that there is a 
connection between sexual preference and sexual identity that underpins the 
existence of a ‘gay world’; second, generation is a contested but important 
sociological concept; third, the self is narratively constituted; and fourth, age 
and ageing are socially constructed. Bringing these four dimensions together, 
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Robinson is making an argument for the importance of considering experiences 
and relationships over the life course as being actively negotiated and contested 
by individuals inhabiting particular worlds, and for a social constructivist 
approach both to understanding people’s relationships and to the creation of 
knowledge about their lives. 
         Having established an analytic foundation for his research, the empirical 
data for the book is constituted by 97 life story interviews that the author 
conducted in 2009-2011 with gay men in nine major cities, namely Auckland, 
Hong Kong, London, Los Angeles, Manchester, Melbourne, Mumbai, New 
York, and Sydney. In addition, the author also revisits data that he collected in 
Australia in 2001-2003 for his PhD, namely interviews with 80 gay men. This 
data, and Robinson’s analysis of it, are a real highlight of the book. 
         Among the many important contributions of Robinson’s book, here I focus 
on three. First, the book makes a significant contribution to the existing 
literature by giving voice to gay men from a range of different social locations 
and contexts, and at different stages of the life course. Through his analysis of 
his data, Robinson is able to provide many important insights into the lives of 
gay men, often challenging dominant understandings of those lives. For 
example, his participants reveal that a single life is not a lonely life, and also 
that, contrary to dominant myths, gay men develop and maintain strong and 
mutually beneficial friendships (chapter 2; and page 166). Importantly, 
Robinson is also able to show how gay men have developed a range of 
strategies to develop such relationships in a world that is frequently hostile to 
them. As another example, Robinson’s analysis of fatherhood settings and 
stories reveals both that gay fatherhood is connected to heteronormativity 
because of the settings in which many gay men become fathers, but also that 
within this context there are a wide variety of fatherhood experiences, including 
very close relations, regular contact, distant relations, and no contact. As 
Robinson shows, while there are still very powerful societal practices and norms 
that associate parenthood with heterosexual relations, ‘the growing number of 
successful non-heterosexual fatherhood experiences are opening up all sorts of 
gay fatherhood possibilities that were not available to previous generations of 
gay men’ (page 99). These are just two examples of the insights that the reader 
is rewarded with in reading the rich data presented and analysed in Robinson’s 
book. 
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        Second, Robinson’s book shows the value of sustained in-depth qualitative 
engagement as a means of providing important insights into people’s lives, and 
also of providing insights into how they negotiate the different stages of their 
life course. One of the highlights of the book is Robinson’s reflections on his 
research process (chapter one), identifying both the contributions of his work 
and also some of the challenges. As he candidly notes, some aspects of the 
qualitative research process are difficult to engage with, including being able to 
frequent clubs and bars late at night and into the early morning. Robinson also 
provides well informed insights into a range of qualitative research challenges 
that will reward the reader considering undertaking similar fieldwork, including 
the challenges of organising interviews across national borders, navigating the 
landscape of unfamiliar cities, and working with electronic media. He also 
stresses the importance where possible of gaining the assistance of a local 
contact person, and the critical significance of pre-planning. The rich data that 
Robinson has collected, often on very sensitive personal issues, shows the 
relevance and success of his approach. 
          Third, the book reveals the significant contribution that sociology as a 
discipline can make to understanding the variety of relationships that people 
build over their life course. A key point that the author makes through the book 
is to show ‘how alike gay men are to the rest of the population-how alike we are 
in how we manage our friendships and relationships, and yet how distinctive 
and unique the experimental relationships and families we create can be’ (page 
169). At the same time, Robinson’s book also shows how it is important to 
understand those lives as being essentially social, in particular ‘in emphasising 
how their lives have been and are socially constructed in response to varying 
degrees of social tolerance, and how gay men have shaped their relationships 
either by conforming to dominant, heterosexual patterns or by shaping them 
through experimentation to suit their own needs’ (page 169). Through making 
such points grounded in data, Robinson also reveals the need for further critical 
engagement with some of the key sociological theoretical issues of the current 
period, including debates around individualisation and its consequences. Such 
insights show the contribution that sociology can make to understanding human 
behaviour and relationships, in a period in which such understandings are 
frequently dominated by other academic disciplines. 
         While the book has many strengths, there are two areas where I would like 
to have seen the author develop his analysis further. First, while the book 
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contributes to a range of theoretical issues and debates, these could have been 
brought together more fully in the conclusion to emphasise the theoretical 
implications of the research. In particular, Robinson’s research has important 
contributions to make to debates both around generations and age, and around 
the intersections of sexual identity and gay worlds. The theoretical implications 
of these factors could have been more fully developed. Second, while the author 
is clear that location and place are not central to his analysis (page 35), more 
could have been done in producing a more fully developed comparative 
analysis, in particular given the excellence of the data collected from nine 
different cities. These are two areas that the analysis begins to develop, that 
could perhaps be sites for further research. 
        This is an important book, that will be of interest to sociologists and other 
researchers interested in understanding gay men’s relationships across the life 
course in particular, but also in understanding relationship formation and 
maintenance processes over the life course more generally. The book is written 
in a clear, thoughtful and accessible style, meaning that it will be of interest to 
students at all levels as well as to academic readers. The timely nature of the 
topic of the book means that it will also be of interest and relevance to a broader 
audience than a purely academic readership. When combined with his earlier 
book, The Changing World of Gay Men (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and 
New York, 2008), which won The Australian Sociological Association’s 
Inaugural Raewyn Connell Prize in 2010, awarded biennially to the best 
authored first monograph by an author within the discipline of sociology, it is 
clear that Peter Robinson is making an important and sustained contribution to 
sociological understandings of the worlds of gay men.  
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Cris Shore and Susanna Trnka (eds.) (2013) Up Close and  
Personal: on peripheral perspectives and the production of 
anthropological knowledge. NY & Oxford: Berghahn 
 
Reviewed by Charles Crothers 
 
As the editors proclaim (p. ix) “..the volume offers ..12 highly personal yet 
structured accounts of anthropologists as authors and practitioners, their key 
discoveries, what attracted them to anthropology, how they have helped to 
shape the discipline and in turn how the discipline has shaped their works and 
lives”.  The criteria for the selection of these 12 is unclear but definitely 
represent an antipodean emphasis within the broader context of British social 
anthropology (cf. the US version more usually referred to as cultural 
anthropology).  There seems to be a research design ... “Our aim was to explore 
the extent to which the discipline of social anthropology in two post-colonial 
settler societies (Australia and New Zealand) differs from its counterparts in 
Britain’s mainstream metro centres” (p.4). 
         The volume’s main contribution to the history of New Zealand social 
science is extensive biographical treatment of two of our leading and very 
highly honoured contemporary social scientists: Anne Salmond and Joan Metge, 
with 2 other cases (Jackson and Cowlishaw) being NZ-born although mainly 
pursuing their anthropology elsewhere (Africa and Australia respectively).   
          Some interviews were in Auckland although the text is vague re their 
timing. The participants were interviewed in a semi-structured manner (with 
interesting questions being posed including ‘aha moments’, memorable 
experiences etc. Although a ‘warts and all’ frame is asked for at best the 
accounts (as with almost all published biographies) provide a cleaned up 
version of personal histories and only embarrassments and minor indiscretions 
are mentioned, while the cut and thrust of academic politics or wider constraints 
are suppressed.   
          The accomplishments of the two New Zealand anthropologists are 
portrayed as, “Metge has focused particularly on cross-cultural communication 
and the difficulties that arise when cultures ‘talk past each other’, Salmond’s 
originality has been to look at history from an ethnographic perspective” (p. 20) 
- for instance her rereading of texts concerning Captain Cook. These two 
constitute a slightly odd pair in relation to more orthodox anthropological 
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intellectual trajectories: Salmond is not a fieldwork anthropologist while Metge 
is an excellent example of Anglo-Saxon empiricism. Both, though could be seen 
as ‘Public intellectuals’, contributing to Māori/Pākehā relations through their 
work, which is highly accessible to wider audiences. Moreover, Metge’s post-
retirement career includes an applied aspect in relation to Treaty claims. 
Because they have been so focused on Māori subject-matter neither Salmond 
nor Metge provide much interaction with the broader discipline, although the 
former engaged in some cross-national debates (not dealt with here).  
          Some of these two contributor’s accounts thicken the portrait of changing 
New Zealand anthropology.  Salmond (p. 59) points out that in the mid-1960s 
Anthropology at the University of Auckland was a very exciting field, hosting 
several Pacific experts.  Metge points out that understandable resistance by 
many Māori to anthropological work means that regretfully “.. there are so few 
Pākehā anthropologists working in the Māori field today” (p.89) although a few 
well-entrenched anthropological elders such as herself were able to continue 
their work. She sees tensions as lessening although lingering and she welcomes 
Māori anthropologists. 
          Beyond the provision of useful biographical offerings the volume 
includes a wider effort by the editors to frame these biographies within wider 
contexts. Several different attempts at stating their aims are made...perhaps best 
represented in the four questions: 
‐ what is it that distinguishes anthropology as a professional practise 
and as a way of seeing and knowing the world? 
‐ how has the discipline changed in the past 40 years, and does the 
geographical location of its practitioners affect the ways 
anthropology is practised? 
‐ what are the most exciting innovations and directions that are 
reshaping anthrop to date and where have these ideas come from? 
‐ how do anthropologists engage with the urgent problems facing 
societies around the world and how do they understand that 
engagement? 
The perspective adopted is first sketch as “anthropologists are experts at 
studying cultural ‘others’ and, in the process elucidating aspects of their own 
society” (p.1). Some pages later learning about the wider human condition is 
added (p.14). Contributions to anthropology are seen as being shaped partly by 
changing approaches in the discipline and partly as a result of fieldwork (and 
other) interactions with changing social circumstances.  
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         Some grounded comparisons are built on the case subjects (albeit limited 
by such a small selection, and to such elite practitioners). Several routes into 
anthropology are uncovered all suffuse with accident - early cultural 
experiences with cultural others allowing escape, curiosity etc. were common. 
For New Zealand anthropologists several were raised in small town settings 
which perhaps allowed better access to the exotic others living in Māori 
enclaves. Those from metropolitan centres were particularly embedded in very 
cosmopolitan contexts. Charismatic or at least inspirational teachers also could 
also be important in providing turning-points. Social concerns or more broadly 
Christian ethics were also important in impelling an anthropological interest for 
several. Both contributors and editors are silent on social class but it is 
interesting that most seemed to come from reasonably well-off and/or well-
educated backgrounds so that the apparent ‘luxury ‘of an anthological interest 
was less class-inappropriate. 
         Generational patterns of influences are fairly standard but usefully 
summarised (p.14). “For those trained in the 1950s (such as Metge...) the legacy 
of functionalism still hung heavily around the neck of the discipline; those 
trained in the 1960s (including Salmond) found intellectual excitement in a 
number of new theoretical directions from cultural ecology to structuralism. The 
1970s generation .. was particularly influenced by debates are around Marxism, 
feminism and the critique of colonialism, whereas the post-1980 generation .. 
contended with Orientalism, Gramscian and Foucauldian perspectives, post-
modernism, cultural studies and the rise of indigenous activism”. 
          But more of the commentary soars beyond any empirical grounding in the 
cases. A portrait of the antipodean context is provided: 
“..New Zealand and Australia also provide specific contexts in which 
anthropology has developed and they have given rise to several distinctive 
domestic concerns, from debates over postcolonial identities and subjectivities 
and the politics of indigeneity to applied anthropology and questions of 
ownership, appropriation and land rights” (p.5). 
“As well as producing leading scholars, the pacific region has given rise to 
many key concepts and distinctive disciplinary themes, including those of 
political leadership, chiefs and big men; gift exchange and reciprocity; the 
politics of apology and post-colonial reconciliation; indigenous identity and 
rights, cultural genocide and the politics of forced assimilation; and theories of 
adolescence and childhood” (p.4) with Australian anthropologists contributing 
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substantially and especially to application, although extending this applied 
concern New Zealand (p. 24)  is stretching things as here historians have been 
claimed almost all the intellectual running in relation to the Treaty of  Waitangi 
historical processes. 
          “Anthropology in New Zealand had also been the scholarly training 
ground for a number of leading Māori public figures, political and social 
activists, and intellectuals, including Robert Mahuta, Pita Sharples, Sir Hugh 
Kawharu, Ranginui Walker and Pat Hohepa.” Their activity led to various 
indigenous developments. However, the substantial contribution of Māori 
scholars to anthropology itself is completely elided – a lost opportunity -  and 
there is no even a reference to the recently published intellectual biography on 
Ranginui Walker. 
          This portrait is then placed with a broader core/periphery frame. This is 
not well conceptualised with the core apparently being differentiated from the 
periphery in relation to the latter’s non-financially well-endowed universities. In 
Wallerstein’s framework Australia and New Zealand would be included in the 
core or at least semi-periphery. The relations between core and periphery are 
seen as changing over time: today there is more cross-fertilisation because 
increased movement of academic in the ever-more globalised world of 
academia: with the non-New Zealander component in New Zealand university 
anthropology departments being explicitly noted. 
         The role of anthropologists in the periphery is to critique the core. The 
conclusion reflects on “..the wider question of what perspectives from the 
periphery have to offer the discipline” (p. 248). This perspective, it is argued, 
offers insights into: 
‐ The nature of the core countries 
‐ Neoliberal forms of governance 
‐ Postcolonial redress/compensation for historical injustices 
‐ Ownership and repatriation of cultural artefacts. 
The conclusion is rounded out by delineating some crucial challenges for the 
discipline. 
          The conclusion draws on June Nash’s essay on ‘peripheral vision’ which 
advances the metaphor of looking partially past to grasp the local to better 
ascertain the overall pattern: and how core and periphery are interconnected. 
        This highly-discipline-centred argument is undermined by the rather 
obvious point that a variety of other disciplines are also addressing these issues 
and that ignoring wider literatures may condemn anthropologists to repetition of 
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what is well-known. (Presumably this disciplinary myopia follows from the lack 
of substantial disciplinary competition in the study of small-scale societies.) 
Ironically, the silence on neighbouring disciplines is despite the volume 
appearing in a book series dedicated to encouraging debate between disciplines. 
Sociology not mentioned except a couple of times as a caricature of its 
supposedly quantitative nature. However, the term ‘sociological’ is incorrectly 
deployed instead of social (or societal) contextual factors. Indigenous studies 
are barely noted. 
          The editors note the Comaroffs’ argument that the South is in fact leading 
the North in terms of developments, but remain firmly embedded in a core-
centric perspective. The role of the periphery is certainly accorded a more active 
role than in some models but is still firmly placed in a subordinate position.  As 
with many other ‘others’ it exists only in relation to the core: as a platform for 
critical reflection or in hosting studies which examine processes which the core 
forcefully imposed on the periphery in the past (e.g. appropriation of intellectual 
capital & materials). Had the editors attended more carefully to intellectual 
enterprises in the periphery they might have noted the upsurge in indigenous 
studies – both theoretically and across an array of disciplines – which is 
currently providing an upwelling of new thinking and social movement 
engagement. 
          Neoliberalism has a powerful effect of allowing (corporate) capitalists to 
detach their profit-making enterprise from local contexts for which they are no 
longer held to have responsibilities. Neoliberalism extended to knowledge 
production in universities also abdicates local responsibilities, emphasising 
instead ANY knowledge production (especially in forms and perhaps on topics 
which can appeal to the core) produced by any scholars. So, the formerly strong 
New Zealand and Pacific orientated anthropology hosted by New Zealand 
universities is a victim of this process, which in my view at least needs debate 
and probably is to be deplored. The editors fail to see the connection and are 
thereby less reflexive than they claim for their disciplinary perspective. 
 
